

Southern Regional Model United Nations XXII
Addressing the global financial crisis:
Restoring economic stability through international solidarity
November 17-19, 2011. Atlanta, GA
Email: nato@srmun.org



Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you to the Southern Regional United Nations Conference (SRMUN) XXII and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). My name is Mark Edwards, and I will serve as your director. I am very excited to be a part of NATO at SRMUN XXII. I have been participating in Model United Nations (MUN) conference on the regional, national, and international levels for twelve years, and what I enjoy the most is seeing delegates formulate solutions to the problems that face the diplomats at the United Nations on a daily basis. It is truly rewarding to see students involved in international politics and see them take on real issues. I will be assisted on the dais by Assistant Director Trey Sylvester. Trey has been involved in Model United Nations for seven years and has been involved in SRMUN for four years. We are honored to serve as your dais for NATO and look forward to seeing you combat real-world problems.

NATO was created in 1949 by way of the North Atlantic Treaty as an intergovernmental military alliance. NATO was designed as a collaborative defense against an external party threat. During the Cold War, it was most known as an alliance against the Soviet Union in the event war should break out. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has been involved in the wars in Afghanistan and the conflict in Libya. We have chosen the following topics to discuss at SRMUN XXI due to the importance they play in achieving peace and security within NATO Member States:

- I. Examining NATO's Role in the Africa-EU Energy Partnership
- II. Ensuring NATO's Ability to Operate Effectively in Times of Economic Turbulence
- III. A Review of Policies to Prepare for, Prevent and Deter Maritime Piracy

NATO is a unique committee in that military action can be authorized in order to protect the interests of the Member States of the regional organization. Such action was authorized in the post-September 11 attacks in Afghanistan. Delegates must remember that it is important to remain in policy in this committee in order to ensure that this simulation is realistic and practical.

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper that covers each of the three topics. Position papers should not be longer than 2 pages in length and single spaced. The objective of the position paper is to convince and persuade the members of your committee that the approach outlined in your paper is the best course of action. The position papers are therefore critical in providing insight into not only the policies and positions of each country, but should also provide insight into the direction each country will undertake in providing solutions to the challenges of this body.

Delegates are encouraged to use the position papers as an opportunity to state what your country plans to accomplish in this committee. Strong, well developed position papers are an excellent foundation for conference preparation. It is important to ensure all sides of each issue are adequately addressed and presented in a clear and concise manner that is easy for your audience to understand. More detailed information about how to write position papers can be found at the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). **All position papers MUST be submitted by October 30, 11:59pm EST using the submission system on the SRMUN website.**

Trey and I look forward to serving as your Assistant Director and Director, respectively for NATO at SRMUN XXII. If you have any questions while preparing for the conference, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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Committee History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established on 4 April, 1949 by the North Atlantic Treaty or Washington Treaty, is a regional military alliance comprised of twenty-eight transatlantic Member States.¹ NATO is the result of several events and organizations that followed in the aftermath of WWII. The process of formation began with Chapter VII, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which protects the right of individual and collective self defense.² In 1948, the United States initiated the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe's economy and infrastructure.³ This allowed European powers to construct a plan to maintain their security against the rapidly expanding influence of the Soviet Union. This also led to the signing of the Brussels Treaty and the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU). However, WEU members quickly realized during the Berlin Blockade that the United States was required to stand against the Soviet Union and, with the United States and Canada already seeking an alternative to an increasingly stagnant United Nations Security Council, the door was opened to a transatlantic military alliance.⁴ When Czechoslovakia experienced a communist revolution in March 1949, Western powers realized the urgency of the situation. Subsequent talks began between Britain, Canada, and the United States and expanded to include France, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal, creating the original twelve Member States party to the North Atlantic Treaty.⁵

NATO realized a need for concrete war plans following the outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent United Nations (UN) mission.⁶ At the Lisbon Summit of 1952, NATO established force levels for its defensive plans and a political leadership headed by the NATO Secretary-General.⁷ These permanent force levels were meant to be a non-mobilized conventional reaction force to any Soviet invasion. While this force could not hold off the Soviet military on its own, NATO's primary objective became maintaining peace in Europe and the building of closer institutional ties among the militaries of Alliance Member States.⁸ Principally, this included NATO organized training exercises to provide experience in cooperative operations. Early examples of NATO naval exercises, which began in 1952, are Operations Mariner and Mainbrace.⁹ NATO added Turkey and Greece to its membership, and as the Soviet Union expanded its military threat, West Germany and its extensive manpower were added to shore up force levels in the most likely path of Soviet advance. These pro-democracy alliances resulted in the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, which included the Soviet Union and all Member States then under its influence, cementing Cold War battle lines until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.¹⁰ During this period, NATO experienced a grave crisis when Charles de Gaulle decided to pull France out of NATO military cooperation. This was due to a disagreement on the direction of NATO expansion efforts and what de Gaulle saw as a disproportionate amount of United States influence within the Alliance.¹¹

After the reunification of Germany, NATO redefined itself as a cooperative-security alliance. NATO opened dialogue with former Warsaw Pact states and began considering the maintenance of peace within Europe's sphere of influence.¹² This was applied to the Balkan crisis, which saw the first deployment of NATO led forces on a combat footing. In 1995, NATO sent a 60,000 strong force, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to end to the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Srebrenica massacre.¹³ After the end of hostilities, NATO

¹ History Channel. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <http://www.history.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato>

² Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>

³ History Channel. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <http://www.history.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Encyclopedia.com. Lisbon Agreement on NATO Force Levels. http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Lisbon_Agreement_on_NATO_Force_Levels.aspx

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Time Magazine. NATO: Operation Mainbrace. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,822470,00.html>

¹⁰ Modern History Sourcebook. The Warsaw Pact. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html>

¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Update: 1966. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/60-69/1966e.htm>

¹² History Channel. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <http://www.history.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato>

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Operations and Missions. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm#1949

forces stabilized the region and eventually handed over authority to European Union forces in 2004.¹⁴ NATO redefined its strategic focus from one of conflict reaction to international conflict prevention and crisis management. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, NATO chose to invoke Article 5 of its Charter, which states that an attack against one Member State is an attack on all Member States.¹⁵ In support of this, NATO deployed naval forces in the Mediterranean under Operation Active Endeavor and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.¹⁶ This strategic vision also governed NATO deployments in Kosovo, the horn of Africa, and Iraq. Since the end of the Cold War, former Warsaw Pact states have become party to the organization, and the Republic of France has returned to full military cooperation, bringing the alliance to 28 Member States and additional partner states.¹⁷

NATO and the UN have a history of working together and adapting to the new realities of a globalized world beset by threats from decentralized and non-state actors.¹⁸ The crisis in Bosnia marked the first time that the UN and NATO worked together following the new strategic vision of the Alliance and the initiation of the General Framework for Peace as part of the Dayton Accords.¹⁹ These agreements established the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), a multinational force headed by NATO that was given mandate by the UN as part of Security Council Resolution 1031, due in part to NATO's willingness to support UN peacekeeping operations.²⁰ This cooperation paved the way for future dialogues between the Secretaries General of the two organizations. When the Kosovo crisis arose, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) worked closely together in the field, mirroring the growing relationship between NATO and the UN as their goals became more closely aligned. The new millennium has seen broad cooperation across the globe, notably in support of African Union missions and in Afghanistan, where NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has received the support of the Security Council in the form of resolutions that authorize expansion of ISAF's operations.²¹ Recently, NATO and the United Nations have advanced their relationship to the point of having high level information exchange born from the regular reports of the NATO Secretary General to his UN counterpart. The United Nations is now in regular attendance of North Atlantic Council meetings and is working with NATO to broaden the relationships between international, regional, and sub-regional organizations.²²

NATO now has two distinctive chains of command; military and civilian. Civilian NATO is headed by a Secretary General (SG), currently Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, who runs the day-to-day operations from NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and who is by tradition a European.²³ Decisions of the alliance are made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is chaired by the Secretary General and meets weekly. Typically, NAC representatives are from Member State delegations at Brussels, but occasionally higher-level discussions are attended by high-level ministers or Heads of State.²⁴ Furthermore, there are a number of sub-bodies and departments that implement the policy of the NAC. Notable among these is the NATO Economic Committee, which works to achieve alliance-wide standards of free and fair trade.²⁵ The Military Committee heads the military side of NATO under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Stavridis, traditionally filled by an American.²⁶ Under the SACEUR are the regional commands of NATO, which are led by a variety of Alliance officers.²⁷ The second major arm of the NATO military is Allied Command Transformation (ACT), located in Norfolk, Virginia, which is charged with research and development of new tactics and technology to benefit NATO operations.²⁸ In addition to these visible wings, NATO also maintains divisions charged with

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

¹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Operations and Missions. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm#1949

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-UN Relations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. General Framework for Peace. <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm>

²⁰ United Nations Security Council. SC Resolution 1031. <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/scres95.htm>

²¹ Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-UN Relations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm

²² Ibid

²³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO Secretary General. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50094.htm

²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Handbook. <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm>

²⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=146>

²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Supreme Allied Commander Europe. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50110.htm

²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Structure of NATO. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm>

²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Allied Transformation Command. <http://www.act.nato.int/>

standardization of alliance procedures and armaments, communications, and overall logistics for operations both active and foreseen.²⁹

Current Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

ALBANIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CROATIA, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, ITALY, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SPAIN, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Topic 1: Examining NATO's Role in the Africa-EU Energy Partnership

Over the coming decades the developing world and Africa in particular face enormous energy-related challenges. The manner in which these are addressed will not only have huge consequences for the well-being of citizens in Africa, but for the whole world. And these challenges are at the same time similar and yet different to the challenges that the European Union.”

-Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Development³⁰

Introduction

The international community has made sustainable and renewable energy a top priority in recent years for a variety of reasons. Globally, 1.6 billion people do not have current or consistent access to electricity.³¹ The Secretary-General's Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change released a report titled "Energy for a Sustainable Future," in which the lack of electricity was called a "significant barrier" to development.³² Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also released a statement saying that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be reached by the 2015 deadline without modern energy sources for all.³³ Estimates show that if the current system remains in place, the number without electricity worldwide in 2030 would fall to 1.4 billion, but the number affected in Africa would increase from approximately one-third in 2011 to two-thirds by 2030.³⁴ The problem of little to no electricity was recently highlighted when it was established that the majority of people in the new Republic of South Sudan are without electrical power.³⁵ Research has shown that the number of people with electricity in some African States is extremely low (3.7 percent in Uganda and 4.7 percent in Ethiopia).³⁶ Research has also demonstrated that development rates (measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage of people living on less than \$2 per day) mirrored the electricity rate and availability in surveyed Member States.³⁷ Those that actually have electricity are plagued by blackouts, which add to economic turmoil. In Zambia, one farmer stated that the unreliable power forces him into hardship because the loss of power slows production and he is forced to increase pay for his workers, which highlights the individual financial loss faced in Africa.³⁸ The most favored source of energy in Africa is

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Structure of NATO. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm>

³⁰ Andris Piebalgs. "Renewable Energy in Africa – From Vast Potential to a Reliable Energy Source." Speech to Africa-EU Energy Partnership's Ministerial High Level Meeting. September 14, 2010. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_10078_en.htm.

³¹ "High-Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership Bulletin." *International Institute for Sustainable Development* 181, no. 1, September 17, 2010.

³² Joe DeCapua. "U.N. Report says 1.6 Billion Still Lack Access to Electricity." *VOA News*. April 28, 2010. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua-un-energy-28apr10-92323229.html>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Andris Piebalgs. "Renewable Energy in Africa – From Vast Potential to a Reliable Energy Source."

³⁵ Eva Krafczyk. "South Sudan: Independent, But Now What?" *Mail & Guardian Online*. July 11, 2011. <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-11-s-sudan-independent-but-in-desperate-need-of-aid>.

³⁶ Yemane Wolde-Rufael. "Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth: A Time Series Experience for 17 African Countries." *Energy Policy* 34 (2006). p. 1106.

