

Southern Regional Model United Nations XIX
Promoting Partnerships for a Sustainable Future

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Dear Honorable Delegates,

I would like to welcome you all to Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) XIX and to the General Assembly 1st Committee. My name is Ross Friedman, and it is my pleasure to serve as the Director of this committee. This is my second year on SRMUN staff. This year marks my eighth year participating in Model UN. Currently, I am a junior at Emory University double majoring in political science and music performance. I am thrilled at the opportunity to work in this plenary-sized body which represents the core of UN diplomacy. My Assistant Director, Christina Stephens, and I worked hard to encompass the many aspects of the theme for SRMUN XIX: *Promoting Partnerships for a Sustainable Future*, into our topics. The topics that will be addressed by our committee for this conference are:

Topic I: Maintaining Peace and Security through Reforms to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Topic II: Reforming Peacekeeping Forces: Combating Cultural and Regional Barriers

Topic III: Ending Internal Disputes for a Peaceful Future

This background guide will provide you with a foundation for your research. However, it is by no means exhaustive of the information available to you for each topic. I should remind you that thorough preparation of each topic is expected from every delegate in order to ensure the success of our committee. This background guide will provide an initial step in your research, but you will need to do research beyond the material presented in this background guide. The Technical Appendix Guide found at the end of the background guide is a great place to start for general research about the topics.

I want you to know that I understand first-hand the amount of research and effort that each of you have put forth thus far and am eager to see these topics come to fruition. On that note, Position papers must be submitted on-line via the SRMUN website and will be due by Midnight on October 24, 2008. Further specifications can be found on the SRMUN website. Late or improperly formatted position papers will no be considered for awards.

One of the best tools to prepare for this conference will be the SRMUN website (<http://www.srmun.org>), which is filled with links, position paper guidelines, and the rules of procedure. The SRMUN website will prove to be very beneficial to your delegation's success, so use it to its full advantage! It is also important to note that you will serve on one of the few committees that comprises every member state, an impressive and essential aspect of the GA First Committee.

If you have any questions along the way please feel free to contact Christina or myself. We are here for you. It is with great pleasure and honor to once again welcome you to SRMUN XIX!

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History of the General Assembly First Committee

“The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter; and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”

Article 10 of the United Nations Charter¹

The General Assembly (GA) First Committee of the United Nations (UN) is a plenary body to discuss questions of international peace and security.² In the GA, all 192 members of the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Observer entities (such as the Holy See and Palestine) are represented.³ Due to the vast scope of the General Assembly, it has been divided into several bodies, including the General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security (DISEC), the General Assembly Second Committee: Economic and Financial Committee, the General Assembly Third Committee: Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, the General Assembly Fourth Committee: Special Political and Decolonization Committee, the General Assembly Fifth Committee: Administrative and Budgetary Committee, the General Assembly Sixth Committee: Legal Committee, the Credentials Committee, and the General Committee.⁴ DISEC, like all other GA committees, has the power to consider and make recommendations on issues of cooperation, request studies and subject matter experts, suggest the development of international law and other treaties, recommend solutions to international conflict, and receive and review reports from other UN organs such as the Security Council.⁵ A caveat to the General Assembly is that it may not discuss any issue or provide recommendation to an issue which is currently being discussed by the Security Council. The GA can, however; recommend the Security Council to address a situation if it requires powers or more expedient action than can be provided by the General Assembly.⁶

The primary purpose of the UN is to bring nations together to work for peace and development. DISEC bolsters this goal by focusing directly on international peace and security.⁷ Founded in the aftermath of World War II, a war which may have been prevented by a similar international collaboration forum, the United Nations, and particularly DISEC, was critical in building peace among very conflicted societies and preventing future global disputes.⁸ During the first session of the General Assembly, DISEC passed resolutions concerning the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, extradition and punishment of war criminals, and other issues concerning rehabilitation and maintenance of security.⁹ For example, Resolution 62/22 which establishes protocols for assisting states in curbing illicit traffic in Small Arms and Light Weapons was passed by the First Committee. Another major resolution adopted by the First Committee was Resolution 61/104 which established the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty.¹⁰ Today DISEC deals with timely, general, and preventative issues concerning security and

¹*Charter of the United Nations.* The United Nations. June 26, 1945.
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

² Ibid.

³ “United Nations Member States” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/members/>

⁴ “Main Committees.” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/ga/maincommittees.shtml>

⁵ “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml>

⁶*Charter of the United Nations.* The United Nations. June 26, 1945.
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

⁷ “History of the United Nations” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory/>

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The United Nations. http://disarmament2.un.org/_852571D5007A5CD4.nsf

disarmament including nuclear security,¹¹ reduction of military budgets,¹² and supporting current treaties. As a GA committee, it does not create binding resolutions but its recommendations can translate into binding treaties. For example, DISEC was important in the formation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1956-1957, the United States and the Soviet Union made proposals dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons.¹³ The committee compiled five principles that were to be included in a draft treaty. The treaty was written by DISEC, and a draft was sent to the General Assembly in 1968, which was adopted under Resolution 2373 shortly thereafter.¹⁴ In 1982, DISEC created an Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.¹⁵ In June 1996, due to the overwhelming support received by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the General Assembly considered its adoption. On 10 September 1996 it was adopted under A/RES/50/245.¹⁶

DISEC's main source of authority is the UN Charter; as a committee, its primary focus is upholding the Charter and acting in its spirit. DISEC has also recently focused on its own reform and is guided by the document "Improving the Effectiveness of the Methods of Work of the First Committee," which reforms the method of submitting resolutions and introduces methods of achieving more effect from resolutions.¹⁷ The overall mandate of the First Committee has been modified from the original "Political and Security" role to focus primarily on disarmament and minimizing weapons throughout the world.¹⁸ This includes minimizing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, restricting small arms and light weapons, stopping arms transfer, and banning weaponry in Outer Space from the start of space exploration.¹⁹ Defined, the task of DISEC is "discussing any proposal or request put before the assembly which deals with the admission, suspension or expulsion of member states, disarmament and the regulation of armaments, the promotion of political co-operation between nations, and the general problems of maintaining peace and security, including the peaceful adjustment of dangerous situations."²⁰

Member States: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANDORRA, ANGOLA, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, ARGENTINA, ARMENIA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, AZERBAIJAN, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BELIZE, BENIN, BHUTAN, BOLIVA, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, BRUNEI DARUSSALAM, BULGARIA, BURKINA FASO, BURUNDI, CAMBODIA, CAMEROON, CANADA, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, CHILE, CHINA, COLUMBIA, COMOROS, REPUBLIC OF CONGO, COSTA RICA, CÔTE D'IVOIRE, CROATIA, CUBA, CYPRESS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, DENMARK, DJIBOUTI, DOMINICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, EQUATORIA GUINEA, ERITREA, ESTONIA, ETHIOPIA, FIJI, FINLAND, FRANCE, GABON, GAMBIA, GEORGIA, GERMANY, GHANA, GREECE, GRENADA, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, HAITI, HONDURAS, HUNGARY, ICELAND, INDIA, INDONESIA, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, IRAQ, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAMAICA, JAPAN, JORDAN, KAZAKHSTAN,

¹¹ GA/DIS/3358. *Concluding Work, Disarmament Committee Would Have General Assembly Urge States to Secure Nuclear Plants to Prevent Terrorists' Use of Radioactive Material*. General Assembly First Committee. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gadis3358.doc.htm>

¹² The United Nations. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/526/34/PDF/N0652634.pdf?OpenElement>

¹³ "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptbi.html>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." The United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org/WMD/ctbt/index.html>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ *Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee*. General Assembly First Committee. [http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf/511260f3bf6ae9c005256705006e0a5b/0f486fde8d4b6f1185256f43006f440f/\\$FILE/A-C.1-59-L.60.pdf](http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf/511260f3bf6ae9c005256705006e0a5b/0f486fde8d4b6f1185256f43006f440f/$FILE/A-C.1-59-L.60.pdf)

¹⁸ United Nations. 121-123. *Basic facts About the United Nations*. Department of Public Information, New York: New York. 1995.

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Boyd, Andrew. *The UNO Handbook*. Pilot Press, New York: New York. 1946.

