

I. Creating Sustainable Relations in Regards to Georgia and the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation continues to offer peaceful mediation between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in order to promote peaceful, diplomatic relations amongst these sovereign states. Russia has shown restraint and has patiently advised for negotiations. Georgia's attempts to invade South Ossetia on 7 August 2008 were unacceptable. A response to provocations by Georgian military in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was necessary in order to ensure the safety of thousands of children, women, and men including Russian peacekeepers and citizens. Russian actions have prevented further destabilization in the Caucasus. Since the Cease-Fire and Separation-of-Forces Agreement signed in Moscow 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583) was voided by Georgian leadership, Georgia's hostile tendencies have become more apparent. A diplomatic resolution is wrongfully delayed since Georgia is enforcing economic sanctions, and restricting freedom of movement to the young nation states. Russia is working to promote security through development. The Russian government has signed treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation. The Russian Finance Ministry has allocated 8.5 billion rubles towards rebuilding housing, social amenities and damaged infrastructure in South Ossetia. The possibility of extending credit to both of the young republics is also being considered. Using peaceful means and dialogue to stabilize friendly neighbor relations is Russia's primary focus. However the Russian Federation will not waiver from its commitment to the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia who now have Russia's formal, irrevocable recognition as sovereign states.

The Russian Federation applauds the actions taken by the Republic of Nicaragua and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in regard to their formal recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia as independent states. Russia urges all member states to recognize the new political realities of the region in order to move forward amicably. Non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian sovereignty stifles trade of basic goods and encourages Georgian aggression. Georgian leadership has declared it illegal to trade with the young states of Transcaucasia. Vessels bound for the Republic of Abkhazia are seized along with their precious cargo by Georgia's coast guard; this makes it increasingly difficult for people to receive the humanitarian aid they need and the freedom of trade they deserve.

According to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every person has the right to freedom of movement as well as the right to leave any country and return to one's own country. Russia seeks to protect refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as thousands of Russian citizens living within the newly formed Transcaucasia states from any acts that may violate Security Council Resolution 1866 (S/RES/1866) adopted on 13 February 2009. As young developing nations, Abkhazia and South Ossetia need the help of the international community and private sector in facilitating the freedom of trade and aiding stable development. In order to reach and sustain peaceful relations in the region the Security Council must work on a legally binding document to insure nonviolence between Georgia and the Republic of South Ossetia as well as Georgia and the Republic of Abkhazia. The Russian Federation stresses the need for an international embargo on weapons, supplies and ammunition to Georgia as the key to sustaining peace and the one indubitable method to prevent further militarization of Georgia.

II. Strengthening the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative

The Russian Federation strongly supports strengthening the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which unites 64 nations with the common goal to eradicate the threat of nuclear terrorism. Efforts to increase the effectiveness of the GICNT should work in tandem with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). There are currently a number of international agreements dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Paragraph 9 of the 1996 Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/51/210) adopted 17 December 1996 created an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate on an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings, and link the

compilation of existing international instruments meant to alleviate the threat of terrorism. The Ad Hoc Committee was charged with the goal of further developing a comprehensive legal framework to establish uniformity within existing conventions against international terrorism. The international community must work together to institutionalize these mechanisms in order to explore their potential. No consensus has been reached on the compendium resolution. Adequate legal frameworks on the national level are necessary to implement the initiatives.

Russia stresses the importance of Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted 28 April 2004 (S/RES/1540) as common ground to advance. The Russian Federation is in support of strengthening the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). As outlined in Article III of the NPT, adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system is imperative in order to alleviate the probability of nuclear proliferation as well as the related risk of nuclear terrorism. Worldwide nuclear security is only as strong as the weakest nuclear site. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is the only legally binding document addressing the physical protection of nuclear material. Unquestionably, adherence to the CPPNM should be universal.

Ratification and institutionalization of the GICNT and PSI is imperative to the shared struggle against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These two initiatives today are merely a grouping of nations without any legal backing. The Russian Federation recognizes the creation of a legal framework applying these mechanisms as a guarantee to consolidate international efforts against nuclear terrorism.

III. Increasing Port Security to Combat Terrorism

The Russian Federation is in strong support of Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373) adopted 28 September 2001, and most notably paragraph 2 (c) and (d) which denies safe haven to terrorist accomplices and supporters. Unprotected ports facilitate freedom of terrorist movement. In accordance with Resolution 1373 paragraph 3 (c) Russia has taken bilateral measures in collaboration with the government of Abkhazia to protect the Abkhaz coastline and ports, as well as regulate the flow of traffic into ports in order to minimize the chance for terrorist activity.

The Russian Federation encourages reinvigorating the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) which was established by Resolution 1535 (S/RES/1535) adopted on 26 March 2004. Russia strongly supports the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288), adopted on 8 September 2006. Russia is pleased with the collaborative organizational efforts of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and recognizes the need for continued coherence throughout all agencies and organizations sharing a counter-terrorism agenda. Efforts to strengthen port security should be synchronized with the help of the CTITF. With the effects of climate change, the Arctic ice continues to recede, opening new channels of potential terrorist traffic in the Northern Sea Route. In the interest of security and in accordance with 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Russian Federation has taken the initiative to patrol Arctic waters.

International carrier security and transparency is inherently connected to port security. This is why the Russian Federation supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a collaborative global effort to interdict suspected carriers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) at any and all transshipment points. In order to increase PSI effectiveness, full participation in the initiative is needed.