³⁷ Ibid., 1108.

³⁸ Michael Wines. "Toiling in the Dark: Africa's Power Crisis." *NY Times*. July 29, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/world/africa/29power.html>.

currently fossil fuels. For example, South Africa gets 90 percent of its energy through the burning of fossil fuels.³⁹ It has long been proven that harvesting fossil fuels is a potentially dangerous practice to the environment, harvesting or transportation equipment, and gas leaks.⁴⁰ The other concern is “Peak Oil.” The idea proposed by M. King Hubbert is that eventually oil will peak production and become increasingly scarce.⁴¹ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has argued that the peak has already happened in 2006. Even though production is set to continue, increased energy demands by China and other high demand Member States will cause higher scarcity in oil.⁴² With the combined increased scarcity of oil and the dangers of producing petroleum and other fossil fuels, sustainable energy has become a popular topic in recent years. Also, the lack of electricity in Africa and its connection with development has pushed Africa’s energy problem to a heightened level of concern, especially for the European Union (EU) and NATO.

The Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) was created with the above concerns in mind and the general agreement to spread methods of renewable and sustainable energy to assist in Africa’s development. “The AEEP is a long-term framework for structured political dialogue and co-operation between Africa and the EU on energy issues of strategic importance, reflecting African and European needs.”⁴³ The energy partnership is one of the many parts of AEEP, which was part of a larger idea created through a ‘jointly negotiated and agreed’ idea between Africa and the European Union to foster close cooperation, development, dialogue with other international actors, combat poverty, amongst a long list of other ideas to maintain close relations.⁴⁴ The original idea of cooperation came from the Cotonou Agreement, which calls for cooperation between the EU and Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). It was first signed in Cotonou, Benin on 23 June, 2000 and is revised every five years. The most recent negotiations for revisions were completed in March 2010 and are very important to this particular topic because the African Union became a partner in the EU-ACP relationship, which includes the energy partnerships and AEEP.⁴⁵

An important organization to also remember is the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). While not directly related to AEEP, it is a new organization that operates under similar principles. IRENA was created in January 2009 and 148 Member States have signed the Statute, among them 48 African, 38 European, and the EU (as an organization).⁴⁶ IREANA is meant to act as a global actor for the promotion of sustainable energy, which includes technical and economic data and sustainable projects for further development.⁴⁷ Along with sustainable and renewable energy projects, IRENA will also act to increase economic growth and development and take positive steps towards climate change.⁴⁸ IRENA is important not only because the European Union is a signatory, but also was referenced at the First High-Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership as an organization with similar vision and mandate.⁴⁹

Foundation of AEEP and Mandate

AEEP was created with the primary objective of “improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, cost-effective, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents, with a special focus on achieving the MGDs in Africa.”⁵⁰ The idea of the partnership resulted from the Cotonou Agreement, but AEEP was specifically created as one of eight strategic partnerships referred to as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), at the EU-Africa Summit in

³⁹ “Solar Energy Coming to Africa with the Support of China.” *Renewable Power News*. June 9, 2011.

<http://www.renewablepowernews.com/archives/2547>.

⁴⁰ “Fossil Fuel Revolution Begins.” *BBC News*. November 23, 1999. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/532468.stm>.

⁴¹ M. King Hubbert. *Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels*. 1956. p. 22.

⁴² John Collins Rudolf. “Is ‘Peak Oil’ Behind Us?” *NY Times*. November 14, 2010.

<http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/is-peak-oil-behind-us/?partner=rss&emc=rss>.

⁴³ “Energy.” *Africa and Europe in Partnership*. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/energy#aEEP>.

⁴⁴ “Frequently Asked Questions.” *Africa and Europe in Partnership*. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/frequently-asked-questions>.

⁴⁵ “Overview of ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.” *European Commission Development and Cooperation*.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm#background.

⁴⁶ “About IRENA.” *IRENA*. <http://www.irena.org/Menu/index.aspx?PriMenuID=13&mnu=Pri>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

⁴⁸ “Vision and Mission.” *IRENA*. <http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=cat&PriMenuID=13&CatID=9>.

⁴⁹ “High-Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership Bulletin.”

⁵⁰ “Energy.” *Africa and Europe in Partnership*. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/energy#aEEP>.

Lisbon in December 2007.⁵¹ AEEP is governed by a Joint Expert Group (JEG) made up of both African and European representatives with Europe represented by Austria and Germany and Africa represented by the African Union Commission and Mauritius.⁵² AEEP is designed to be a forum to promote development from an energy point of view.

Upon creation, AEEP was recognized as a much-needed venue to exchange energy ideas, including energy access, infrastructure, and renewable energy.⁵³ Conscious of these ideas, early recommended objectives included advancement and promotion of renewable energy; the sharing of information between the civil, private, research, academia, and technological sectors; and the strengthening of regional communities and powers within AEEP.⁵⁴ AEEP also convened the First High Level Meeting (HLM) of AEEP in September 2010. The Declaration of the First HLM updated the goals of AEEP by 2020 to include: improvement of energy efficiency in Africa, bring new modern and sustainable energy to 100 million Africans, increase relations between Africa and the EU, use natural gas in Africa, and build additional hydro, solar, and wind power facilities.⁵⁵ It is with these goals in mind that AEEP has formulated action plans to address energy concerns among EU and Africa.

First Action Plan

The “First Action Plan (2008-2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership” sets forth a set of priorities in the areas EU-Africa partnership concentrates on over a two-year period, one of these being in the field of energy.⁵⁶ The overall idea of the Energy section in the First Action Plan was to promote European and African investments in energy infrastructure, which includes a greater emphasis on renewable energy technology and implementation.⁵⁷ There are five sections of the action plan as it pertains to energy: objectives, expected outcomes, activities, actors and finance. The objectives include the enhancement of cooperation between Africa and the EU for energy access and security and an increased investment in infrastructure related to the energy markets in Africa. The expected outcomes include advancement in the energy infrastructure, improved rates of electricity access, further technological capabilities and developments, and the integration of the climate change issue into energy development.⁵⁸ Activities to fulfill these ideas include cooperation to strengthen African energy institutions, open a dialogue on nuclear energy options under all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions, financial assistance through grants and other methods to energy development in Africa and Europe, and implement technology to assist in combating climate change into new developments.⁵⁹ Actors involved in these operations include the African Union (AU), EU, individual Member States, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and a variety of private energy companies. These ideas will be financed by individual companies with international partners such as the EU and AU, African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank among others.⁶⁰ It was these goals and methods that set forth further advancement of AEEP’s agenda.

First High Level Meeting

The First High Level Meeting (HLM) of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership took place 14-15 September, 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Its purpose was to create a sense of collaboration between African and European countries in bringing renewable and sustainable energy to all. Prior to the conference, the EU adopted the Renewable Energy Directive in April 2009, which states that EU Member States must be able to obtain 20 percent of their energy from renewable sources by 2020.⁶¹ The HLM built off of that idea and the First Action Plan for 2008-2010 in the negotiations and work. The HLM Declaration set the following five targets to be completed by 2020: bring access to electricity to an additional 100 million Africans; increase ‘electrical interconnections’ to and within Africa;

⁵¹ AEEP. “Fact File: The Africa-EU Energy Partnership.”

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ AEEP. “JAES/AEEP Recommendations for the Future of the AEEP.” March 19, 2010.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ “Energy.” *Africa and Europe in Partnership*. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/energy#aEEP>.

⁵⁶ Joint Africa-EU Strategy. “First Action Plan (2008-2010).” p.1.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.30-31.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

⁶¹ “High-Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership Bulletin.”

double natural gas use in Africa, build facilities for hydro, solar, and water power; and improving energy efficiency in Africa.⁶² Also established at the HLM was the Africa-AU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP), which was started with a €5 million contribution.⁶³ RECP set goals to increase the production of renewable energy in industry, increase sustainable energy in general to promote investment, and promote research for technological advancements.⁶⁴ All of these goals build on the First Action Plan and expand them beyond to 2020. All of these goals relate back to the mandate of AEEP, which is to help spread renewable energy in order to fulfill the MDGs.

Second Action Plan

The Second Action Plan builds off the general idea of the Vienne HLM that all energy goals should be implemented by 2020 to benefit 100 million Africans.⁶⁵ With the upcoming fulfillment goal of the MDGs in 2015, there is also a special emphasis on using energy so Africa can make progress in fulfilling the MDGs. There are six priorities to the Second Action Plan that also reflect the HLM: energy access, energy security, renewable energy/efficiency, institutional capacity building, scaling up investment, and dialogue.⁶⁶ Currently, there are 64 projects being pursued in 34 countries by the ACP-EU to increase individual and regional energy access and the Action Plan calls for an additional 35 projects.⁶⁷ It also suggests that bi-lateral projects be implemented and specifically points at the Dutch-German Energising Development (EnDev) as an example.⁶⁸ The EnDev program is a German and Dutch partnership designed to implement the MDGs by the 2015 goal in developing Member States.⁶⁹ In the first phase (up to December 2009) of this program, 5.01 people in developing Member States were provided with electricity and the primary goal of the second phase (up to 2014) is to increase this number by at least 3 million.⁷⁰ The Action Plan relies on formations of other bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships to implement the new ideas for energy access. The expected outcome is to allow 100 million more Africans access to energy in order to obtain basic services (health, water, education, and communication) through sustainable methods.⁷¹

The other high and detailed priority area is renewable energy. There is a high emphasis on water, hydro and solar energy capacity building. It calls upon AEEP to increase their role in providing further research and development for sustainable and renewable energy technology.⁷² As previously mentioned, AEEP has a number of projects in progress to assist in bringing sustainable energy technology to African countries. The other priorities mentioned in the Action Plan include energy security, which is supposed to guarantee interconnectivity between African markets and between the EU and Africa as well.⁷³ Another point under energy security is the increased use of natural gas and the development of infrastructure to export natural gas to the EU.⁷⁴ Another priority is institutional building. The Action Plan calls for an increased emphasis on institution building, particularly in African and European private and civil research sectors, in order to be able to provide methods to carry out the other listed priorities.⁷⁵ A related priority concerns investment to fund these ideas. Investment in the energy sector needs to be increased through private and public sources in order to fund the other priorities of energy security, access, and others.⁷⁶ The last priority is about dialogue. This priority simply calls for an increase in the dialogue at all levels between African and European actors involved in the energy process.⁷⁷ The six priorities build upon the First Action Plan and implement

⁶² AEEP. "Fact File: The Africa-EU Energy Partnership."

⁶³ "Energy in Africa: Launch the Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme." *Africa and Europe in Partnership*. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/node/1219>.

⁶⁴ "High-Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership Bulletin."

⁶⁵ Joint Africa-EU Strategy. "Action Plan 2011-2013." p. 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 56.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "Energising Development." <http://www.agentschapnl.nl/programmas-regelingen/energising-development>.

⁷⁰ "Results and Goals: Energising Development." <http://www.agentschapnl.nl/programmas-regelingen/results-and-goals-energising-development>.

⁷¹ "Action Plan 2011-2013." p. 56.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 57.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 59.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 60.

new ideas to provide energy to more individuals in African countries. They need to be considered in all planning aspects of viewing NATO's role in AEEP.

NATO and Energy Security

While the EU and NATO overlap in membership by individual Member States, they are different organizations with different mandates. NATO was created to offer collaborative protection to its Member States from threats both by political and military methods.⁷⁸ Most recently, NATO declared the 11 September, 2001 attacks an attack on all NATO Member States and used Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to support the United States in all anti-terrorism campaigns.⁷⁹ The protection of all Member States is of concern to NATO when discussing energy security and ways to address possible problems.