KENYA, KIRIBATI, KUWAIT, KYRGYSTAN, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, LATVIA, LEBANON, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LYBIAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, LIECHTENSTEIN, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, MADAGASCAR, MALAWI, MALAYSIA, MALDIVES, MALI, MALTA, MARSHALL ISLANDS, MAURITANIA, MAURITIUS, MEXICO, FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, MOLDOVA, MONACO, MONGOLIA, MONTENEGRO, MOROCCO, MOZAMBIQUE, MYANMAR, NAMIBIA, NAURU, NEPAL, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NIGER, NIGERIA, NORWAY, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PALAU, PANAMA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, PORTUGAL, QATAR, REPUBLIC OF KORA, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RWANDA, SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, SAMOA, SAN MARINO, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SERBIA, SEYCHELLES, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, SOMALIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SRI LANKA, SUDAN, SURINAME, SWAZILAND, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TAJIKISTAN, THAILAND, THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, TIMOR-LESTE, TOGO, TONJA, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, TUNISIA, TURKEY, TURKMENISTAN, TUVALU, UGANDA, UKRAINE, UNITD ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, URUGUAY, UZBEKISTAN, VANUATU, BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, VIET NAM, YEMEN, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE, HOLY SEE, PALESTINE

Topic I: Maintaining Peace and Security through Reforms to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

"History is full of periods when empires collapse and there are brief periods of stability before new competitions arise. By a combination of luck and good management, we got through the Cold War without blowing ourselves up. We're now at a moment when we can get nuclear weapons under control and on the way out -- or we can fumble it, and watch the sort of events that occurred in Yugoslavia happen on a grand scale between nation-states over a longer time frame. I don't think most people realize what an historic moment this is." - Daniel Plesch²¹

Introduction

The international community has been notably concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and has been addressing nuclear proliferation since the 1960's. Before 1968, 21 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean had established the first nuclear free zone through the Treaty of Tlatelolco.²² The Treaty of Tlatelolco was first proposed by Costa Rica in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1958.²³ In response to French Nuclear testing in the Sahara desert, Brazil advocated a Latin American nuclear weapons free zone²⁴. Mexican Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles utilized his relationship with Brazil and other Latin American nations to gain the support of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico of a Latin American nuclear free zone²⁵. The United States and Soviet Union realized the potential dangers of nuclear weapons and negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly, to prevent the spread of such deadly weapons. On 1 July 1968 the NPT was opened to signatories and was ratified on 5 March 1970.²⁶ The NPT allows only five states – the United States, the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), China, France, and the United Kingdom – to retain their nuclear arsenals with an eventual goal of complete disarmament.²⁷ All other nations were not permitted to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear energy technology.²⁸ Currently, 187 states have signed the NPT, which include all nations except India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.²⁹ Global cooperation has created an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

²¹ "The 1995 Review and Extension Conference." <http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1995revcon/main.htm>

²² "The Development and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The Nobel Foundation. http://nobelprize.org/educational_games/peace/nuclear_weapons/readmore.html

²³ "The Treaty of Tlatelolco." The Center for Nonproliferation Studies. <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/tlat.pdf>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "The Development and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The Nobel Foundation. http://nobelprize.org/educational_games/peace/nuclear_weapons/readmore.html

²⁷ "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." The United Nations. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm>

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

The NPT has endured many events that have undermined its effectiveness at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Since 1991, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have hid clandestine nuclear activities including uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and other weapons-related activities from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.³⁰ Iraq's nuclear program was only found after more invasive measures were taken that would not have been sanctioned under normal IAEA guidelines.³¹ In the past, the IAEA did not generally perform inspections beyond the edge of nuclear sites that were declared open for inspection.³² Uranium separation, a process not banned by the NPT, caused concern in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, because they were occurring in places that were not open to IAEA inspections. The fact that North Korea and Iran obtained its uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan suggests that nations that are not party to the NPT can weaken its effectiveness within the international community.³³

The United States has further weakened the NPT through unilateral measures. For example, when the United States persuaded the international community to keep the NPT indefinitely, it was to be in exchange of the United States ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).³⁴ While former US President Bill Clinton agreed to the treaty and attempted to have it ratified in the United States Senate, President Bush opposes the treaty. Additionally, President Bush has violated expectations of the nuclear states in their commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons by creating new types of nuclear weapons to be used in combat.³⁵ The double standard of the United States, arguably the world's superpower, further threatens the effectiveness of the NPT.

History of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Although not expressly stated in the UN Charter, the issue of nuclear weapons became a concern of the United Nations almost immediately after its establishment. The first resolution adopted by the General Assembly "established a commission ... to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy".³⁶ This commission became known as the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and was charged with the task of proposing ways to eliminate nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.³⁷ The committee was also supposed to insure that atomic energy would only be utilized for peaceful purposes.³⁸ Comprised of the members of the Security Council and Canada, the commission deliberated several proposals. Due to differences in opinions and ideals regarding the timeframe of implementation, the commission remained at a deadlock. It was finally dissolved in 1952.³⁹

In the mid 1950's the concern shifted from developing peaceful sources of atomic energy to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international community. Between 1956 and 1957, the United States and the Soviet Union began negotiating the first steps directly dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons in the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission.⁴⁰ The General Assembly addressed this issue further by unanimously adopting

³⁰ Bunn, George. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." *Arms Control Association*. December 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn.asp

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." *The United Nations*. <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptbi.html>

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Sherman, Robert. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/>

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Resolution 1665 which called for a “prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.”⁴¹ Resolution 1665 also called upon “all States, and in particular the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.”⁴²

Four years after Resolution 1665, Resolution 2028 was adopted, outlining five principles upon which the future NPT would be based.⁴³ These five principles include: preventing loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear states to proliferate nuclear weapons in any form, including a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for both nuclear and non-nuclear powers, ensuring that the treaty is a positive step for general and complete disarmament, specifically with regards to nuclear disarmament, ensuring workable and acceptable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty, and respecting regional treaties that would ensure the total and complete absence of nuclear weapons within a nation’s territory.⁴⁴

Multiple copies of proposed draft treaties were submitted by both the United States and the Soviet Union to the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), a predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.⁴⁵ In 1967, the ENDC agreed upon the text of a possible treaty and submitted the document to the General Assembly. After further revisions, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2373, in which adoption and adherence to the treaty was highly encouraged.⁴⁶ To quell fears of non-nuclear states, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union declared that they would utilize the Security Council to counteract threats against non-nuclear states by nuclear weapons.⁴⁷

The text of the NPT encompasses three main principles: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nonproliferation refers to the obligation of the five nuclear states not to transfer nuclear weapons, other types of nuclear explosives, or nuclear technology to any non-nuclear weapons state.⁴⁸ To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states are not permitted to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, they must accept safeguards to distinguish the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful activities to military uses.⁴⁹

The second pillar of the NPT is disarmament. The NPT is the only binding agreement on nuclear disarmament agreed upon by the nuclear weapons states. Article VI of the NPT mandates that nuclear weapons states should cease participation in an arms race as soon as possible, and that states must agree upon a treaty that stipulates “general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”⁵⁰

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” *The United States State Department*. <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ “The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” The United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptbi.html>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Sherman, Robert. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Women’s Reaching Critical Will. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/npttext.html#6>

The third principle of the NPT is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Article IV of the NPT states that it is the “inalienable right” of member states to develop: research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁵¹ Additionally, the NPT establishes that the technology of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be shared with non-nuclear states with special consideration for the developing world.⁵² Thus, nuclear energy is used to encourage states to ratify the treaty. All nuclear energy is subject to the safeguards of the IAEA. Almost every nation in the world has signed and ratified the NPT. There are currently four nations that have not. Israel, India, and Pakistan never signed the treaty.

The Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT was limited to a term of 25 years. In 1995, the member states of the NPT unanimously agreed to extend the term of the NPT indefinitely. The Review Committee, in addition to its normal function of determining effectiveness of the NPT, was also charged with determining whether to extend the NPT or not and decided upon four decisions to improve the NPT.⁵³ These decisions were known as the “package deal,” meant to encourage unanimous agreement to the extension of the NPT.⁵⁴ The first decision involved strengthening the review process, by renewing the NPT every five years.⁵⁵ The second decision established “principles and objectives” to evaluate progress in universality, nonproliferation, disarmament, nuclear-weapons-free-zones, security assurances, safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁵⁶ For instance, the second decision included a program of action, which included the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and progressive efforts by nuclear weapons states to reduce their nuclear arsenal.⁵⁷ The third decision of the 1995 Review Committee was to extend the NPT indefinitely. This decision, formally due to a majority of nations’ desire to extend the NPT, also rested upon the linkage between that decision to the “package deal.” The final portion of the package deal was a resolution on the Middle East. Through agreements with many member states, a nuclear weapons free zone was encouraged to be created in the Middle East.⁵⁸ The intention of a nuclear free zone established in the Middle East was imperative to the extension of the NPT. However, 13 years later, no such nuclear weapons free zone exists. International support remains strong with overwhelming support for the nonproliferation aspect of the NPT.⁵⁹ Since 1995, the international track record with disarmament has not been as strong. Transparency still remains a major issue. It is still unknown precisely how many nuclear weapons and what quantity of relevant fissile material nations possess in their arsenals.⁶⁰ Global events since 1995 have further undermined the NPT. These include the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998, the U.S. Senate’s vote against the CTBT, North Korea’s departure from the NPT in 2003, recent safeguard and compliance issues regarding Iran and other states, and other methods that nuclear weapons states have validated nuclear weapons since 1995.⁶¹ Additionally, many non-nuclear states are unsatisfied with nuclear weapon states’ failure to fulfill their commitments under the 2000 NPT Conference review.⁶² These

⁵¹ “The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npptreaty.html>

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “1995 NPT Review Conference Package of Decisions.” *Reaching Critical Will*. January 2008. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html#1>

⁵⁴ Rydell, Randy. *Looking Back : The 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference*. Arms Control Association. April 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/LookingBack.asp

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

include establishing a fissile material treaty, the CTBT, and the lack of negotiating multilateral disarmament and missile defense treaties in the Committee on Disarmament.⁶³

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The idea of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was first conceived in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 8 December 1953.⁶⁴ In his speech he proposed that the IAEA have the responsibility

“to devise methods where by... fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.”⁶⁵

Additionally, Eisenhower proposed that the IAEA encourage global investigation into peaceful means of radioactive material, reduce the destructive power of nuclear stockpiles, remain interested in human aspirations over building weapons of destruction, and establish a new medium of peaceful discussion to make progress towards peace.⁶⁶ In April 1955, as a result of the “Atoms for Peace” speech, work began in Washington, DC to establish the statute of the IAEA with assistance from Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.⁶⁷ This group of nations was joined in 1956 by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil.⁶⁸ In October 1956, 82 member states in the United Nations approve the Statute of the IAEA incorporating such responsibilities as the control and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁶⁹

The IAEA was given a significant amount of responsibility under the NPT. Article III of the NPT stipulates that the IAEA functions as a safeguard to verify that states are not diverting nuclear materials to pursue nuclear weapons.⁷⁰ It is important to note that the IAEA may only act as an alarm bell and not as an organization to punish nations for violations to the NPT. Article IV also empowers the IAEA to disseminate nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.⁷¹ By providing this nuclear material for peaceful purposes, the IAEA provides a way to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and adhere to the NPT.