The concept of energy security first arose for NATO in 2006 through the Riga Summit Declaration adopted on 29 November, 2006. The Riga Declaration stated that NATO needed to assess energy security risks in an effort to not disrupt vital resources.⁸⁰ Energy security was an important concept because of the European use of imported energy. In 2006, the EU was importing approximately 50 percent of their energy, the majority of which came from Russia.⁸¹ Some documentation shows the trigger for the topic of energy security was the actions of Russia towards Ukraine in December 2005-January 2006 when Russia raised the price of natural gas. This also triggered issues in other EU Member States because others were also affected by the natural gas price increase.⁸² These combined events of 2006 led to the Bucharest Summit Declaration of 3 April, 2008, which addressed energy security in more detail. The Declaration stated that NATO would engage in the following fields of energy security: "information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure."⁸³ When compared to the goals of the Second Action Plan, the NATO goals are very similar to those under the energy security priority, but do not touch upon energy access for all. NATO Member States have also gone to war over energy security and protection. In the 1980s, NATO Member States became involved in the oil trading sea lines in Middle Eastern waters to protect allied oil tankers on neutral trading lines.⁸⁴ Also, one of the aspects of the First Gulf War was the protection of oil trading partners of individual NATO Member States and protection of the international oil markets. While NATO has not itself acted militarily to protect energy security as a full alliance, it is a possible course of action as resources and global markets change. Because of the design of NATO's mandate, energy security is a top priority.

It is possible for Member States to use energy resources to gain politically. Wars have been fought and skirmishes have occurred both politically and militarily over energy, but more recently, Iran has threatened to cut off its energy supply to buyers in order to make political gains and avoid sanctions.⁸⁵ For these reasons, the dependence on foreign energy supplies was an important topic at a conference in Croatia in May 2011. Peter Poptchev, Ambassador at Large for Energy Security and Climate Change of Bulgaria, introduced a three-track approach to energy security by "gathering intelligence, sharing information, and raising awareness on issues of common concern."⁸⁶ Military and political actions have been taken to address energy security under NATO's concerns. Since the majority of the oil trade comes through pirate and hostile territories, Operation Active Endeavour also is NATO's maritime force meant to protect the economic trade that passes through the Mediterranean and hostile territories.⁸⁷ Presently, 65percent of the oil and natural gas to the European Union travels through the Mediterranean

⁷⁸ "What Does NATO do?" *NATO: Frequently Asked Questions*. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/faq.htm>.

⁷⁹ "What is NATO's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism?" *NATO: Frequently Asked Questions*. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/faq.htm>.

⁸⁰ NATO. *Riga Summit Declaration*. November 29, 2006. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_37920.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁸¹ Paul Gallis. "NATO and Energy Security." *CRS Report for Congress*. March 21, 2006. p. CRS-2.

⁸² *Ibid.* p. CRS-2.

⁸³ NATO. *Bucharest Summit Declaration*. April 3, 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁸⁴ Gallis, p. CRS-5

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. CRS-4.

⁸⁶ NATO. "NATO's Role in Energy Security Challenges for South-Eastern Europe." May 26-27, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2065B764-A4BC5341/natolive/news_75463.htm.

⁸⁷ "Topic: NATO's Role in Energy Security." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm.

Sea.⁸⁸ With the possible maritime threats, energy security is a prime concern because it can affect the economic market of NATO and individual Member States. NATO is concerned with physical security of energy resources as well as energy security so all Member States can have adequate energy access.

NATO Assistance to the African Union

As a part of the energy partnership between EU and African Member States, it is important to understand NATO's relation with the African Union. The majority of the partnership and assistance to Africa is to assist in attaining peace and security through stabilization and peacekeepers. Since 2005, NATO has been assisting the mission in Sudan at the request of the African Union (AU).⁸⁹ The NATO assistance to the AU has come in missions to Sudan/Darfur and Somalia by way of peacekeepers and civilian police.⁹⁰ Any decision of assistance to the AU has come from the North Atlantic Council and must be approved by that body.⁹¹ While NATO's direct role in AU affairs has been a peacekeeping view, the Council can determine to increase depending on how energy security progresses and the role NATO plays in the EU-African Partnership.

EU-NATO Partnership

While the EU and NATO are two different organizations with overlapping members, it is important to note the partnerships and general concepts the organizations share and how they interact. The NATO-EU alliance has already occurred in the fields of energy security under the Bucharest Summit Declaration. NATO wants to work with the EU in a variety of areas and to do this suggests the following measures: strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU with open communication, mutual support for crisis, more collaboration politically for common issues to share assessments and perspectives, and more collaborative support in capability development to maximize action while minimizing costs.⁹² The EU-NATO partnership was also evident in the events in the Balkans. The EU has been contributing civil assets to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. More recently, NATO and the EU have worked together in Darfur, Afghanistan, and against the piracy issue in Somalia.⁹³ In terms of the alliances and their work on energy, there are clear goals of energy security, especially as the international markets have evolved in recent years with energy used for political purposes. Now it must be determined the role NATO has in the AEEP.

NATO's Previous Role in AEEP

NATO has acknowledged that energy systems are a target. A recent report specifically pointed to an evolving world where attacks are becoming more hostile and less predictable, which specifically mentioned destruction of energy pipelines.⁹⁴ In the same report, it was recommended that NATO forge more regional subgroups with the AU and others.⁹⁵ NATO's roles in this partnership is still being defined, but will no doubt become important as the economic markets change and as new types of energy are developed. With new development comes the need for security and protection, especially with the increased use of energy as leverage for political or economic gain.

Conclusion

The establishment of AEEP was meant to provide African Member States a method to spread electricity and other forms of energy in order to foster development in each individual state economy. The EU has been working closely in this alliance to foster this development and provide a method of energy security. With the evolving political arena and threats to basic energy, NATO is being asked to analyze their role in this effort. AEEP has a particular list of priorities set forth in the Second Action Plan to cover 2011-2013. NATO also has a division dedicated to energy

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "African Union Discusses Practical Cooperation with NATO." *NATO*. February 18-19, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-428395C0-91E69579/natolive/news_61534.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁹⁰ "Topic: NATO Assistance to the African Union." *NATO*. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² "Topic" NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership." *NATO*. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement." *NATO*. May 17, 2010.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en#p1.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

security and can activate political and military if needed. NATO must decide their role in the AEEP and decide how it will help benefit Africans and Europeans in development through energy access and security.

Committee Directive

AEEP, while still as a relatively new organization, also must combat the always changing international political dynamic. The purpose of the partnership is to foster development; however, because of increasing political, guerilla, and military threats to energy sources or use, energy security and access has become a barrier to development, which is why NATO might become involved. This topic is very new and still evolving, meaning that the amount of research about direct NATO-AEEP will be difficult. Delegates should look into individual Member State energy policies towards the EU-Africa Partnership. The best way to determine NATO's role in this partnership is to go through individual policies. Since this is a fresh topic, delegates will be able to formulate a solution, based on NATO and Member State policies, that is fresh and uncharted. Because of the military alliance aspect of NATO, delegates should also remember this consideration as well as the overlap of some Member States between NATO and the EU. One of the most important parts to this topic is the energy aspect. Delegates must remember that while the larger partnership focuses on a variety of issues, this topic focuses specifically on energy. All of these aspects must be remembered when solidifying what role NATO should and will play in this energy partnership.

Topic II: Ensuring NATO's Ability to Operate Effectively in Times of Economic Turbulence

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
-Article 2, the North Atlantic Charter, 4 April 1949⁹⁶

Introduction

The devastation of World War II limited the production, use, and flow of goods and services that constituted a strong European economy.⁹⁷ At this time, the United States (US) was becoming increasingly aware that its former ally, the communist Soviet Union, would be the principal rival for control of the post-war world and as such constituted a major security concern.⁹⁸ The United States, because of its geographic isolation, emerged from the war as an economic superpower and was in a unique position to use this to its advantage.⁹⁹ In 1948, the US instituted the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive investment aimed at rebuilding the European continent as an economic and political shield against the advance of communism.¹⁰⁰ However, the United States and its allies recognized the Marshall Plan was only a short-term answer to European economic issues.¹⁰¹ As a result, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949, the Washington Treaty included a responsibility to collectively manage and bolster Member economies as a guarantee of future security.¹⁰² NATO and its Member States, in following with Article 2, use a two-part system to handle economic questions. Officially, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) relies on its Economic and Budget Committees for advice during the decision-making process, but this advice primarily serves for short-term issues concerned with NATO civil and military deployments.¹⁰³ Thus, in 1955, Member States formed the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA), which serves as a forum for long term domestic and alliance policy debate outside of the North Atlantic Council.¹⁰⁴ It is comprised of legislative

⁹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

⁹⁷ Library of Congress. The Marshall Plan: Proposal. <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars1.html>

⁹⁸ About Economics. The Post War Economy (1945-1960). http://economics.about.com/od/useconomicichistory/a/post_war.htm

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Library of Congress. The Marshall Plan: Communist Domination. <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars2.html>

¹⁰¹ Foreign Policy Research Institute. "America and the West: Lessons from the Marshall Plan." <http://www.fpri.org/ww/0103.199801.sicherman.lessonsfromthemarshallplan.html>

¹⁰² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

¹⁰³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Economic Sphere. <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0706.htm>

¹⁰⁴ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO-PA Milestones. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=8>

representatives of Member States, their regional partners, and international observers.¹⁰⁵ The NATO-PA acquires its funding, currently 4.2 million USD, from participating governments based on NATO civil budget contribution guidelines. It also makes policy recommendations to the NAC and Alliance governments.¹⁰⁶ While no formal relationship exists, the NATO Secretary-General responds to the policy recommendations of the assembly and regularly addresses its meetings.¹⁰⁷ The NATO-PA dedicates its Committee on Economics and Security as the primary oversight and research organ for current and future economic issues.¹⁰⁸ This body makes recommendations and reports on economic trends within NATO missions, Member State policy, and the international economy to the Parliamentary Assembly.¹⁰⁹ NATO and the NATO-PA, because of the worldwide economic crisis and associated cutbacks in defense budgets of Member States, perceive the need for comprehensive measures to safeguard future capabilities. A comparison, performed by NATO, of defense budgets reported by its members for the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years showed significant changes in defense budget policy.¹¹⁰ The report showed sharp reductions in the budgets of almost every Member State, with the exception of the United States, Turkey, and Germany who actually reported increases in their defense budgets for 2011.¹¹¹ In response, NATO began studying ways to increase the economic stability of Member States and ensure continuing troop availability for the swelling number of NATO commitments and interests, culminating in the 2010 Lisbon Summit's new strategic concept.¹¹²

As a military organization, the most pressing issue to NATO is the readiness of alliance militaries to respond to threats and security issues on a variety of different levels. NATO's new Strategic Concept highlights one response as being the development of better cooperation through Alliance channels.¹¹³ NATO also recognizes that an important step in this process is efficiency within the military and procurement apparatuses in which NATO leads the way by eliminating approximately 4,000 personnel and closing some of its bases following the Lisbon Summit.¹¹⁴ The NATO-PA has expressed interest in collectively bargaining with defense firms and resource suppliers to eliminate costs incurred from competition for military contracts among allies.¹¹⁵ The NATO-PA also acknowledges the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty as an important step toward the establishment of joint military units that share costs among participating Member States.¹¹⁶

NATO Austerity

NATO's new strategic concept focuses on cooperation as key to the future of the organization.¹¹⁷ NATO expansion and diplomatic interaction was central to the alliance's ability to adapt and meet its responsibilities in the past.¹¹⁸ NATO is focusing on this tried method of development because NATO confronts a need to meet more expansive and expensive commitments in the twenty-first century.¹¹⁹ The Alliance proposes to foster relations and reduce the costs to individual Member States by developing dialogue and cooperation with entities sharing NATO interests, expanding cooperation with the United Nations (UN), broadening the relationship between NATO and the EU, inviting the participation of the Russian Federation in European security initiatives, and reaffirming NATO partnerships in the Gulf and Mediterranean.¹²⁰

¹⁰⁵ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO-PA Overview. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1>

¹⁰⁶ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Budget. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=202>

¹⁰⁷ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Relations with NATO. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=5>

¹⁰⁸ NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on Economics and Security. <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=146>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Atlantic Organization for Security. NATO Defense Budgets. <http://aofs.org/2010/11/20/natos-defense-budgets-2011/>

¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon Summit. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

¹¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon Summit. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

¹¹⁴ BBC News. NATO cuts to be backed by UK Government. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11781843>

¹¹⁵ NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹¹⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office. UK-France Defense and Security Co-operation Treaty. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaty-command-papers-ems/explanatory-memoranda/explanatory-memoranda-2010/120FranceDefenceSec>

¹¹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Active Enlargement, Modern Defense." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm

¹¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Enlargement. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm

¹¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Active Enlargement, Modern Defense." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm

¹²⁰ Ibid

In addition to inter-organizational partnerships, NATO is planning cost-cutting measures for its own Member States and civilian operations. These plans include reductions in employed labor, joint research and production projects within the alliance, and the formation of standing multi-national units.¹²¹ Partnerships outside the alliance may lead to lower operations costs due to burden sharing, but individual Member States must also embrace cost-cutting measures that will ensure future capability for decreased expenditure. NATO is an organization of consensus and unity; this must also apply to budgets both within the frame of defense and domestic spheres. The Alliance system, threatened by the defense budget instabilities of its Member States, must endeavor to pursue methods of integrating units and working toward collective alliance defense projects.¹²²

NATO relations with the UN and EU

With respect to the UN, NATO plans to increase information sharing, joint training exercises, and planning for future issues.¹²³ NATO experts and staff will participate in the meetings of the UN's major organs and will provide NATO experience at UN special sessions. Additionally, the alliance intends to expand its involvement with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC).¹²⁴ The UN CTC is a sub-committee of the Security Council (UNSC) and formed following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.¹²⁵ Its mandate is to determine the best counter terrorism strategies, report to the UNSC on the state of world terrorism, provide expert information to the UNSC regarding specific terrorism information, and to coordinate UN assistance to Member States and world organizations that are combating terrorism.¹²⁶ NATO collaborated closely with this body during the UN CTC's annual special meetings with regional security organizations and NATO contributes to the discussions on terrorism and global security.¹²⁷ In the field, NATO's Operation Unified Protector within Libya represents the evolving relationship between the UN and NATO. NATO takes full responsibility for military operations which leaves the UN the ability to focus on humanitarian issues within Libya as fighting continues.¹²⁸ Data from the United Kingdom, a major component in Unified Protector, suggests that active participants, such as the UK, France, and US, are already spending 50,000 USD per sortie and 820,000 USD per missile deployed.¹²⁹ The UN calculates that 310 million USD is required to address the humanitarian issues with Libya, such as challenges to food security and health care.¹³⁰ This specificity of mission allows both actors to accomplish their goals effectively but at reduced cost. This also allows NATO to undertake military expenditures that would otherwise be unmanageable in the face of humanitarian obligations.

The shared membership and interests between the EU and NATO has led to a close but often complex relationship.¹³¹ The two organizations share twenty-one members.¹³² NATO members who are not part of the EU participate in all meetings between organizations, however due to security concerns EU members who do not enjoy NATO Member status may not participate.¹³³ This strategic partnership is a significant resource to both parties, and NATO plans to push forward with strategies that pursue greater joint capability. NATO promises the EU the use of assets for its operations, as well as access to NATO planning staffers. However, this exchange ensures that the EU

¹²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹²² NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹²³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Relations with the United Nations.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ United Nations. Counter-Terrorism Committee. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/>

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ United Nations. Counter-terrorism Committee Special Meetings. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/cooperation.html>

¹²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO and Libya. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm

¹²⁹ BBC News. "Libya: Is cost of military mission sustainable?" <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12806709>

¹³⁰ UN News Center. "Libya faces potential food crisis unless stocks are replenished soon, UN warns"

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38220&Cr=libya&Cr1>

¹³¹ Eurotopics. The EU and NATO. http://www.eurotopics.net/en/archiv/magazin/politik-verteilerseite/nato_2007_11/debatte_nato_2007/

¹³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-EU: a strategic partnership.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm

¹³³ Ibid

has the ability to install permanent advisers to NATO strategic command.¹³⁴ This allows for better communication between the EU and NATO on capabilities and cooperation. Specifically, the two alliances are expanding their NATO-EU Helicopter transport initiative, and the NATO Secretary General suggests that medical technology, heavy-lift helicopters, and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) research be added to the list of cooperative efforts.¹³⁵ This will continue to give NATO and EU powers high-tech capabilities without the traditional procurement and maintenance costs of duplicated force and research structures.

NATO Relations with the Russian Federation

European cooperation is also coming to include the Russian Federation. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave birth to a Russia that was open to expanding its ties with the world. And while discussions began almost immediately, NATO began the process of cooperative efforts with Russia in 1997 with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NATO-Russia Founding Act).¹³⁶ This act set down the rules and responsibilities of the new relationship between the two powers and called for a joint NATO-Russia Council.¹³⁷ Officially formed in 2002, this council gives the 28 NATO Member States and Russia a forum to create a realistic framework of cooperation.¹³⁸ Despite moves by both Russia and NATO to build relations, old attitudes and differences of opinion on world affairs, notably Kosovo, has strained the partnership and prevented any major steps toward cooperative initiatives beyond communication.¹³⁹ However, in November of 2010 the Lisbon Summit declaration included a focus on closer bonds with the Russian Federation based on the unprecedented willingness to cooperate in the concurrent NATO-Russia summit. When the April 2011 minister's summit took place in Berlin, Germany, the NATO-Russia council began negotiations on how and when new agreements would enter into force. The ministers came to agreement on new counter-terrorism initiatives (CTIs), supporting UN resolution enforcement in Libya, and further joint missile defense research.¹⁴⁰ A complex partnership could yield significant bonuses for European security and for NATO operations in Central Asia, such as Afghanistan. In Europe the focus is missile defense. Currently, NATO and Russian military experts are studying the possibility of linking the NATO and Russian missile defense networks.¹⁴¹ Cooperation would see a Europe and Russia protected by a layered system of extremely sophisticated anti-ballistic missile systems that would provide significantly augmented protection from rogue state attacks. During the Cold War, Russia opposed unilateral action by the US to add depth to European missile defenses as it was a threat to Russia's strategic interests. Today, however, Russia's counter-proposal is a fully integrated missile defense network that would cover all of Russia and Europe. However, NATO Member States are resistant to this plan as it would give equal control of European defenses to Russia, a growing but still suspicious partner. Instead, EU Member States are pushing for a system that simply shares information.¹⁴² While this remains an unclear issue, Russia's commitment to countering terrorism is beyond question.¹⁴³ The victim of numerous terrorist and separatist attacks during its history, Russia is undertaking a violent crackdown with the support of as many as seventy-five percent of its populace.¹⁴⁴ Russia and NATO develop joint counter-terrorist plans and now rehearse joint operations for combating terrorism. Russia is an important and strong ally in the fight

¹³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-EU: a strategic partnership. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm

¹³⁵ International Security Information Service. "NATO and the EU: Cooperation?" http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_445_eu-nato-capabilities.pdf

¹³⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-Russia Founding Act. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO's relations with Russia. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-CC9EEA1F-77562DBE/natolive/topics_50090.htm

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO and Russia Move Forward the Lisbon Agenda." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1660E092-F82C0431/natolive/news_72654.htm

¹⁴¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Topic: Missile Defense. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ Time. "Russia's War on Terror: A Crackdown by Popular Demand." <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981941,00.html>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

against international terrorism both for its experience and commitment, but Member States remember frustration in the past at Russia's shifting policy concerning terrorist states.¹⁴⁵

NATO Relations with Regional Partners

NATO benefits significantly from its Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The PfP toolbox includes policy reforms and normalization of security relationships that modernize an interested Member State and build a closer bond with the Alliance. The PfP is remarkable because relationships allow Member States, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine, to discuss reform and cooperation at a pace and level of their choosing. This allows bi-lateral cooperation with a number of non-Member States that otherwise would have been excluded from traditional routes to NATO partnership and even membership.¹⁴⁶ This program is responsible for ten of the current Member States of NATO. The EAPC, which is a forum for discussion between the 28 allies and 22 states from greater Europe and Near-Asia, expands upon this initiative. Cooperation in the monthly meetings of the EAPC leads to agreements on security reform and civil defense. NATO serves as a source of expertise to interested parties and works to assist troubled states whose governments are often unable to reform on their own.¹⁴⁷

In 1995, recognizing a need to open dialogues with the possible Mediterranean partners, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue. This body of Member States and seven partners is the focus of security in Europe and North Africa and a key forum for the current crises in the region. A key goal of the organization is to dispel misconceptions regarding NATO and its goals in the region, which are limited to ensuring European security with regional stability in the Mediterranean.¹⁴⁸ The ICI is the second arm of NATO partnership directed at the Middle East and focuses on the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, while not excluding interested parties of the greater Middle East. The ICI builds upon a foundation of shared views concerning foreign policy, specifically, on terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The initiative provides tailored advice to governments on the defense industry, military cooperation and interoperability, and participation in Alliance exercises; in exchange for cooperation in the fight against terrorism, combating arms trafficking through border security, and assistance against nuclear proliferation.¹⁴⁹ Since its creation in 2004, four of the six invitees have joined the ICI: Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Bahrain.¹⁵⁰ Currently, Operation Unified Protector in Libya includes the PfP member Sweden, the MD member Jordan, and the ICI members Qatar and UAE. Plans for the twenty first century envision the elevation of Member States such as Ukraine and Georgia, current PfP members, to full NATO membership.¹⁵¹

Restructuring Technology Procurement, logistical Support, and Force Deployment

Alliance members are already beginning the process of cutting defense budgets. While this may be causing Member States to withdraw from important commitments, the economic downturn presents an opportunity for streamlining within home militaries.¹⁵² NATO demonstrates this by significantly cutting its civilian employment and eliminating duplicated responsibilities within the NATO command structure. Duplicated capabilities and non-mission critical civilian and military staff positions are a focus of NATO's reduction plan.¹⁵³ NATO also sees a potential for creating

¹⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO-Russia cooperation to counter terrorism. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art2.html>

¹⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Partnership for Peace Programme. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm

¹⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm

¹⁴⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mediterranean Dialogue. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A1150A81-93514CBB/natolive/topics_60021.htm

¹⁴⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58787.htm?