Following the establishment of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT, the IAEA developed specific safeguards to enforce these international agreements. The IAEA uses the concept of nuclear accountancy as its basic measure of safeguarding declared nuclear material. Nuclear accountancy supervises the amount of the amount of nuclear

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ “President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ Speech.” *Atom Archive*. <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Atomsforpeace.shtml>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ “International Atomic Energy Agency Turns 40.” *The International Atomic Energy Agency*. <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull393/Chronology/chronology.pdf>

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ “In Focus: IAEA and the NPT.” *International Atomic Energy Agency*. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/key_role.shtml

⁷¹ Ibid.

material present in a nuclear facility and the changes in amount that occur over time.⁷² The discovery of secret nuclear activities in Iraq in the 1980's encouraged the IAEA to develop additional safeguards to detect undeclared nuclear materials. The Additional Protocol was developed, which required states to provide the IAEA with broader information including information and access to state's nuclear fuel cycles, which include nuclear mines and nuclear waste sites, short-notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site, information on the production and export of nuclear technology, access to other nuclear-related locations, and collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations when stipulated by the IAEA.⁷³ As of 30 May 2008, only 88 nations actually have the Additional Protocols in place, continuing to leave the IAEA at a significant disadvantage when identifying potential violators of the NPT.⁷⁴ Additionally, the IAEA was assigned special inspections responsibilities under Security Council Resolution 687.⁷⁵ The Security Council charged the IAEA with uncovering and dismantling Iraq's secret nuclear program, and developing and employing a plan for continued monitoring and verification of Iraq's nuclear obligations.⁷⁶ The IAEA has unique rights within these resolutions. Inspections are carried out by a special team of IAEA inspectors who report directly to the IAEA Director General, who in turn reports to the UN Secretary General.⁷⁷

Denuclearization

Since the establishment of the NPT, several instances have occurred when states have chosen to give up weapons of mass destruction voluntarily; one such state is Ukraine. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine was "born nuclear" with over 4,000 nuclear weapons within its borders.⁷⁸ However, in November 1994, Ukraine's parliament voted overwhelmingly to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state.⁷⁹ Many believed that the possible threat of the Russian Federation would cause Ukraine to want to keep their nuclear weapons. Popular opinion polls in 1992 and 1993 showed that support for nuclear weapons was increasing by the domestic population.⁸⁰ Furthermore, retired military officers in the new Ukrainian government and senior political officials lobbied to keep nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma worked in the Soviet missile-building industry under the former regime and was therefore not expected to take an anti-nuclear stance.⁸¹

Author Scott Sagan argues that to understand why Ukraine gave up its weapons of mass destruction, one must understand the normative effect the NPT has had on international relations. One reason the Ukraine did not want nuclear weapons was because they believed it was a way to assert an independent foreign policy from Moscow.⁸² In July 1990, the parliament of Kiev issued a Declaration of Sovereignty, which affirmed the Ukraine's right to

⁷² "IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." The International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ "Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols." *International Atomic Energy Agency*. http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html

⁷⁵ "IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." The International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Sagan, Scott. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Potter, William C., "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Khazakstan, and Ukraine," Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 22, April 1995, p. 49.

⁸¹ Nahaylo, Bohdan. "The Shaping of Ukranian Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (February 19, 1993), pp. 21-45.

⁸² Sagan, Scott. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

participate in any agreement concerning “international peace and security” and that the Ukraine would “become a neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and that adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to maintain, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons.”⁸³ This declaration was adopted by a vote of 355-4, by a parliament that consisted of a majority of conservative communists.⁸⁴ Because of this declaration, Ukraine was compelled to give up its weapons despite other mitigating factors in fear of losing credibility in the international community. A second reason that the Ukrainians decided to become a non-nuclear state was because of the implications on international prestige. While in the past, nuclear nations such as the United States and the Soviet Union were superpowers; by 1991 new nuclear states were not seen in the same positive light.⁸⁵ Most recently, potential new nuclear states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq were seen as “rogue states.”⁸⁶ Because of the international political climate, many pro-NPT Ukrainian officials asserted that relinquishing nuclear weapons would be the best way to gain prestige in the international community.⁸⁷

Economic pressure was another reason for Ukraine’s decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states argued that nuclear weapons could not serve as a military deterrent for Moscow and that not becoming a member of the NPT regime could have economic consequences.⁸⁸ Sagan notes that one must remember that coordinating sanctions and threatening collective economic retaliation was much more credible due to the NPT norm against creating new nuclear weapons states.⁸⁹

While Ukrainian disarmament could have still been possible without the NPT, it would have been much more difficult. The 25-year precedent of the NPT allowed the international community to pressure Ukraine into giving up its weapons of mass destruction.⁹⁰ Without the NPT, Ukraine would have fallen into the category of the United States or China rather than be classified as a dissenter like Israel or North Korea. International threats would have been less credible because of a less unified global front on weapons of mass destruction. It would be more likely that a nation would defect to trade with Ukraine, undermining any broken political ties or sanctions.⁹¹ Furthermore, assistance by the United States might be seen in a more hostile light because it could have been interpreted as a purchase of weapons rather than a true destruction of them.⁹²

Withdrawal from the NPT: North Korea

North Korea has maintained a demonstrated interest in nuclear technology since the 1950’s. In the 1970’s the North Koreans began expanding their interest by authorizing plans for a nuclear program including program design, rapid expansion of the nuclear related facilities and development of infrastructure for a weapons program in Yongbyon.⁹³ During the early 1980’s the North Koreans completed other elements of their weapons program including a mill to

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Nahaylo, Bohdan. “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms,” *RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (February 19, 1993), pp. 21-45.

⁸⁵ Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Potter, William C., “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 22, April 1995, p. 49.

⁸⁸ Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Mansourov, Alexandre. “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of North Korean Nuclear Program.” *The Nonproliferation Review*. Spring-Summer 1995. <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol02/23/mansou23.pdf>

concentrate uranium ore into “yellowcake,” a plant to purify the material, a storage site, and a nuclear rod production plant.⁹⁴ While the North Koreans were developing their nuclear program in the 1970’s and 1980’s under Kim Il-sung, the Soviets were pressuring them to join the NPT, which they finally did in 1985.⁹⁵ Following intense pressure from the international community, North Korea signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the IAEA, allowing inspectors to enter in April 1992.⁹⁶

The promising developments of allowing IAEA inspectors into North Korea stalled in January 1993 when North Korea refused to allow inspectors to see two undisclosed sites suspected of containing nuclear waste.⁹⁷ Because North Korea refused to give inspectors access to certain sites, the global community became suspicious that North Korea was not upholding the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.⁹⁸ Tension from both sides led to an announcement by Pyongyang that they were withdrawing from the NPT on 12 March 1993 citing that it was in their supreme national interest to do so under Article X.⁹⁹ The decision to withdraw from the NPT strained relations with both South Korea and the United States. Under the provisions of Article X, a state must give written notice to the President of the Security Council and wait 90 days before the withdrawal comes into force.

On 11 June 1993, following talks with the United States in New York, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT one day before it would come into effect.¹⁰⁰ North Korea agreed to continue its membership in the NPT, agreeing to the full and impartial implementation of the IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the United States guaranteed that they would not use force against North Korea, including nuclear weapons, and that they would not interfere in their internal politics.¹⁰¹ On 19 July, after a second round of discussions, North Korea announces that it is willing to deal with the IAEA on the safeguard issue and may possibly make a deal with the United States to exchange their nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), an alternative type of nuclear reactor that produces far less plutonium and only requires uranium enriched to 7 percent.¹⁰² Although negotiations were complicated with the death of Kim Il Sung, the United States and North Korea came to an agreement. The Agreed Framework, negotiated by Jimmy Carter, was an agreement between the United States and North Korea concluded in October 1994. Under the Agreed Framework North Korea agreed to put a hold on its nuclear program, abandon any desire to develop nuclear weapons, and allow two secret military sites to be opened for investigation to determine whether North Korea has nuclear capabilities.¹⁰³ In exchange for these concessions, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization pledged to replace North Korea’s graphite reactors with LWRs.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, the United States agreed to low level diplomatic ties with Pyongyang.¹⁰⁵ The United States also agreed to arrange a

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ “Nuclear Weapons Program.” <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Kimball, Daryl. “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” *Arms Control Association*. June 2008. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Riding, Alan. “U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute.” *The New York Times*. October 22, 1994. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404E3DB103EF931A15753C1A962958260&scp=3&sq=agreed+framework&st=nyt>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

significant amount of heavy oil to be delivered to North Korea to compensate them for the loss in energy resources in the time it would take to replace the old reactors.¹⁰⁶

While there was a high sense of optimism following the Agreed Framework, relations between Washington and Pyongyang began to deteriorate during the missile talks. North Korea's actions regarding missile technology proliferation, missile testing, and missile development coupled with the United States Nuclear Posture Review further strained relations between the two nations. In October 2002, North Korea admitted to a secret uranium enrichment program to produce nuclear material.¹⁰⁷

By December, North Korea announced that it has restarted its reactor and will reopen facilities that were closed under the 1994 Agreed Framework.¹⁰⁸ On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced their withdrawal from the NPT, effective 11 January.¹⁰⁹ Pyongyang argued that they did not have to wait for the three month grace period because they suspended their withdrawal proceedings one day before it became legal in 1993. Some countries contest the legality of North Korea's claim and consider them members of the NPT because they did not give the proper notice to withdraw from the NPT. Other countries consider their withdrawal to have gone into effect 90 days after their 10 January announcement. Regardless of the legal issues, North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT sets a dangerous precedent. No country had ever withdrawn from the NPT up until that point. Ceasing to be a state party to the NPT signifies that this behavior is acceptable in the international community and might encourage others to do so. Furthermore, North Korea had received some benefits under the NPT's clause regarding a nations "inalienable right" to nuclear energy. By withdrawing, the North Koreans exposed a dangerous weakness in the NPT. A nation could use the treaty to acquire nuclear technology and withdraw from the treaty, keeping what they have attained.