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon Summit Declaration. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

¹⁵² Atlantic Council US. "Trans Atlantic Austerity: Can NATO Remain Relevant Amid Defense Cuts?". http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/trans-atlantic-austerity-can-nato-remain-relevant-amid-defense-cuts

¹⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon Summit Declaration. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

centralized commands of Member State Special Forces units and military training cadres. This centralization is to include an elevation of the NATO Response Force to primary foundation for NATO extra-territorial operations.¹⁵⁴

A major burden on defense budgets is the development, procurement, and maintenance of new military technologies. Alliance members, while showing some cooperation, run numerous programs to develop similar technologies. NATO is attempting to counter this by introducing Alliance wide research collaborations and encouraging Member State research cooperation.¹⁵⁵ NATO collaborations allow Member States to invest much lower levels of capital in development than would be possible in solo ventures. However, Alliance members have been slow to fully cooperate in the high cost areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), missile defense packages, and multi-Member State ventures such as the US led Joint Strike Fighter program (JSF).¹⁵⁶ In alliance UAV's, NATO originally envisioned the Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS) as a manned group of converted Airbus A321 commercial aircraft and unmanned global hawk RQ-4B UAV's, but a development cost ceiling of 4.2 billion USD forced NATO to focus solely on the UAV capability with an advanced radar package to serve both objectives.¹⁵⁷ The US JSF program is an attempt to build a truly multi-role aircraft for all military services, the F-35 lightning II, but the costs are proving to be high.¹⁵⁸ The original projected research cost of 30 billion USD has become 54 billion with the aircraft itself going from a 69 million USD price to more than 135 million per plane, and the development process is ongoing with not a single plane yet delivered.¹⁵⁹ Despite moves by NATO and the US to reduce program costs, several alliance members are completely withdrawing from the (AGS) and US led JSF program citing unreasonable demands on conservative defense budgets and duplication of existing air capability.¹⁶⁰

While several Member States continue to lead in these projects and technologies, there is greater concern that Member States with lower budgets may choose to rely on the free technology infusions provided by Alliance partners.¹⁶¹ NATO finds itself burdened by a major transatlantic spending gap that extends from research to average soldier investment. The United States already invests three hundred thousand Euros per soldier; this is more than three times the average European defense investment. Partnerships in development are essential if NATO is to prevent spending gaps turning into capability gaps between Member States in its operations. A positive step toward unified Alliance development is a NATO led operation toward communications installations that when utilized by all Member States will streamline command and control during NATO exercises and operations.¹⁶² Additionally, NATO hopes to decrease spending and capability gaps by restructuring operational logistics that are a major component of the average maintenance costs for a soldier. The Lisbon Summit recognizes the inefficiencies that plagued past NATO operations in terms of logistical planning both in the short and long term.¹⁶³ In order to rectify these problems the Lisbon Summit Capabilities Package proposes the use of Collective Logistical Contracts (CLC). Logistical contracts are typically negotiated immediately before an operation begins, but CLCs would set up dedicated preparations and areas of responsibility concerning operation logistics with the hope of greatly increasing the speed with which a NATO mission can be dispatched and decreasing the cost of its maintenance. Finally, NATO is reassessing Member State permanent force levels. Alliance Member States are required to have fifty percent of their total available ground forces deployable for NATO operations at any given time. Additionally, governments are to be able to support ten percent of their land forces on operation or at a high state of readiness for deployment.

¹⁵⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mediterranean Dialogue. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A1150A81-93514CBB/natolive/topics_60021.htm

¹⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Improving NATO's Capabilities.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹⁵⁶ Atlantic Council US. "Trans Atlantic Austerity: Can NATO Remain Relevant Amid Defense Cuts?"

http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/trans-atlantic-austerity-can-nato-remain-relevant-amid-defense-cuts

¹⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Alliance Ground Surveillance. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm

¹⁵⁸ Time. "The costly F-35: The Saga of America's Next Fighter Jet."

<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1975139,00.html>

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Atlantic Council US. "Trans Atlantic Austerity: Can NATO Remain Relevant Amid Defense Cuts?"

http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/trans-atlantic-austerity-can-nato-remain-relevant-amid-defense-cuts

¹⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Security Policy in an Era of Budgetary Constraint.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64563.htm

¹⁶² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO C3 Feasibility Study.

http://www.dodccrp.org/files/nneccfs_executive_summary_2.0_nu.pdf

¹⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Improving NATO's Capabilities.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en

These levels will not decrease with falling defense budgets but instead are to expand to include forty percent of deployable air units with eight percent available for sustained operations. An increase to the minimum readiness figures for Member States should help to offset the gap in voluntary transatlantic defense spending.¹⁶⁴

Multinational units could serve as the foundation for future alliance operations and the UK-France Defense Co-operation Treaty appears to meet all of the goals of cooperation that NATO seeks to establish.¹⁶⁵ The treaty creates a non-standing expeditionary force built around the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, with the goal of full military integration within the task group. This goal is to increase the efficiency of inter-service cooperation through special training for the units that will serve with the new force. Further, the new task group will have the full logistical requirements for the units of each Member State deployed with it. The agreement also establishes a formal dialogue on the joint acquisition of new technologies to work toward more capabilities that are common.¹⁶⁶ The new force will enjoy joint and equal financing from the Member States involved. By duplicating this idea among Member States, the model has the potential to reduce operations costs within NATO missions and Member State militaries.¹⁶⁷ NATO could call upon fully integrated multinational units that will not require the same level of logistical support inherent with Alliance missions comprising so many different Member State's units.¹⁶⁸ In Operation Unified Protector in Libya, Alliance forces must operate from facilities capable of supporting their specific unit maintenance needs which restricts many partner states such as the UAE and Qatar to NATO air bases in Italy.¹⁶⁹ This translates to NATO operating separate forces, which adds to the coordination complexity and the operation costs for these aircraft. An Alliance wide agreement on the active encouragement of these arrangements should produce a NATO that is more capable and flexible at decreased cost.¹⁷⁰

Instability in the Euro-Zone

Differences in economic policy and monetary procedures between and among Member States were a major factor in the worldwide economic crisis.¹⁷¹ Overspending and over saving caused an unsustainable economic environment that hid warning signs of an impending collapse.¹⁷² The NATO-PA finds that the European economy is in deep need of currency reform and Member States need to renegotiate their monetary policy to counter instabilities.¹⁷³ The EU's primary currency, the Euro, saw establishment in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty and a launch in 1999.¹⁷⁴ The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which is an organization made up of all of the EU Member States who participate in the Euro, supports this currency.¹⁷⁵ Economic policy remains a decision of national governments but the EMU sets the rules that the Euro system is to adhere to in a fiscal cycle.¹⁷⁶ The economic collapse destabilized the EMU and the Euro currency by exposing a key weakness in its appearance. The big powers of the EU, such as Germany, are very stable and as such are safe for banks to lend to, as they will be able to handle the debt load.¹⁷⁷ Many Euro-zone governments are weak and would usually have very low borrowing limits relative to their economy, as banks would be unsure of returns. However, with the birth of the Euro and the perception of unified economic and monetary policies, European banks saw all governments within the Euro-zone as equally stable because the big economies and safe governments like Germany technically supported them. Thus, banks lent out

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

¹⁶⁵ Ministry of Defense. UK-France Defense Co-operation Treaty Announced. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/UkfranceDefenceCooperationTreatyAnnounced.htm>

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

¹⁶⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Improving NATO's Capabilities. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unified Protector Fact Sheet. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110325_110325-unified-protector-factsheet.pdf

¹⁶⁹ NATO-PA. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid

¹⁷¹ New York Times. "Marching to Different Tunes". <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/27/opinion/27iht-edkennedy.html>

¹⁷² Ibid

¹⁷³ NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁷⁴ European Commission. The Euro. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ European Commission. The Euro. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm

¹⁷⁷ The New York Times. The Euro-Zone's Structural Problem. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/23/is-there-any-hope-for-greeces-debt-problem/the-euro-zones-structural-problem>

large portions of their capital to weaker governments like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.¹⁷⁸ This has triggered debt servicing payments beyond government capability and the EMU has been unable to compelling its Member States to act.¹⁷⁹ These increasingly nonviable economies infect the currency of the Euro zone with instability. The Euro relies on the stability of all of its Member States in order to maintain its strength and now the EU must bail out these governments or risk the complete collapse of the Euro as a viable currency.¹⁸⁰ NATO Member States and European partners must find a way to reform the process of bank to government lending and resolve the structural problems of a unified currency without a proper corrective authority.¹⁸¹

Government Spending Reform

The Euro continues to be a source of special instability for European Member States but issues of government spending plague all Member States.¹⁸² For example, the American economy is more centralized and influential organism than its individual European counter-parts.¹⁸³ The US relies on the use of government spending to manipulate its economy in order to offset imbalances in world trade.¹⁸⁴ This is most apparent in assessing the United States' relationship with China, which is an unhealthy exchange that obfuscates China's currency while causing chronic budget deficits for the US.¹⁸⁵ The result of this relationship is that China has generated massive trade imbalances in its benefit with NATO Member States.¹⁸⁶ NATO's contribution to correcting this problem is to work with the United States and other Member States to control budget requirements while maintaining defense-spending targets for the Alliance.¹⁸⁷ Another major component in NATO Member States' budgets is the contribution of more than ninety billion USD in foreign aid for 2008.¹⁸⁸ This represents approximately ninety percent of all development aid worldwide and on average accounts for 0.45 percent of Member States GDP. The UN set the expected contribution at 0.7 percent meaning that, despite the heavy burden that NATO Member States are already carrying current levels fall below standards.¹⁸⁹ In an era of recession following economic collapse, Member States are considering the importance of foreign aid commitments balanced against the maintenance of domestic economies and regional security.¹⁹⁰ NATO's long-term goals require a United States and Europe capable of sustaining their commitments to collective security.¹⁹¹ In light of the difficulty that the European Union is having with economic controls and the unpredictability of US politics in the American economy, NATO has a responsibility to reinforce and champion corrective procedures in the interest of transatlantic stability and security.¹⁹²

Burden of National Debt

National debt is an important factor in the overall economic health of a Member State and severe limits fiscal growth. National debt is the total amount of money owed by a state's central government because of borrowing.¹⁹³ This number, total amount of borrowed money, weighed against Gross Domestic Product (GDP) effects the way a government is able to interact economically with the world. Public debt, in and of itself, is a valuable tool to balance currency and aid economic growth.¹⁹⁴ Specifically, national debt plays a large part in Member State

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ NATO-PA. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁸⁰ European Commission. The Euro. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm

¹⁸¹ NATO-PA. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ About Economics. Mixed Economy. http://economics.about.com/od/howtheuseconomyworks/a/mixed_economy.htm

¹⁸⁴ About Economics. Government's Role in the Economy.

<http://economics.about.com/od/howtheuseconomyworks/a/government.htm>

¹⁸⁵ NATO-PA. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁸⁶ New York Times. "Marching to Different Tunes". <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/27/opinion/27iht-edkennedy.html>

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹⁸⁸ Politics, Arts, and Philosophy Blog. Statistics on International Development Aid. <http://filipsagnoli.wordpress.com/stats-on-human-rights/statistics-on-poverty/statistics-on-international-development-aid/>

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁹¹ NATO-PA. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ About Economics. Definition of National Debt. http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/national_debt.htm

¹⁹⁴ Institute for Policy Innovation. "Who's Afraid of the National Debt."

<http://www.ipi.org/IPI/IPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupExecutiveSummary/BF86DA7A61CB842986256AB7006C5FFD>

economies because the Euro and US dollar determine their worth by demand, which is a function of the financial stability of a central government.¹⁹⁵ Member States can borrow money based on their perceived credit rating or a government's ability to pay back the debt it currently holds.¹⁹⁶ Changes in the perception or credit rating of a state not only impacts that state's borrowing power, but also begins to limit foreign investment and internal economic development.¹⁹⁷ This is the case with Greece, an overburdening of national debt crippled foreign investment and government solvency. The reason an outright collapse did not occur is that Greece's currency, and by extension its technical ability to pay back debt, ties into the European Union as a whole.¹⁹⁸ This is good for Greece, but burdens the Euro with Greek economic instability, and thus, this event threatens the future of the Euro currency. Globally, states hold currencies in reserve as treasuries of the government. In the past, many governments held large reserves of US dollars but with the growth of the EU, states are now holding larger reserves of the Euro.¹⁹⁹ Governments do not want to hold currencies that depreciate or outright collapse in value as assets, which is occurring as US debt rises and the EU becomes unstable. Unfortunately, demand driven currencies become even less valuable as foreign governments decrease their reserves of that currency in favor of more stable holdings.²⁰⁰ Thus, it can be argued that high national debt undermines global economic power and long-term economic solvency.

NATO Member States, such as the United Kingdom, are undertaking extensive measures to unload national debt by raising taxes and decreasing spending.²⁰¹ The NATO-PA endorses two approaches to the problem of national debt levels. The first is an attempt to boost the economy of Member States, which would change the GDP to national debt ratio.²⁰² Normally, this is a natural and somewhat unpredictable phenomenon but it is possible to engineer economic growth by increasing the integration of the industries to improve market efficiency.²⁰³ However, even with intelligent market controls the results are not guaranteed which is why the second method relies on predictable government policy changes. As in the United Kingdom, this option would allow Member States to use controlled tax increases and spending cuts to get their budgets under control which should lead to a better economic environment following the debt burden's removal.²⁰⁴ The NATO-PA notes that this approach is more practical in light of the turbulence in the current world market. If the United Kingdom's approach proves unsuccessful, NATO Member States will reassess their options for debt and deficit control.²⁰⁵ NATO's role in this process is to encourage the paying off debts and the fostering of conditions favorable for economic growth; especially should economic slowdowns occur because of debt unloading programs.

Conclusion

As NATO becomes an organization for the twenty-first century, it must find a way to balance its continuing commitment to the security of Europe against its need to protect the interests of Member States abroad. The onset of economic recession challenged NATO to reassess its goals and find a way to accomplish its mission at reduced cost to its Member States.²⁰⁶ The external solution is the expansion of the alliance proper and the development of numerous partners around the world.²⁰⁷ The internal approach has been a dramatic restructuring of the way that NATO operates and the proposal of numerous methods that allied governments can reduce defense budgets without threatening alliance security.²⁰⁸ As NATO Member States adapt their defense commitments to contemporary

¹⁹⁵ About Economics. Value of the US Dollar. http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/Dollar_Value.htm

¹⁹⁶ Standard and Poor's. Understanding Standard and Poor's Rating Definitions.

http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/delivery/assets/files/Understanding_Rating_Definitions.pdf

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ European Commission. The Euro. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm

¹⁹⁹ About Economics. Value of the US Dollar. http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/Dollar_Value.htm

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Wall Street Journal. "UK grows slows, yielding further worries as cuts loom."

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB40001424052748703752404576178532138057362.html>

²⁰² NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

²⁰³ Ibid

²⁰⁴ Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Southwest Economy. <http://www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2005/swe0504b.html>

²⁰⁵ NATO-Parliamentary Assembly. Spring Report 2011. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2435>

²⁰⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Security Policy in an Era of Budgetary Constraint.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64563.htm

²⁰⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Improving NATO's Capabilities.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en

²⁰⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Improving NATO's Capabilities.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en

economic realities, the tradition of partnership and unity will be more important than ever in this and future periods of economic turbulence.²⁰⁹

Committee Directives

NATO is a unique and sometimes difficult committee to understand in SRMUN, especially in dealing with economic issues. The first step for delegates is to familiarize themselves with NATO's operational mechanisms. Specifically, each delegate should be very familiar with what *consensus* means and how NATO's *consensus-based voting* shapes economic decisions. Delegates will also benefit from exploring the NATO and NATO-PA websites, which include a fair amount of general knowledge information on the Alliance's economic policies. Second, various economic terms and concepts will come up in discussions on this topic. This guide touches upon many of these, but it is strongly recommended that delegates develop a working knowledge beyond the brief explanations included in this guide. Included in the Technical Appendix Guide (TAG) is a link to The Economist's dictionary of economics. Third, delegates should be very comfortable with economic and security data from their respective Member States. Figures show up frequently in this guide and can be expected to play a large part in discussions on issues within this topic. An accurate knowledge on figures strengthens speeches and position papers.

As delegates approach this topic, it is important to remember that NATO is a military alliance focused on security but that addressing economic problems is a way of approaching long-term security. Obviously, all information gathered beyond the summary the guide provides will be very useful to delegates, but a delegate might consider researching a few areas in detail. The relationships between NATO and other powers and organizations are important as the alliance considers ways to expand its partnerships around the world. The mechanics of logistics and development reform in NATO is an on-going discussion. The proposed France-UK carrier task group could be a model for the rest of NATO or it may not be feasible outside of agreements. A serious factor may be the authority, if any, that NATO has to police its members on currency and spending reform in consideration of long-term security. Finally, an interesting issue, which will be supported by a few links in the Technical Appendix Guide, is cyber-security and its economic impact. Should NATO and its Member States be equally concerned with cyber attacks in considerations of economic stability in light of recent major cyber attacks and their economic fallout? Further, in light of the warning given to NATO, in June, by the hacker group, anonymous, and the increasingly dangerous behavior of hacker groups, like Lulzsec; should NATO consider conventional combat against these groups or utilize digital mediums alone? Do cyber groups pose the same threat and merit the same response as international terrorist groups to defend Member States?

III: A Review of Policies to Prepare for, Prevent, and Deter Maritime Piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

-Definition of Piracy, Article 15, Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958²¹⁰

Introduction

Piracy is an external threat to the economic security and stability of Member States and as such, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has a responsibility to act alone or with international partners to safeguard the shipping lanes that sustain Europe. The authoring document for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enshrines the idea of

²⁰⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Security Policy in an Era of Budgetary Constraint." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64563.htm

²¹⁰ United Nations. Convention on the High Seas. http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf

collective defense, Article 5, not simply of territory but of Member State interests abroad, such as the vital trade links of Europe.²¹¹

International awareness and concern over modern piracy began in the 1980's leading to the inclusion of a formal definition of piracy in the United Nations Convention on the High Seas.²¹² Since then, acts of piracy have continued to be on the rise with an average of two to four hundred incidents reported annually to the International Piracy Reporting Center.²¹³ This data does not include attacks where ship captains declined to make formal reports. The widespread rise in piracy is associated with areas of weak or outright failed government. This leads to a breakdown of economic potentials as territorial control and political stability recede.²¹⁴ This is true in the case of the Horn of Africa, where the collapse of the Somali government and the fishing disruption of an international trade corridor have led to economic meltdown.²¹⁵ These former anglers are now employing themselves and their vessels as pirates for either personal profit or, in more organized cases, as agents for powerful investors.²¹⁶ In general, this poses a threat to the stability of international trade, the safety of crews, and the cost of doing business with regard to losses and insurance. However, more specifically this is a direct threat and challenge to NATO and the European Union (EU) who rely heavily on the Gulf of Aden corridor for trade.

NATO and the EU responded with the deployment of several forces to combat piracy. NATO deployed Operation Active Endeavour for the security of the Mediterranean and deployed, beginning in 2007, Operations Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden.²¹⁷ The EU dispatched Operation ATALANTA along with the establishment of a complex land based coordination facility for merchants in the trade corridor.²¹⁸ NATO and the EU have also worked with private organizations to develop new guidelines for merchants passing through high risk areas.²¹⁹ NATO is also leading the way in training Member State officers in boarding procedures by developing sophisticated and target programs to give alliance personnel experience in the inspection of suspicious vessels.²²⁰

Operation Active Endeavour

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) began on 6 October, 2001 as NATO's first, Article 5, mission.²²¹ Article 5 of the Washington Treaty established the principle of collective defense as it applies to the NATO alliance. Member States recognize any attack against one as an attack against all and, under Article 51 of the United Nations charter, reserve the right to use any means necessary to restore security to the North Atlantic.²²² These measures are to remain in place until the Security Council takes steps to restore international peace and security.²²³ It was part of a two-fold operation, along with the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) deployed in Operation Eagle Assist, in response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.²²⁴ The original mandate of OAE was to track and board vessels suspected to be in support of or actively engaged in terrorist activities; and were limited to the Eastern Mediterranean. From 2003-2004, this mandate expanded to include requests from alliance vessels for escort through the Straits of Gibraltar, due to the perceived threat of attack in the narrow waterway. This specific courtesy ceased when, following the successes of OAE, the North Atlantic Council expanded the operational area to include the entire Mediterranean.²²⁵

²¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

²¹² NATO-PA. 2009 Annual Session. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770>

²¹³ International Maritime Bureau. IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre>

²¹⁴ Middle East Research and Information Project. On Piracy and the Afterlives of Failed States. <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer256/piracy-afterlives-failed-states>

²¹⁵ NATO-PA. 2009 Annual Session. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770>

²¹⁶ Time. "How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates." <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html>

²¹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Counter-Piracy Operations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

²¹⁸ EU NAVFOR Somalia. Mission. <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>

²¹⁹ Best Management Practice 3. Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/images/stories/pdfs/bmp3.pdf>

²²⁰ NMIOTC. Mission. http://www.hellenicnavy.gr/nmiotc/fastConnections/index_en.htm

²²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Operation: Active Endeavour. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

²²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Treaty. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

²²³ Ibid

²²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Operation: Active Endeavour. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

²²⁵ Ibid

OAE is under the command of Joint Forces Command (JFC), Naples and, in a deployment configuration, consists of a balanced collection of surface units, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft. The units serve as reaction forces that respond to reports of suspicious activity collected by NATO Mediterranean sensors and allied aircraft overflights. This deployed force supports its operations with the ability to call on NATO's two high readiness frigate squadrons and NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Groups One and Two for surge operations. Mediterranean Member States initially contributed the majority of units to the operation, but OAE has seen these forces joined by contributions from other European Member States and Mediterranean partners. Additionally NATO considers offers of support from the international community in the conduct of OAE.²²⁶

Since 2001, OAE hailed more than 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded some one hundred fifty-five suspected vessel. Technically, the OAE mandate is limited to deterring terrorism but the NATO presence has served to stabilize the area and increase security. Additionally, OAE has been able to assist ships in distress and aided the Greek Government in security operations for the 2004 Olympic Games. NATO further benefits from the fact that OAE serves as a means of increasing cooperation with partners of the Mediterranean dialogue and information sharing among the states in the region. The command also serves as a chance to increase inter-alliance cooperation and provide sailors from Member States with experience in multi-national operations. Currently, OAE is transitioning from a deployed force to a network of on-call vessels designed to provide more rapid response over a wider area of responsibility.²²⁷

Operations Allied Provider and Allied Protector

In 2008, Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon, requested that the NATO Secretary General consider deployment of naval forces to provide consistent escorts for World Food Programme (WFP) vessels in and around the Horn of Africa while plans were completed for a permanent European Union naval deployment.²²⁸ At the Budapest, Hungary conference, NATO defense ministers agreed to provide naval forces to combat piracy and escort WFP vessels delivering food to Somalia. Allied Protector diverted three vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) that were to visit Istanbul Cooperation Initiative states (ICI) and reassigned them to make regular patrols of the sea around Somalia to defend WFP vessels pursuant to the rules of engagement.²²⁹ In October of 2008, SNMG2 made transit of the Suez Canal and began its duties as the first NATO flagged deployment on the Horn of Africa. This operation lasted until December of 2008 when the European Union force arrived to take over permanent duties in the area.²³⁰

Operation Allied Protector ran from March to August of 2009 and was a response to increased pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and the horn of Africa. Originally, the operation was the second phase of a tour of Southeast Asian ports by SNMG1 but attacks in April 2009 led the North Atlantic Council to suspend the last two port visits and to initiate counter-piracy operations on May 1. SNMG1 deployed until June when SNMG2 with its greater operational experience in countering piracy assumed control. The operation had five warships available and patrolled the area in support of the EU ATALANTA mission, discussed in detail below. The operation folded into the much larger Operation Ocean Shield, outlined below, in August of 2009. Allied Provider and Allied Protector drew directly from NATO OAE forces in the Mediterranean and utilized the same operational parameters to track and intercept suspicious vessels as well as responding to distress calls from commercial vessels under attack by suspected pirate forces.²³¹

²²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Operation: Active Endeavour. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

²²⁷ Ibid

²²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Operation Allied Provider. http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_allied_provider.aspx

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Counter-Piracy Operations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

²³¹ Ibid

Operation Ocean Shield

Operations Allied Provider and Allied Protector showed a continuing need for NATO military presence in the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy.²³² Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) began in August of 2009 as a more permanent and comprehensive mission to replace the temporary Operation Allied Protector. OOS conducts helicopter surveillance of the region; and track and identify vessels similarly to Active Endeavor.²³³ The primary mission is the disruption of hijacking and armed robberies of vessels in the area but at the request of the UN Secretary-General, OOS also conducts escort duties for supply vessels of the United Nations Support Office for ANISOM (UNSOA).²³⁴ The African Union Mission in Somalia (ANISOM) is often short on supplies and requires UN assistance in maintaining supply lines. The NATO vessels guard supply ships until they reach the relative safety of the Mogadishu harbor entrance. NATO also seeks to develop partnerships with the other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimize the knowledge and countering of evolving pirate tactics. This extends to NATO offers of assistance to regional states who wish to develop native counter-piracy capabilities.²³⁵