In August 2003, six-party talks commenced, which consisted of the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, Russian Federation, and North Korea.¹¹⁰ Because the Bush administration had made it their policy not to talk to North Korea until they relinquished their alleged nuclear weapons program, the six-party talks were a way for North Korea and the United States to negotiate without an implicit U.S. recognition of the Pyongyang regime. Progress in these talks was hampered by the announcement of a North Korean official to Reuters that Pyongyang possessed a "workable nuclear device."¹¹¹ Progress had also been slowed by various actions of North Korea to spread nuclear technology following its withdrawal from the NPT. On 7 February 2005 a report was released identifying North Korea as the originator of the uranium hexafluoride in Libya's clandestine nuclear program.¹¹² The nuclear facility bombed in an Israeli air raid in late 2007 was also found to contain technology and designs contributed by North Korea.¹¹³ Talks continued on, and a joint statement was reached on 19 September 2005, outlining a framework for future negotiations.¹¹⁴ Progress continued to be hampered by disagreements between the U.S. and North Korea,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Wit, Joel S. "New Rules of Engagement with North Korea." *The New York Times*. October 19, 2002. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05EEDF103DF93AA25753C1A9649C8B63&scp=1&sq=agreed+framework&st=nyt>

¹⁰⁸ Kimball, Daryl. "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." *Arms Control Association*. June 2008. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ "Timeline: North Korea." *BBC News*. April 18, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1132268.stm

¹¹¹ Kimball, Daryl. "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." *Arms Control Association*. June 2008. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>

¹¹² Sanger, David E. and William Broad. "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea." *The New York Times*. February 2, 2005. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07E0DD133BF931A35751C0A9639C8B63&scp=2&sq=Libya+percent2C+North+Korea&st=nyt>

¹¹³ Erlanger, Steven. "Israel Silent on Reports of Bombing Within Syria." *The New York Times*. October 15, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/world/middleeast/15mideast.html?scp=1&sq=Israel+percent2C+Syria+percent2C+2007+percent2C+North+Korea&st=nyt>

¹¹⁴ Kimball, Daryl. "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." *Arms Control Association*. June 2008. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>

leading to an announcement by KEDO that they have officially terminated plans to build LWRs in North Korea due to the “continued and extended failure” of the 1994 Agreed Framework.¹¹⁵

On 9 October 2006, North Korea conducted an underground test of a nuclear device. Pyongyang released a statement on 11 October stating that its “nuclear test was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanction, and pressure.”¹¹⁶ They also stated that North Korea was committed to the September 2005 joint statement and believed that the nuclear test “constitutes a positive measure for its implementation,” adding that Kim Il Sung’s last instructions were the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and that it was North Korea’s ultimate goal.¹¹⁷ The United Nations Security Council subsequently passed Resolution 1718 and acting under Chapter VII condemned North Korea’s nuclear test, called upon North Korea to disarm and return to the six-party talks, and placed heavy sanctions on Pyongyang.¹¹⁸

A sixth round of talks resumed in Beijing, which concluded in an agreed action plan. In the agreement North Korea stated that they would shut down their Yongbyon reactor, which produces plutonium on its spent fuel rods, and provide a complete declaration of their plutonium production. In exchange, the United States would provide significant amounts of energy aid and remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list and prevent the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act.¹¹⁹ The shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor was confirmed in July 2007, and the requested documents were produced on 8 May 2008.¹²⁰ As a result, the United States has taken North Korea off of the list of countries that sponsor terrorism and no longer apply the Trading with the Enemy Act.¹²¹ While the recent deal with North Korea is a positive step regarding the denuclearization of North Korea, there are many questions that are still unanswered at this point. North Korea has not made any declarations regarding their alleged HEU program. Furthermore, Pyongyang has made no declarations about the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, which some experts estimate could be half a dozen. The lack of knowledge of number of weapons makes any disarmament plan difficult without the knowledge of the baseline figure. Additionally, Pyongyang has made no declarations regarding their proliferation activities with Libya and Syria.

Case Study: Iran

When examining the three frameworks established by Sagan, one must utilize practical applications to determine which one best explains a nation’s reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons. According to Donald Weadon, an international lawyer in Iran, the United States (US) began pursuing investment initiatives in Iran including selling nuclear power plants after the 1972 oil crisis.¹²² In 1978, the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed, which was designed to “facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran’s nuclear energy program.”¹²³ When the Islamic Revolution toppled the shah’s

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ S/Res/1718. *Nonproliferation in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea*. Security Council. October 14, 2006. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm

¹¹⁹ Kimball, Daryl. “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” Arms Control Association. June 2008. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Cooper, Helene. “Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs.” The New York Times. June 27, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/world/asia/27nuke.html?scp=6&sq=north+korea&st=nyt>

¹²² Beeman, William O. “U.S. Instigated Iran’s Nuclear Policy in the 1970s.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/ Jun2006, Vol. 25, Issue 4.

¹²³ Sahimi, Mohammed. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History.” October 2, 2003. <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html>

government, Bushehr-1, the first nuclear reactor, was ninety percent complete and Bushehr-2 was fifty percent complete.¹²⁴ Work on the nuclear reactors following the Islamic Revolution was suspended.

In 1985, Iran began a secret uranium enrichment program during its war with Iraq.¹²⁵ Due to US pressure, Iran had trouble finding nations to assist in rebuilding the Bushehr-1 reactor that had been bombed several times during the war with Iraq.¹²⁶ Pressure from the United States also prevented companies from Argentina, Germany, and Spain from completing the Iranian reactor.¹²⁷ In June 1991, Mark Hibbs reported that A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani who sold nuclear weapons technology on the black market, visited Iran in 1988 to discuss the potential of acquiring centrifuges for uranium enrichment.¹²⁸ In 1989 the speaker of Iran's parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, traveled to Moscow and negotiated an agreement with the Russians on trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation, which included the peaceful use of nuclear technology.¹²⁹ This alliance between Iran and Russia encouraged the Russian Federation to supply Iran with conventional military technology and civilian nuclear technology over the next ten years.¹³⁰

On 14 August 2002 the Washington DC office of the National Council of the Resistance of Iran (NCRI) announced that Iran was pursuing clandestine nuclear projects.¹³¹ The IAEA scheduled an inspection of the suspected sites for late February 2003.¹³² During this visit, Iran confirmed that it was producing centrifuge parts, but took significant steps to hide details surrounding the centrifuge enrichment program.¹³³ Since this time, Iran has continued implementing its centrifuge enrichment program, claiming that it has the right to engage in research for peaceful means under the NPT. The United Nations Security Council has implemented sanctions to prevent Iran's uranium enrichment program.¹³⁴

In June 2003, environmental samples taken from the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran had trace amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU). While the IAEA-General Director Mohamed El-Bardei did not want to state that Iran was in violation of the NPT, he did go as far to say that, "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement."¹³⁵ The IAEA Board of Governors also called upon Iran to sign the Additional Protocol. Facing potential sanctions and international isolation, Iran agreed on 2 October 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA, sign the

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Alexander, Yonah, and Milton Hoenig. *The New Iranian Leadership*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Pg. 113

¹²⁶ Sahimi, Mohammed. "Iran's Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History." October 2, 2003. <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html>

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Alexander, Yonah, and Milton Hoenig. *The New Iranian Leadership*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Pg. 119

¹²⁹ Eisenstadt, Michael. "Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges for the United States." *Arms Control Association*. March 2001. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/eisenstadt.asp

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Alexander, Yonah, and Milton Hoenig. *The New Iranian Leadership*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Pg. 119

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Sanger, David E. "Atomic Agency Confirms Advances by Iran's Nuclear Program." *The New York Times*. April 19, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/middleeast/19nukes.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Atomic+Agency+Confirms+Advances+by+Iran+percent27s+Nuclear+Program.&st=nyt&oref=slogin

¹³⁵ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director-General, *International Atomic Energy Agency*. 19 June 2003, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf>

Additional Protocol to begin the process of ratifying it, and suspend all enrichment and reprocessing for an interim period.¹³⁶ On 18 December, Iran signed the Additional Protocol allowing inspections on Iranian facilities.¹³⁷ While Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol has revealed new information to the IAEA, their cooperation has not been absolute. Several aspects, such as information regarding Iran's centrifuges were omitted from their declaration report in October 2003.¹³⁸

In November 2004, Iran voluntarily ceased its nuclear activities temporarily. In exchange, the EU-3 in cooperation with the IAEA offered Iran nuclear and trade incentives, and released a joint statement referring to Iran's right to a nuclear energy program.¹³⁹ The IAEA was granted access to two sites that had been previously off limits. However, in March 2005, the Iranians refused inspectors a second visit to Parchin, a military site that may have had nuclear activities.¹⁴⁰ In August 2005, Iran announced that it was restarting its uranium conversion activities. These actions were a violation of the November 2004 agreement.¹⁴¹

In February 2006, based upon Iran's decision to restart its nuclear reactor, the IAEA voted to refer Iran to the Security Council for non-compliance with safeguard agreements. At the same time, Russia was pursuing diplomacy with Iran. Russia offered to host Iran's nuclear enrichment program, leaving uranium conversion in Iran. However, Iran claimed that uranium enrichment was their sovereign right to which all states with a nuclear program are entitled.¹⁴² Furthermore, uranium enrichment is not restricted under the NPT. The situation between Iran and the West worsened, culminating in several Security Council meetings regarding the matter. The situation further deteriorated after Iran's President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran possessed a second uranium enrichment facility, constituting an additional violation of Iran's safeguards agreements.¹⁴³

In early June 2006, after several attempts had failed, an economic incentives package was offered by the West in order to encourage Iran to return to the nuclear negotiating table. The U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia, and Germany developed four incentives for the package: the provision of light water reactors and fuel, support for Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization, the lifting of restrictions on the use of U.S. technology in agriculture, and the availability of spare parts for civilian aircraft made by U.S. manufacturers.¹⁴⁴ After considering the offer, Iran rejected the deal stating that it contained too many ambiguities, causing the states that offered the incentives to refer Iran to the Security Council.¹⁴⁵

On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1696 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution calls for the immediate suspension of uranium enrichment activity by August 31. The resolution passed with 14

¹³⁶ "Iran Country Profile." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/index_1822.html#fn6

¹³⁷ Global Security Newswire, "Iran Signs Additional Protocol," 18 December 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003_12_18.html#C836A786

¹³⁸ "Iran Country Profile." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/index_1822.html#fn6

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "Report: Russia and Iran Resume Nuclear Negotiations," Associated Press, 2 March 2006; "Iran will Allow IAEA to Inspect Nuclear Programs-Negotiator," RIA-Novosti, 2 March 2006.

¹⁴³ Sanger, David E. and Nazila Fathi, "Iran is described as defiant on 2nd Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 25 April 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=is+described+as+defiant+on+2nd+Nuclear+Program&st=nyt&oref=slogin

¹⁴⁴ "Iran Country Profile." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/index_1822.html#fn6

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

votes to 1, with Qatar being the only nation to vote against the measure.¹⁴⁶ El-Baradei released a report in August 2006 that stated that Iran had ignored the Security Council resolution that they were not adhering to the Additional Protocol, and that particles of HEU had been found on a nuclear storage site in Iran.¹⁴⁷

Russia has frozen their assistance to Iran on the Bushehr reactor until Iran complies with Security Council demands.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, France rejected an offer by Iran to create a French consortium for uranium enrichment.¹⁴⁹ In this way, France could monitor and control enrichment processes in Iran. France stated that they would only deal with Iran through the Security Council.¹⁵⁰ The Security Council issued an ultimatum on 23 December, threatening further sanctions if Iran did not stop its uranium enrichment. Reports indicate that in 2007 Iran had increased their uranium production rather than slowing it down, causing the IAEA to suspend 22 technical nuclear aid projects as a part of sanctions imposed on Iran.¹⁵¹

Iran ignored the Security Council's declaration, leading to the passage of Resolution 1747 on 24 March 2007. Resolution 1747 established sanctions against Iran including military equipment and financial assistance.¹⁵² While negotiations between Iran and the Security Council continue, the United States National Intelligence Estimate released in November 2007 states that Iran has not engaged in active military nuclear actions since 2003. However, the amount of HEU produced could allow it to produce a nuclear device between 2010 and 2015.¹⁵³

The Iranian case exposes serious weaknesses in the NPT and the international nonproliferation regime. Members of the international community are too apprehensive to deal effectively with Iran because they do not want to push Iran to withdraw from the NPT. These fears are especially pronounced following the North Korean withdrawal. Furthermore, Iran continues to enrich uranium although they provide no viable reason for enriching it past the 7 percent needed for most nuclear reactors. Because uranium enrichment is not technically banned by the NPT, Iran is not in violation of the NPT. While the Security Council has established sanctions, they have done little to dissuade Iran from pursuing uranium enrichment and a potential nuclear weapons program.

Permissive Action Links (PALs) in Pakistan

In accordance with the Article I of the NPT, nuclear weapon states are not permitted to give any technology that could be used on a nuclear warhead. This restraint has placed the United States in a difficult position in recent years. Following the attacks of 11 September, President Bush debated whether or not to share "one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection technology."¹⁵⁴ This technology is known as permissive action links (PALs), which is an electronic system preventing a nuclear weapon from detonating without proper authorization codes. Although the United States has given similar types of aid to both France and the Russian Federation, it decided that providing Pakistan with this technology would be a violation of the NPT. The United States has a clear vested interest in ensuring that Pakistani nuclear weapons are not detonated by an unauthorized user because Pakistan

¹⁴⁶ S/Res/1696. *Nonproliferation*. Security Council. July 31, 2006. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm

¹⁴⁷ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 31 August 2006.

¹⁴⁸ "Iran Country Profile." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/index_1822.html#fn6

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ "Iran continues to enrich in defiance of Security Council, says U.N. Nuclear monitor," CBS, 22 February 2007.

¹⁵² S/Res/1747. *Nonproliferation*. Security Council. March 24, 2007. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm

¹⁵³ "National Intelligence Estimate." November 2007. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf

¹⁵⁴ Sanger, David E. and William J. Broad. "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms." *The New York Times*. November 18, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html?scp=1&sq=permissive+action+links&st=nyt>

borders Afghanistan, where many members of Al-Qaeda are believed to be hiding. The relatively insecure state of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals leaves them at a greater threat of being stolen by Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. In addition to the provisions established by the NPT, other factors prevented the PALS from being shared by the United States. Pakistan was suspicious that the American technology could act as a kill-switch, rendering their nuclear weapons useless. Another concern by some federal officials was that giving the Pakistanis this technology might allow them to learn too much about American nuclear technology. However, this sets a dangerous precedent that many technologies that could be used to help make the global community safer will not be shared due to the provision established in Article I of the NPT.

Conclusion

The NPT was a treaty forged by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Although the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, many questions remain about how it can be effective. Some nations, such as India, liken it to a "nuclear apartheid" because it confers legal nuclear weapons status on the five permanent members of the Security Council and does not allow any other states to have nuclear weapons. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the nuclear weapons states have not begun their disarmament requirements established in the NPT. Furthermore, the situation of North Korea demonstrates that nations can receive the benefits of nuclear energy and choose to withdraw, keeping those benefits for their own purposes. The situations of North Korea and Iran also demonstrate the cat and mouse game that can be played with the IAEA before any real action takes place. However, situation such as those of the former Soviet states that gave up nuclear weapons in the early 1990's demonstrate that denuclearization is possible. It is important to realize that the current state of the NPT has many issues, which must be dealt with effectively if it is expected to keep nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Committee Directive

Delegates should examine the relevant issues surrounding the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Has the NPT effectively discouraged the spread of nuclear weapons? In what ways has it failed to prevent states from attaining weapons of mass destruction? What can be fixed in the NPT to prevent these failures from occurring in the future? Has the NPT's statement on disarmament by the nuclear weapons states been realized? If not, how can that aspect be improved in the future? How can other nations be expected to abide by their NPT obligations if the United States does not? What about the fact that since the NPT has been created, the number of nuclear states has actually grown, rather than diminished? Is it the responsibility of nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapon states to ensure that China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation are disarming? How should the NPT treat states like Israel, India, and Pakistan, who have not signed the NPT? Should there be harsher penalties for NPT violations? If so, what and how would they be enforced? What about the provision preventing the sharing of dual-use technology? Should certain types of technologies such as the Permissive Action Links be allowed to be shared?