OOS is composed of four standing reaction forces under the command of Allied Maritime Component Command (CC-Mar) UK Northwood.²³⁶ The primary service rotation is by SNMG1 and SNMG2 but NATO has two counter-mine task groups in reserve to serve as support during surge operations. The six to ten vessels of the SNMG's are representative of numerous Member States and are permanently available to NATO for operations. The membership of the SNMG's rotates on four to six month deployments for allied vessels. The OOC's mandate extends until 2012 when the mission will be re-evaluated.²³⁷

Operation Ocean Shield has seen significant successes against pirate forces, notably in May 2011.²³⁸ In the first week of May 2011, the USS Bainbridge acting as part of OCC was on patrol on the Somali coast as part of a NATO move to hit pirates closer to bases along the coast.²³⁹ Under cover of darkness, the Bainbridge tracked a suspected pirate dhow as it left port. When day broke in the Indian Ocean, the pirates were met with the Bainbridge's Seahawk helicopter and boarding team.²⁴⁰ The pirates surrendered upon sighting the warship and the Bainbridge was able to seize all of the pirates' equipment as evidence. The boarding team was also able to make contact with the ship's Pakistani master and fifteen-man crew who confirmed that the vessel had been pirated more than six months earlier.²⁴¹ The USS Bainbridge provided the vessel's crew with medical attention and supplies for their voyage home after long captivity. Following up on this success, the USS Bainbridge, USS Stephen W Groves, and HDMS Esbern Snare each hit pirate action groups (PAG) in the third week of May 2011. Responding to an attempted hijacking of the MSC Ayala the Bainbridge encountered a pirated dhow. After radio interrogation, the pirates agreed to leave the ship via their attack skiff. However, it became apparent that the skiff was unseaworthy and the Bainbridge rescued the pirates from their vessel. The dhow, which was hijacked four days earlier, was allowed to proceed on its business. At about the same time, the Esbern Snare and Stephen W Groves encountered pirate mother ships that opened fire upon the alliance vessels as they approached. After brief fire fights, the pirates surrendered in both cases and the hostages on the vessels were able to receive medical attention before being returned to their respective states.²⁴²

²³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Counter-Piracy Operations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Counter-Piracy Operations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

²³⁵ Ibid

²³⁶ Ibid

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Ibid

²³⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO warship intercepts pirate mother ship and frees 15 hostages.*

<http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/10%2005%2011%20GB%20PAO%20%207%20Pirates%20surrender%20to%20NATO.pdf>

²⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO warship intercepts pirate mother ship and frees 15 hostages.*

<http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/10%2005%2011%20GB%20PAO%20%207%20Pirates%20surrender%20to%20NATO.pdf>

²⁴¹ Ibid

²⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO action frees hostages and defeats pirates.*

<http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/20%2005%2011GB%20PAO%20%20SWG%20ESSN%20BAIN%20round%20up%20v%202%20%205%2011.pdf>

EU NAVFOR Somalia: Operation ATALANTA

Following the temporary mission of NATO's Allied Provider, the EU NAVFOR Somalia assumed responsibility for the safety of World Food Programme shipping into Somalia and of the counter-piracy operations in the region. Further, the mission is to work toward better control of illegal fishing in the area.²⁴³ As of 2010, twenty-six EU Member States have contributed in some way with thirteen of those contributing units for the mission during its deployment. UK Northwood command Operation ATALANTA as in NATO's OOC. The operation is budgeted at approximately eight million Euros' annually, which goes toward funding the command functions while EU Member States continue to maintain the funding for any physical contributions to the mission. The force comprises ten surface combatants, two auxiliary craft, and four aircraft.²⁴⁴ This drops by half in the monsoon season due to the decreased pirate activity. However, the mission benefits from coordination with Ocean Shield and independent operators such as Russia and China.

EU NAVFOR Somalia since taking station in 2007 ensured that no WFP ships received attacks and assisted in the delivery 480,000 metric tons of supplies to Somalia. Piracy in the region has also seen a fifty percent drop because of international naval patrols and the increase in awareness among ship owners on proper anti-piracy measures. Because of these clear successes, the EU extended EU NAVFOR's mandate until December of 2012.²⁴⁵

NATO Interception Procedures

NATO commanders responding to a need to protect shipping in a given area will consider four operational concepts defined by alliance planners. These are sea control, distant and close escort, naval cooperation and guidance support, and convoying. The nature of the threat to shipping defines the operation that a commander will implement. Escorts are reasonable for individual vessels when commercial traffic is below a certain numerical level or when the threat is in a smaller geographic area. Convoying is an operation that further concentrates the escorting forces and reduces individual merchant risk by grouping the vessel with merchants of similar speed for the duration of transit, which is useful when traffic volume is at a medium level. While escort missions are without specific requests, naval cooperation is an upgrade in complexity and legal responsibility. In this operation, NATO forces organize the merchant groups and plan specific routes for shipping with defined military escorts when merchant vessels volunteer for assistance. Commanders consider sea control operations when the threat to shipping is both great and widespread in area. A sea control operation seeks to use mobile and static units to gain supremacy in a region; it may include elements of the three other concepts in order to project power and dominance over the sea-lane. It is most useful when traffic is too high to consider individual or group escorts alone.²⁴⁶

Operation Active Endeavour allowed NATO a chance to develop and test a system of monitoring of merchant traffic, standardized radio challenges, and interception protocol.²⁴⁷ Units within an operational attempt to establish a recognized surface picture (RSP).²⁴⁸ This is a complete picture of all surface traffic in the area along with the identification of friendly, neutral, and suspect vessels. Alliance vessels are to use the maximum performance of organic sensors and freely use air and shore assets for complete coverage.²⁴⁹ Data transmitted among fleet units and coordinated with command centers forms individual dossiers, which contain available manifests and crew. Alliance units are to radio challenge all vessels in the area of interest.²⁵⁰ NATO recommends the use of radio operators who are located on the bridge and possesses experience in radio communications. Operators should also have a strong and confident voice in communications. The contact vessel requests data on origination, destination, and technical information from the suspect ship.²⁵¹ The contacting unit will then compare the received data against compiled records. If the information clears the vessel, it is to continue on to its destination. However, if discrepancies arise,

²⁴³ EU NAVFOR Somalia. Mission. <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid

²⁴⁶ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Protection of Shipping*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Counter-Piracy Operations. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

²⁴⁸ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Detection and Surveillance*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Interrogation, Approach, and Stopping*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

the vessel will require a physical inspection.²⁵² After a vessel identified and notified for boarding, the contact naval unit will compile important information from operation command and organic sensor data. This report, known as an Essential Elements of Information (EEI), is to provide the boarding team (BT) with data needed for their safety and inspection. The report includes information such as number of suspect personnel, weapons carried by the ship and crew, photos of ship and any unusual activity, evidence of ship modification, cargo manifest, and travel history with recent movements.²⁵³ The alliance vessel is to, in daylight, place the sun behind it to aid surveillance on the target vessel and obscure itself to its target. Helicopters are the preferred platform for the boarding operation as they provide additional surveillance and sniper capability.²⁵⁴ NATO boarding procedures dictate that as the landing boat engineer or helicopter gunner cover the boarding the security team is to lead.²⁵⁵ Security team leader is to board first and cover the entry ladder or helicopter drop point. In the case of ladder, no more than two men should board the ship at a time. Forces will use fast roping procedure on a clear drop point or helipad when deploying from a helicopter.²⁵⁶ Security teams then take up positions of observation, line of fire, and triangulation over the crew, boat, and boarding party. The search team will proceed to question the crew and search the cargo for contraband, flawed paperwork, and suspicious contents. If the crew and cargo match manifests, the team will disembark from the vessel in same manner as its boarding with the security team leader following last to maintain defense.²⁵⁷

NATO has very clear guidelines on the treatment of captured persons defined by Geneva commitments concerning prisoners of war.²⁵⁸ However, the prosecution of pirates poses a problem for the alliance as Member States have different ideas on what constitutes proper trials for suspects. The Law of the High Seas states that the arresting party may decide the punishment of the vessel and crew when arrested in international waters.²⁵⁹ The problem arises in areas of territorial waters, specifically Yemeni and Somali waters, which are popular routes for international shipping. These legal questions lead to at best widespread confusion and at worst unwillingness on the part of Member States to accept responsibility for prisoner trials or turnover to home government for inhumane punishments. Specifically, Germany's constitution forbids navy vessels from taking pirate suspects as prisoners in international waters much less the territorial waters of Somalia.²⁶⁰ The EU had an agreement with Kenya in the early years of Operation ATALANTA and was able to garner more international support and contributions to their efforts.²⁶¹ However, Kenya in the face of mounting trial costs discontinued their agreement with the EU and now individual nations are again responsible for costs of trials. The United Kingdom is attempting to take responsibility for its captured pirates but the trial costs are again becoming prohibitive and the alternative of holding suspects accountable to Somalia's Shari'ah law is unsustainable.²⁶²

Private Industry Procedures for Piracy

Private industry, as the primary victim of pirate attacks, is producing numerous new guidelines in concert with government authority. The leading developers are the Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Maritime Bureau. MSCHOA is the shore based command component of the EUNAVOR mission in Somalia and provides information on pirate attacks and best shipping routes to shipmasters and operators.²⁶³ The IMO is the United Nations organization responsible for stability and safety in the maritime trade environment.²⁶⁴ Finally, the IMB is the anti-piracy branch of the International Chamber of Commerce established in 1992 and represents the first private organization protecting

²⁵² NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Detection and Surveillance*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁵³ Ibid

²⁵⁴ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Interrogation, Approach, and Stopping*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁵⁵ Ibid

²⁵⁶ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Boarding and Searching*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ NATO Multinational Doctrine Manual. *Procedures for Handling Captured Persons*. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Anti-Piracy.pdf>

²⁵⁹ United Nations. Convention on the High Seas.

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf

²⁶⁰ NATO-PA. 2009 Annual Session. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770>

²⁶¹ EU NAVFOR Somalia. Mission. <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>

²⁶² NATO-PA. 2009 Annual Session. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770>

²⁶³ Maritime Security Centre. Horn of Africa. <http://www.mschoa.org/pages/default.aspx>

²⁶⁴ International Maritime Organization. About IMO. <http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx>

companies from pirate attacks.²⁶⁵ The IMB operates a Pirate Reporting Center in Malaysia, which often handles the first reports from ships of pirate attacks and relays information to government authorities and local vessels. The IMB also maintains a live map on their website of all reported pirate attacks as well as basic information regarding the nature of the incidents.²⁶⁶ The goal of these new procedures is to reduce the risk to ships that must pass through areas of high pirate activity. According to IMB, merchant vessels should consider:

- Maintaining speeds in excess of eighteen knots,
- Maintaining contact with naval forces during transit,
- The use of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC),
- Increases in watch numbers,
- The purchase of Kevlar vests and helmets for bridge personnel,
- The placement of razor wire on ship access points, and
- The placement of outward facing warnings of electrified barriers in Somalia.²⁶⁷

The speed of eighteen knots emerged as a general rule as it often makes the boarding process difficult or impossible for the small skiffs used in attacks. Maintaining contact with international forces speeds reaction time if an incident occurs and provides a more effective deterrent from coordination. The IRTC is an international devised passage that groups vessels together on the most efficient route through the high pirate activity zone. In addition to being the focal point of international military presence, the passage has groups of vessels that coordinate clustered transits based around the members' sustained speed. These formations post rallying and departure times for interested vessels in the secure section of the MSCHOA website. Access to this data and other information about vessels registered with the MSCHOA is restricted pending vetting by security forces. If approved, MSCHOA issues a secure login to a ship's captain or company security officer to access planned commercial and military movements for a given period. Ship awareness of attacks in progress or suspicious activity is very important and posting of more watchers during transit increases vigilance. The bridge is often the focus of the opening phases of a pirate attack and private industry suggest the employment of protective equipment in non-military colors to reduce the risk to the bridge and prevent the ship's controls falling to boarders. Strands of double-coiled razor wire on ship access points during the passage can serve as a powerful barrier for the poorly equipped and unarmored pirate forces. Finally, whether a vessel possesses electrified barriers or not, the Somali language warning of electric shock and discourage potential boarders from risking contact with the ship. In addition, private industry recommends that companies and operators develop individual plans of action for their ships to minimize crew confusion and maximize the speed of any response to an attack.²⁶⁸