Topic II. Reforming Peacekeeping Forces: Combating Cultural and Regional Barriers

"Our peace missions are a vital tool to fulfill one of the United Nations' most important responsibilities. That is the maintenance of international peace and security. United Nations troops provide space and breathing room that encourage warring parties to cool down. They also enable political processes to take root, and peace dividends to bear fruit." – Asha-Rose Migiro¹⁵⁵

Introduction

Peacekeeping operations are often considered one of the core activities implored by the United Nations as a way of helping war torn countries create the conditions for lasting peace.¹⁵⁶ Currently there is no clear mandate outlined by the United Nations (UN) Charter for peacekeeping troops. The first mission was established in 1948 by the Security

¹⁵⁵ "Deputy Secretary General Remarks." <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/dsgsm334.doc.htm>

¹⁵⁶ "United Nations Peacekeeping." <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>

Council and was called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).¹⁵⁷ Considered the first peacebuilding operation of its kind, UNTSO is still a vigilant actor and remains as an active operation stationed in the Middle East.¹⁵⁸

In 1949 Armistice Agreements were written and signed between Israel and Egypt. These agreements were designed to end the aggressions from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and named as such, as they created armistice lines between Israel and the West Bank.¹⁵⁹ The Armistice Agreement was also signed by Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The agreement facilitated the deployment of UN military observers and was authorized to ensure compliance by all involved parties.¹⁶⁰ Peacekeeping was originally designed to maintain ceasefires and stabilize combat areas in order for political efforts to be made toward conflict resolution.¹⁶¹ Peacekeeping troops were lightly armed and present as monitoring/observing agents to support ceasefires and limited peace agreements.¹⁶² Since 1948, peacekeeping troops have been mandated to 63 UN missions, with their role changing drastically following the end of the Cold War.¹⁶³

The definition of peacebuilding was noted by author Senzo Ngubane for the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) study on *Peacebuilding in Southern Africa*.¹⁶⁴ ACCORD was commissioned by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2004, and states:

“Peacebuilding starts when hostilities end, usually marked by a cease-fire or peace agreement, and typically progress through three stages, namely a stabilization phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase. Peacebuilding ends when a society can sustain its transition without external support and it is replaced by a sustainable development period.”¹⁶⁵

Currently, 17 active Peacekeeping Missions throughout the world help to build sustainable institutions of governance, human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.¹⁶⁶ The severity of regional conflicts and civil wars has repositioned the UN to take a stronger stance in maintaining peace and security through peacekeeping missions. Challenged with complex peace operations, the UN must work vigorously to strengthen their ability to manage and sustain field operations.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁷ “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/>

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ “Who Are We? The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes <http://www.accord.org.za/web/home.htm>

¹⁶⁵ Coning, Cedric de. “Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations.” www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/civmil2005.pdf

¹⁶⁶ “United Nations Peacekeeping.” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

In 1992 the UN developed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) under former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.¹⁶⁸ That June, the Secretary General clarified the role of the DPKO by issuing a plan that strengthened the UN's capacity for preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping.¹⁶⁹ Today DPKO is responsible for planning, preparing, managing, and directing UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁰ The role of peacekeeping missions since the development of DPKO has done much to create peace and stability in the world; however there are still a number of vague issues including defining the mission, human rights violations, implementation/integration of regional bodies, length of peacekeeping missions, rights of peacekeepers, and cross cultural impacts of peacekeepers and their missions that surround the use of peacekeeping troops in conflict plagued areas

Many of these issues were especially criticized in the late 1990's when many of the world's actors felt as if UN peacekeeping was no longer a viable option for maintaining peace and stability.¹⁷¹ As a result, regional bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Australia-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) played a more prominent role in peacekeeping operations during situations in Kosovo and East Timor respectively.¹⁷² Thus, the precedent was set that the UN would no longer be called upon for difficult peacekeeping operations and instead they would be handled by regional organizations.¹⁷³ With this change becoming a stark reality for the UN, Secretary General, Kofi Annan, announced the development of *The Panel on UN Peace Operations* on 7 March 2000.¹⁷⁴ This report, commonly known as the "Brahimi Report", led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 1327 (2000) which resolved to mandate clear, credible and achievable UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁷⁵

In October 2000, Y.K. Sinha provided recommendations and observations from the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations. The panel oversaw a four month study aimed at improving UN peacekeeping activities and ultimately issued a report filled with recommendations.¹⁷⁶ Sinha points out that the term "Peace Operations" does not demand intergovernmental cooperation, a negative observation of the Brahimi Report.¹⁷⁷

"The Brahimi Report defines this as entailing three principal activities; conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building. These are three distinct elements and should not be combined. All too often the mandates of a peacekeeping operation have been confused with that of a peace conflict peace-building mission. Blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building leads to unrealistic expectations and unachievable mandates. While we support coordination in complex peacekeeping operations we cannot support integration of various diverse activities

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

¹⁷⁰ "UNDPKO – Mission Statement" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm>

¹⁷¹ "United Nations Peace operations and the Brahimi Report" <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/peaceopsbr1001.pdf>

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ "Press Release SC/6948" <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001113.sc6948.doc.html>

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ "General Observations on the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations." Y.K. Sinha. October 30, 2000. <http://www.un.int/india/ind431.htm>

being mandated by the Security Council for such operations¹⁷⁸.”

The Security Council, and later the General Assembly and Secretary General, urged Member States, along with regional and sub-regional organizations, to cooperate fully with the UN.¹⁷⁹ Today the Brahimi Report is still a vital tool for reform in peacekeeping operations. There is still ample work that needs to be done to address the issues burdening peacekeeping missions around the world. In March 2007, the General Assembly supported plans to restructure the DPKO in an effort to advance the Secretary General’s disarmament agenda by supporting the establishment of a new Department of Field Support which would strengthen and reinforce the goals of the DPKO.¹⁸⁰

Defining the Mission: Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking or Peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is amongst a range of actions used by the UN to maintain international peace and security.¹⁸¹ Attempting to reform peacekeeping operations must coincide with an understanding of how peacekeeping differentiates from conflict prevention and peacemaking.¹⁸²

The goals and actions associated with conflict prevention differ from the work of peacebuilding operations. Conflict prevention focuses on the cause of tensions and serves in a monitoring role. Efforts to curb these uprisings also include intervening in potential problems before they escalate.¹⁸³ The emphasis is placed on what underlining causes sparked the problems and works to create the means, through discussions, noted warning signs, and established prior problems, to correct the issue. There is also attention placed on local, regional, and international levels and creating a culturally diverse plan of action, based on the country in question. Conflict prevention is a primary step, hoping to end the dispute before having to resort to peacemaking.¹⁸⁴ Unlike peacekeeping, conflict prevention uses the application of diplomatic measures to prevent regional or civil disputes from escalating or reemerging into violence.¹⁸⁵ The main objective is “to protect and secure human rights and needs” by gathering and analyzing information that could lead to conflict before violence erupts.¹⁸⁶

Of all the tactics employed by the United Nations to keep peace in the world, peacemaking often is the most difficult to define. These operations involve measures which address conflicts in progress, and strive to negotiate between hostile parties.¹⁸⁷ Peacemaking is an aspect associated with conflict resolution and places emphasis on creating equal power relationships between the disagreeing parties to ensure no future conflict. This technique is needed when conflicts escalate between large, factional combatants, and is marked by resolutions and agreements between

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ “To Restructure United Nations Peacekeeping, Disarmament” <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10579.doc.htm>

¹⁸¹ “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ “Conflict Prevention – Overview.” Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/conflictprevention/index.html>

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ “Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” http://www.unfoundation.org/media_center/publications/pdf/Conflict_Prev_Peace0.pdf

¹⁸⁷ “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf

these disputing actors. Usually a third party or arbitrator is used to facilitate these talks, and often can include official diplomats.¹⁸⁸

While peacemaking involves the act assisting governments and combatants during times of conflict, peacekeeping is designed to preserve peace where fighting has ceased. The peacekeepers are used as a means of implementing cease fire agreements and separation of forces after inter-state wars. **Peacekeeping, as defined by the United Nations, is "a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace."**¹⁸⁹ Peacekeepers are situated to **monitor** peacemaking processes in areas stricken by conflict as well as help combatants **implement agreements** and resolutions that were created.¹⁹⁰ There is a variety of **assistance** provided, including post-conflict election assistance, enforce and stabilize rule of law, and economic and social development.¹⁹¹ Peacekeeping is a long and complex process that focuses on creating the conditions for sustainable peace and reduces the risk of a country lapsing or relapsing into conflict.¹⁹² These operations aim to enhance the capacity of the state and highlight the issues that affect how well the society functions.¹⁹³ Peace building operations often take place after, or in conjunction with, the cessation of violence within a conflict area.

Peacemaking: East Timor and Central African Republic

In 1960 the United Nations placed East Timor on its list of non-self-governing territories and set in motion over 40 years of unrest within the country. During that time civil war divided the country between those who wanted independence and those who wanted integration with Indonesia. East Timor had been considered a territory of Portugal since 1960. After attempting to establish an unsuccessful government in 1974, Portugal withdrew from East Timor and in 1976 Indonesia integrated East Timor as a province. The integration was never recognized by the United Nations and thus Security Council and General Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor.

After nearly two decades of fighting Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia in 1998, and by 1999 a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal had been signed. The two governments asked the Secretary General to conduct a popular consultation which would determine the consent of the East Timorese people for the special autonomy. Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which was responsible for carrying out the popular consultation. UNAMET would oversee a transition period depending on the decision of the East Timorese people.

After the votes had been tallied 78.5 percent rejected the proposed autonomy and these results spurred violence by pro-integration militias.¹⁹⁴ A severe campaign of violence ensued throughout the territory and on 12 September 1999 the Security Council, through resolution 1264, authorized a multinational force (INTERFET) headed by Australia to restore peace and security in East Timor.¹⁹⁵ The INTERFET peacemaking operation was essential for the implementation of UNAMET. The situation in East Timor exemplifies why peacemaking is an important aspect of peacekeeping operations and how they are sometimes necessary to achieve the goals of a mission's mandate.

The United Nations Peace-building office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) was established in February 2000 with the principle mission of supporting the government's efforts to consolidate peace and national

¹⁸⁸ "Peacemaking." International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict. Conflict Research Consortium. University of Colorado. 1998. www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/peacemkg.htm

¹⁸⁹ "Meeting New Challenges." United Nations Peacekeeping. www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines" http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ "East Timor – UNMISSET – Background" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmisset/background.html>

¹⁹⁵ Ibid

reconciliation.¹⁹⁶ BONUCA strived for economic recovery in the country through political support, national reconstruction, and the promotion of public awareness concerning human rights issues.¹⁹⁷ The need for BONUCA became apparent in the late 1990's when the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (MINURCA) replaced the Inter-African force in the Central African Republic (MISAB).¹⁹⁸ Both missions were launched after the Central African Republic was disrupted by a military crisis that was intensified by the public's displeasure with social and economic problems including non-payment of salaries.¹⁹⁹ With the potential impact of this crisis on the region, the presidents of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, came together to mediate a truce between the President's forces and the rebels. After intense negotiations the Bangui Agreements were signed by all involved parties on 25 January 1997. One month later MISAB was deployed to restore peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and by March 1998 the Security Council had passed Resolution 1159 establishing MINURCA.²⁰⁰ MINURCA's contribution to restoring security and dialogue among politicians was essential for the success of the region. Security Council Resolution 1271 (1999) extended the mandate of MINURCA to ensure a gradual transition from simply a peacekeeping mission to a long-term peace building process that would eventually become BONUCA in February 2000.²⁰¹ While MINURCA and MISAB were critical in establishing peace and security in the region, it would be BONUCA that would continue to work toward solving the challenges of a complete economic recovery. This peace building mission emphasizes the need for this type of work from the United Nations. Without the capacity to lay groundwork for long lasting sustainability and peace, regions such as Central African Republic would continuously be plagued with conflict.

Peacekeeping: a Look at Africa

During the 1990's severe conflict swept the African continent. By 1996, 13 of the continent's 54 countries were in the midst of war.²⁰² This severe violence ended in a death toll that forced the United Nations to take serious action in conflict prevention. In September 1997 the Security Council held the first meeting on Africa that was intended to address the challenges the continent faced, as well as develop a plan for political and economic success. Addressing the source of these conflicts and looking for ways to prevent them was the goal for providing durable peace and economic growth within the continent.²⁰³ Several resolutions between 1998 and 2000, including Security Council resolutions 1196 and 1197, focused on the UN's role in conflict prevention and the stabilization of the African continent.²⁰⁴

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established through Security Council Resolution 1590.²⁰⁵ This mission serves as a branch of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in January 2005.²⁰⁶ UNMIS calls for the monitoring of the ceasefire while also deploying armed forces. UNMIS also worked towards disarmament, demobilization, restoring authority, and promoting the law of the government. These goals are

¹⁹⁶ "United Nations and Central African Republic" <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/CAR.pdf>

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ "Central African Republic – MINURCA – Background" <http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/minurcaB.htm>

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² "Update Report No. 3: Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa" <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.3198353/>

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ "United Nations Mission in Sudan." Background. United Nations. <http://www.unmis.org/english/en-main.htm>

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

completed through a partnership with the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to promote unity.²⁰⁷ Currently the UNMIS works hand in hand with the UN and the Secretary General to provide support and resources in the region. The work of the UNMIS has gone a long way in bringing awareness and contributions to the region of Darfur and Africa as a whole. This work coincides with Security Council resolutions 1556 from 30 July 2004 and 1564 from 18 September 2004.²⁰⁸

The Arusha Accords, compiling the work of the Arusha Peace Agreement and Arusha negotiations, were a set of five protocols that were signed in Arusha, Tanzania in August of 1993.²⁰⁹ The Arusha Accords created unity between both the government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), in an effort to end a three year civil war. The treaty was mediated by the Organization of African Unity and other Member States, most notably the United States and France.²¹⁰ At the conclusion of the mediation the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established by Security Council Resolution 1545.²¹¹ ONUB was created in May 2004 as a means to ensure cooperation with the peace agreements for the region. Security Council resolution 1545 and the accompanying mission were effectively ended with the passing of SC Resolution 1719. The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was established by SC Resolution 1719 to maintain order and peace from January 2007.²¹² The United Nations Intergrated Office in Burundi has helped to facilitate support to the Government in their efforts to maintain not just peace, but long-term peace and stability to the region.

In July 2007 the United Nations, along with the African Union, through Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized a joint mission in Darfur designed to implement the Darfur peace agreement.²¹³ The mission was labeled UNAMID (United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur), and serves as an excellent example of a peacekeeping mission that incorporates the help of regional actors. The core objectives of UNAMID include the protection of civilians, securing humanitarian assistance, assisting in the political process and monitoring the peace agreement.²¹⁴ Although there is still violence in the region, much of the major violence had subsided and a peace agreement was formed before the authorization of UNAMID.²¹⁵

Despite valiant efforts to halt violence in Darfur, the current UNAMID deployment faces great difficulties that raise many of the questions associated with peacekeeping reform. UNAMID is not fully equipped to carry out its mandate due to difficulties with logistics and operations in remote and inhospitable terrain. They lack support that can only be delivered by member states such as air and ground transportation needed to protect the mandate.²¹⁶ Inconsistent cooperation from Sudan is yet another hindrance for UNAMID and has led to worsened conflict. Current peacekeeping missions throughout the world incorporate several actors including military, police and civilian that are working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.²¹⁷ Although fighting still remains in some countries, the earlier work of the United Nations has helped to curb the violence that once claimed innocent lives in Africa.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ "United Nations Operation in Burundi." Department of Public Information. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub/>

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ "United Nations Operation in Burundi." Department of Public Information. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub/>

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ "UNAMID" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/>

²¹⁴ "Darfur – UNAMID – Background" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html>

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ "Remarks of the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. Mr. Jean-Marie Guhenno to the special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations." March 10, 2008. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article100308.htm>

²¹⁷ "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines" http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf

A Blurring of the Lines

Understanding the fundamental differences between conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping also highlights many of the gray areas associated with the various forms of establishing or maintaining peace and stability within a conflict area. Since almost all peace operations are extremely complex and involve several actors, it is rare that these operations would only encompass one of the aspects of peacekeeping. Even if a peacekeeping operation is deployed to support a ceasefire, they will often be required to assist in conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts, with the possibility of having to use force in certain situations. An example of this overlapping can be found in the current peace mission in Cote d'Ivoire. United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established through Security Council Resolution 1528 in 2004, and has been an ongoing mission to provide peace and stability in the region. Several subsequent resolutions have been passed, including Security Council Resolution 1609 (2005) and Security Council Resolution 1739 (2007), in an effort to extend the mandate and field questions not answered in previous resolutions.²¹⁸ UNOCI troops upheld their peacekeeping mission by monitoring the ceasefire implementation and attempting to halt any hostile actions.²¹⁹ However, they were also charged with the task of peacemaking through disarmament and dismantling of militias.²²⁰

Peace building efforts included identifying the population and registering voters, as well as reforming the security sector.²²¹ Understanding the fine balance between the various aspects of a mission, will help to outline a clearer mandate and ultimately lead to the integration of peace in an otherwise unstable region.

Implementation/Integration of Regional Actors

Only 13 operations were deployed in the first 40 years of peacekeeping compared to the 50 operations that have been launched in the past 20 years. This stark increase in missions does illustrate a level of trust on the part of the international community, but it also boosts expectations that can only be met if the United Nations continues to expand their peacekeeping capacity.²²² Since the inception of peacekeeping missions, the formula for success has changed drastically bringing the world to realize that the demand for peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention efforts will continue to grow in the decades to come. The integration of regional bodies is an excellent way of combating the growing need for peacekeeping missions. In 2006 Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed the deepening engagement of regional organizations saying, "the political engagement of regional actors is improving our knowledge of specific situations. Their military peacekeeping capacities have made it possible to respond more quickly at the outset of a crisis and at key moments."²²³

In March 1991 a severe conflict erupted in Sierra Leone when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war near the Liberian border to overthrow the government. Sierra Leone's government attempted to defend itself with the help of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but in 1992 the army overthrew the government.²²⁴ Elections were held in 1996 that established Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as Sierra Leone's new president and the army relinquished their power. The RUF did not participate in the elections and never recognized the authority of the new president. By 1997 a military coup d'etat brought together RUF and army forces to form the ruling junta. Fighting continued in the country despite several efforts at peace, and remained predominately unstable until 23 October 1997 when a meeting between ECOWAS

²¹⁸ "UNOCI Mandate" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unoci/mandate.html>

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² "United Nations Office at Geneva" [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/0709F14713B237AFC12574580036D7C4?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/0709F14713B237AFC12574580036D7C4?OpenDocument)

²²³ "United Nations Radio" <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/5281.html>

²²⁴ "Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html>

and leading members of the junta led to a peace plan that included an immediate ceasefire to be monitored by ECOMOG and the United Nations Security Council.²²⁵

While the junta publicly accepted the agreement, they never fully implemented it and in February 1998 ECOMOG responded to a rebel attack with a military strike that led to the expulsion of the junta from Freetown. President Kabbah returned to office 10 March 1998, and that June the United Nations established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. Despite their best efforts, by December 1998 the fighting continued and the rebel alliance managed to again take control of half the country including the majority of Freetown by January 1999.²²⁶ UNOMSIL troops were evacuated but later that month ECOMOG troops again gained control of the capitol and installed the civilian government.²²⁷ Again ECOWAS initiated diplomatic efforts and peace talks between the rebels and the government and by 7 July 1999 the involved parties had signed the Lome Peace agreement to end hostilities and form a government of national unity.²²⁸

Both the rebels and the government requested an expanded UNOMSIL which the Security Council granted on 20 August 1999 with the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNOMSIL was terminated and the new UNAMSIL had a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers that would assist the government in carrying out the provisions of the Lome Peace agreement.²²⁹ Through Resolution 1289 (2000), the Security Council introduced mandate revisions for UNAMSIL that included expanding the military component to 11,100 military personnel and the civil component to include more civilian police, administrative support, and technical assistance.²³⁰ The Security Council expanded UNAMSIL's mandate twice more through Resolutions 1299 (2000), and 1346 (2001), and ultimately strengthened the capacity of Sierra Leone with 17,500 military personnel.