Conclusion

NATO and the EU are responding to piracy with strong and sophisticated military responses but the number of pirate attacks continues to rise even as the attacks themselves intensify.²⁶⁹ Progress is certainly visible and naval force is serving as a deterrent but military responses alone are not sufficient to eliminate piracy. This will continue to limit NATO's ability to control the Gulf of Aden seaway. Additionally, the legal barriers to effective boarding, arrest, and prosecution of suspected pirates internationally and even among Member States will hamper the long-term success of NATO operations. Partners such as the European Union and the United Nations may be required to redefine piracy and redevelop the Horn of Africa's economy to remove piracy as viable employment.²⁷⁰

Committee Directive

Piracy in the horn of Africa is largely a result of the failed state of Somalia. However, NATO has neither the interest nor the ability to provide the comprehensive aid and support required to stabilize Somalia. NATO is a military alliance and the sorely needed development in Somalia must come from organizations like the UN, EU, and African Union. In addressing this topic, delegates should focus on the military policy of NATO and to a limited

²⁶⁵ International Maritime Bureau. IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre>

²⁶⁶ IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. Live Piracy Report. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-report>

²⁶⁷ Best Management Practice 3. Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/images/stories/pdfs/bmp3.pdf>

²⁶⁸ Ibid

²⁶⁹ NATO-PA. 2009 Annual Session. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770>

²⁷⁰ Ibid

degree the public policy of Member States and maritime shipping. Delegates have freedom to determine and modify policy and procedures of vessels participating in NATO operations. NATO further has the ability to issue binding decisions to Member States on military logistics and readiness, propose recommendations to Member States on domestic maritime policy, and issue advice to private industry. NATO, as a military alliance, cannot dictate to alliance Member States, private industry, or sovereign UN Member States.

In awareness of these limitations, delegates should consider under policy and procedures:

- Ways to maximize the defense of merchant vessels
- Changes to Allied interception practices
- Changes to the rules of engagement for alliance vessels
- The size and scale of existing and future counter-piracy operations
- Changes to patrol methods within operational areas
- Current and future cooperation with international partners and organizations

Under Legal Questions:

- Changes to the definition of piracy
- The limitations of territorial water boundaries on counter-piracy operations
- Unified policies on the capture of suspected pirates
- Unified policies on the rights of a pirate
- Unified policies on the trial of accused pirates

A firm grasp of the geography of the Horn of Africa will aid a delegate in following discussion and understanding the legal problems involved in the regional suppression of piracy, thus a detailed map is in the Technical Appendix Guide below. This background guide endeavors to provide a delegate with a general review of the issue. Delegates, at a minimum, should be prepared to discuss the sub-topics of this document and a prepared delegate will be very knowledgeable on their Member State's legal positions and public policy concerning piracy and merchant marine.

Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)

Topic I: Examining NATO's Role in the Africa-EU Energy Partnership

Lars Holstenkamp. "An Overview of European Programs to Support Energy Projects in Africa and Strategies to Involve the Private Sector." In *European Development Cooperation*. Ed. Paul Hoebink. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 95-124.

This is an excellent overview of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership. This section is a great starting overview of the partnership and the challenges that face both Africa and the EU. It also offers future suggestions for the partnership to succeed. This overview is useful because it can be used and compared to NATO's priorities when it comes to energy security.

News and Resources on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. *Europafrica Bulletin Issue 43-April 2011*.
<http://europafrica.net/2009/04/28/europafrica-bulletin-issue-43-%E2%80%93-april-2011/>

This bulletin from April 2011 is an excellent way to become acquainted with up to date news about the entire partnership. Delegates can also get comfortable with other aspects of the partnership. While the importance of this topic is energy, it would be useful to see if there is any overlap with other parts of the partnership and if those ideas can be implemented to the energy topic.

Borcher, Heiko and Karina Forster. EU-NATO Cooperation Could Guarantee Energy Infrastructure Security.
[http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/EU-NATO Cooperation Could Guarantee Energy Infrastructure Security](http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/EU-NATO_Cooperation_Could_Guarantee_Energy_Infrastructure_Security)

This is an older commentary, but important for delegates to consider when analyzing solutions. The authors argue that energy infrastructure requires military-type security. They propose three ways where the EU and NATO can join forces: security and defense science and technology programs, military cooperation with key partners, and use previous lessons learned about energy security. This commentary could prove useful to delegates in the solution formation process.

Infrastructure and Energy. African Union: A United and Strong Africa. <http://www.au.int/en/dp/ie/>

This is the African Union's overview about energy and infrastructure. The AU is advocating for sustainable and clean energy sources and like the EU, feels that appropriate energy usage and development will improve the level of development throughout the Union. This website is important because it offers an insight to the goals and visions of the African energy systems and their plan to develop sustainable and renewable energy sources in the near future.

AfDB Danish government to set up \$57m sustainable energy fund for Africa. Ghana Business News.
<http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2011/07/22/afdb-danish-government-to-set-up-57m-sustainable-energy-fund-for-africa/>

This news article highlights the work of individual Member States in working with Africa to produce renewable energy. Denmark and the African Development Bank will establish a \$57 billion fund for sustainable energy development in Africa. The idea is to assist in achieving the MDGs by the 2015 deadline. This is one example of how Member States are assisting African development, which is vital to understanding the topic.

Lee, Andrew. EU Boost for Africa's New Renewable Development. RenewableEnergyWorld.com
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/12/eu-boost-for-africas-new-renewable-development>

This article uses the new renewable energy system that was recently installed in Cape Verde as an example of how the EU is bringing renewable energy sources to Africa. With more nations supporting new energy sources in Africa, it can increase development as well as offer more trading partners with EU Member

States. The article highlights the start of RECP and how it will benefit African Member States in the future.

Topic II: Ensuring NATO's Ability to Operate Effectively in Times of Economic Turbulence

Euractiv.com. "Cyber-attacks now the most feared EU energy threat." <http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/cyber-attacks-feared-eu-energy-threat-news-501547>

This is a basic article outlining European reactions to digital attacks and illustrates some of the dangers of truly malicious assaults on infrastructure. The external links at the bottom of the article are a great resource for linking to more data from the EU and NATO on cyber defense policy.

The Economist. Economic Terms A-Z. <http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=A>

This is a very useful database of terms through which you can search by letter for an economic word you are unfamiliar with. The site is useful whether you need clarity on just a few terms or are working from a very low level of economic understanding. This database is a key starting point for fully understanding the topic and drafting position papers.

The Economist. World Debt Comparison. http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock

This page is an interactive map of world debt levels in public debt per person from 2000 to a forecast of 2012. The map itself displays levels in color shades but the side bar also contains a tool to compare up to three different world states. The information from the comparison tool displays figures for public debt, population, and percentages of debt against GDP and annual change. This is useful tool for quickly finding information on a state besides the US and comparing against regional neighbors for context. The site also includes a clock of the approximate world public debt based on quarterly update factors for the displayed year.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 2009 Annual Report. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1928>

This is a report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly for 2009. The document is an informational paper exploring the impact of the economic crisis on NATO defense budgets and the key issues of the Member States following the 2009 session. Delegates can easily search the document for a Member State of interest and the data is backed with citation that be explored for more in depth data.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 2010 Annual Report. <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2081>

This is another annual report of the NATO parliamentary assembly for 2010. The document explores the effects of long-term economic change on the global balance of power. This paper seems lengthy at first glance but is a very smooth read and does a lot to help one understand the importance of economics to security issues. The other major advantage to these reports is the bibliography at the end of the document which link to interesting and in depth articles on specific topics discussed in the report. Keep an eye out for the in text citations as you read the report.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Defending Against Cyber Attacks. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-AC837816-7D8552FC/natolive/topics_49193.htm?selectedLocale=en

The committee directive references cyber security as a topic of research for delegates. This page is NATO's current cyber defense plan and gives delegates useful links to other NATO documents relating to digital security and cyber warfare as it relates to the defense of economic assets. However, it does not contain the June 2011 summit proposals which represent NATO new strategy with regard to cyber threats.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Review: "World Financial Crisis: what it means for security."
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/EN/index.htm>

This is a wonderful report from NATO that is broken down into video, photo, and text sections. It is a wonderful resource and represents NATO's understanding of what caused the financial crisis and what its short-term effects are in the realm of security. The report also touches upon some very interesting economic issues like modern protectionism. Delegates will find this a good complement to the NATO-PA's report on long-term economics.

Topic III: A Review of Policies to Prepare for, Prevent and Deter Maritime Piracy

Maritime Security: Sink or Swim. NATO Review
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Maritime_Security/EN/index.htm

This is a publication of the NATO review for 2010. It is discussion of maritime security, as NATO understands it. The issue contains a collection of short documentaries and interviews with NATO commanders. It also looks at the changing face of NATO Operation Active Endeavour and a discussion of the future of the alliance maritime security. This is a valuable introduction to delegates to maritime security as it is geared as a public relations piece.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Maritime Security. NATO and EU Roles and Coordination.
<http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2087>

This is part of the 2010 annual report of the NATO parliamentary assembly. It is a well-sourced analysis of the importance of NATO cooperation with the EU in maritime security and what roles both organizations will play in the Mediterranean and horn of Africa region. Delegates with basic knowledge of maritime security will find this report very valuable in shaping the focus of their research.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO Operation Under a New Strategic Concept and the EU as an Operational Partner <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2441>

Following up on the 2010 annual report, this is part of the NATO-PA 2011 spring report. These are the preliminary views of the various committees before the full parliamentary assembly votes on reports. This document is an update to the 2010 version but they address different issues. This one focuses on the effect that the new strategic concept has on future operations a cooperation with the EU. Delegates who find the last document interesting or who are looking for one document to give them an overview will find this useful.

Maritime Boundaries of the World http://assets.panda.org/img/original/hawksbill_maritime_boundaries.gif

This is a world map of territorial waters. Delegates may have to play with the zoom level to get exactly the view they want but this is a very useful picture. It's hard to visualize territorial boundaries and understand how difficult it is for international naval operations to effectively defend shipping while staying in international waters.

2011 Somali Piracy Update. gCaptain. <http://gcaptain.com/2011-piracy-update?19763>

The map in this article shows the level and extent of pirate attacks in the Horn of Africa region as well as showing the major international trade routes. This article is a useful counterpoint to the other documents in this paper because it is by authors within the shipping and maritime industry. It is also notable that NATO and the EU have failed to mention the numerous large mother ships that are being operated by pirates. However, the operations area and range of the large class mother ships is outside the jurisdiction of the international missions in the area. Delegates will find this article informative on the pirate threat in the greater Indian Ocean .

Desai, Ronak. Piracy Presents Opportunity for NATO-Russia Cooperation. Atlantic Council
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/piracy-presents-opportunity-nato-russia-cooperation

This article is useful for a delegate who wants to get a start at exploring the issues of international cooperation in the Horn of Africa, beyond the EU and NATO. The Russia Federation, China, and many others are also operating vessels in the region against piracy. Future operations may include cooperation with additional partners over a greater operational area.

Lyman, John. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: A Focused Approach. Journal of Foreign Relations. April 19, 2011.
<http://www.jofr.org/2011/04/19/piracy-in-the-gulf-of-aden-a-focused-approach/>

The article looks at the economics of piracy, both the profit for pirates and the cost to shipping of attacks. The BGG has avoided discussions on the issue of piracy because it was beyond the scope of consideration. However, delegates may find this article useful in preparing for discussions of piracy policy. While NATO will not solve the underlying causes of piracy, deeper knowledge of the issue can aid in committee discussion.