UNAMSIL has been viewed as a relatively successful peacekeeping mission despite the sporadic outbursts of violence throughout its operation. The mission has successfully disarmed tens of thousands of ex-fighters, helped hold national elections, rebuilt the police force, and contributed to the rehabilitation of infrastructure that brings government services to local communities. Along with the help of other UN agencies, jobs have been provided to thousands of youths and ex-fighters, schools and clinics have been reconstructed, agricultural projects have been launched and medical clinics have been established in far reaching areas of the country.²³¹

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ United Nations Integrated office in Sierra Leone <http://www.uniosil.org/content.asp?catid=1&navid=14>

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ "Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html>

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

Length of Peacekeeping Missions

The Middle East provides an excellent example of how peace building operations are being used as a means to bring peace to an area grappling with war since the first UN peacekeeping mission was established. The ongoing power struggle originates from the attempt to control natural resources, cultural and religious differences, corrupt leaders, lack of democracy and many other factors. Although UNTSO troops were originally military observers ensuring the implementation of a ceasefire, following the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, their role changed drastically along with the circumstances in the area.²³² Troops were used as mediators for hostile parties, and were often able to contain isolated incidents, preventing them from escalating into major conflicts.²³³

Today the UNTSO aids in other peacekeeping missions throughout the region including the United Nations Disengagement observer Force (UNDOF), which was established in 1974 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Syria.²³⁴ The Middle East has continued to be an area of strife and thus the UNTSO remains in effect today monitoring areas within 5 states – Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic.²³⁵

In addition to the UNDOF, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is another mission that has shown success in peace building throughout the Middle East. Established in 1978, UNIFIL was adopted by Security Council Resolution 425 and 426, after the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched a terrorist attack on Israel.²³⁶ In response to the attack, Israel invaded Lebanon since it was seen as a power source for the PLO. Soon after, Lebanon tried to persuade the United Nations and Security Council that it was not connected with the PLO, resulting in the establishment of UNIFIL to ensure the peaceful withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.²³⁷ Between 1978 and 2006 several instances of violence erupted in the region that altered and extended UNIFIL's mandate. Despite various violent outbreaks during this period, UNIFIL continued to support and strengthen the region by attempting to maintain peace and stability in the area. They conducted military observation, assisted in humanitarian efforts and provided medical assistance throughout the region.²³⁸ In August 2006 Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed, which called for a full cessation of hostilities, and an immediate stop to the attacks being launched by Israel in Lebanon.

Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated that,

“it is absolutely vital that the fighting now stop. Provided it does, I believe this resolution will make it possible to conclude a sustainable and lasting ceasefire agreement in the days ahead. And I hope that this could be the beginning of a process to solve the underlying political problems in the region through peaceful means.”²³⁹

Annan reiterated the need for sustainable long-term solutions that required regional issues to be taken into account. According to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “until the international community insists on a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, any one of these conflicts has the potential to erupt and engulf the entire region.”²⁴⁰

²³² “Middle East – UNTSO – Background” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/background.html>

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ “Golan Heights – UNDOF – Background” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/undof/background.html>

²³⁵ “Middle East – UNTSO – Background” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/background.html>

²³⁶ “Lebanon – UNIFIL – Background” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html>

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ “Lebanon – UNIFIL – Background” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html>

Cross Cultural Impacts of Peacekeepers:

Peacekeeping missions involve the work of many actors, including the peacekeepers themselves. The distinct cultural norms of a people differ from region to region, as well as within Member States. With that in mind, peacekeeping missions and the peacekeepers must exhibit both an understanding and respect for the cultures around them. While ignoring these customs does not guarantee failure, it is believed that recognizing these traditions allows for a smoother and more successful mission.²⁴¹

In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security” that “expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.”²⁴² While the document focused on the gender issue, regarding peacekeepers, it did bring to light the culture question. As peacekeeping missions have increased and expanded in scope, so too must the idea of cultural considerations.²⁴³

Many researchers cite the problems during the situation in Somalia, from 1992-1993, with a lack of cultural knowledge of the people and country.²⁴⁴ After the removal of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war erupted in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The UN, with assistance from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) moved to resolve the conflict. The UN was dispatched to the mission to facilitate the peace role, as well as offer humanitarian aid and bring in non-governmental organization (NGOs) for relief aid.²⁴⁵ In January of 1992, the Security Council created United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).²⁴⁶ Many analysts recognize that a lack of understanding of cultural norms and of the local customs were among the problems with this mission.²⁴⁷

Western ideals differ greatly from many other regions. This idea is clear when discussing the Middle East. The traditions and cultures of this region conflict with those of their Western neighbors, of which many peacekeepers originate. This clash has affected peacekeeping operations, as seen in Somalia, but now more recently in Iraq. The United States’ ongoing conflict in Iraq, known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, has served as a modern day example of cultural clashing between peacekeepers and citizens.²⁴⁸ Created in 2005 as a means to alleviate the traditional tensions; the Lioness program has been a successful means to bridge this cultural gap. As Muslim men are not allowed to touch women of which they are not related, insurgents often used this to their advantage. Women were smuggled through these checkpoints with money, arms and often served as suicide bombers. The Lioness program was formed from US Marine commanders, who were in need of a culturally acceptable way to perform effective searches of Iraqi women.²⁴⁹ Lioness consists of all female Marines, which are used at checkpoints along the Iraqi

²⁴¹ Banseka, Cage. “The New Era of African Union Peacekeeping and the Culture Question.” <http://www.hollerafrica.com/showArticle.php?artId=122&catId=1>

²⁴² “S/RES/1325” United Nations Security Council. 31 October 2000. www.un.org/events/reg_1325e.pdf

²⁴³ Banseka, Cage. “The New Era of African Union Peacekeeping and the Culture Question.” <http://www.hollerafrica.com/showArticle.php?artId=122&catId=1>

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ “UNOSOM Background.” United Nations Operation in Somalia. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Banseka, Cage. “The New Era of African Union Peacekeeping and the Culture Question.” <http://www.hollerafrica.com/showArticle.php?artId=122&catId=1>

²⁴⁸ “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Multi-National Force- Iraq. <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>

²⁴⁹ Parsons, Claudia. “ ‘Lioness’ Shows US Women on Frontline in Iraq.” Reuters. 6 May 2008. <http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2843902720080506>

border and throughout Iraq. Lioness is a successful program, created to offset the strain of cultural differences in times of peacekeeping.²⁵⁰

Conclusion

Peacekeeping missions should continue to be at the forefront of work done by the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the world. Strengthening the mandates of these missions, and clearly defining the role of peacekeepers is essential to the success of the operation. A clear understanding of hostile situations is often difficult to obtain, making it harder to define that mandate. However, it is the role of the international community to pool their resources for the common good. A solid comprehension of the past failures and successes of peacekeeping missions is necessary for the lasting peace worldly United Nations members strive for daily.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

Committee Directive

The success of peacekeeping missions emphasizes the need for regional bodies in peacekeeping operations. Without the early groundwork laid by ECOMOG and ECOWAS, UNAMSIL would not have been able to achieve such success. However further questions remain. How can the United Nations strengthen peacekeeping missions and encourage the much needed support of the host state and other member states? To what extent should the United Nations allow the integration of regional bodies? At which point in a peacekeeping operation is a regional actor the most influential? Should regional missions supersede those mandated by the United Nations? The longevity of this peace building mission raises many of the fundamental questions of peacekeeping reform. How long should a peacekeeping mission last? To what extent should a missions mandate continue to be extended? Can cultural understanding guarantee successful peacekeeping operations? What rights do the Peacekeepers have? And where are those lines drawn? What place do the cultural ramifications of the people and land have in these missions? The future of peacekeeping is defined by prior successes and failures.

Topic III: Ending Internal Disputes for a Peaceful Future

Third Party Intervention

At the beginning of the 20th century, different types of wars, such as internal conflicts and wars for independence were represented evenly in international conflicts.²⁵¹ However, by the last decade of the 20th century, wars were limited almost strictly to internal conflicts.²⁵² Due to such a high increase of civil wars, nations began interfering more in these conflicts. This caused the civil wars to be more internationalized.²⁵³ Civil wars are further complicated by the fact that the combatants are not always well-defined.²⁵⁴ In many cases, such as that of Hamas or Hezbollah, combatants may not wear a uniform or carry a gun openly.²⁵⁵ This lack of identity makes it more difficult to foster negotiations and peace-keeping initiatives to prevent violence. To appreciate the complexity of ending intrastate conflicts, one must understand the difficulties that face the United Nations as a third party to these conflicts.

The role of a third party in conflict resolution is to manipulate the risks and rewards of conflict in such a way that it is no longer in either combatant's best interest to fight. This is generally possible when a more powerful state or organization can act as a police force to manipulate and control such variables. The control of these variables can have unforeseen repercussions, which may cause a recurrence of fighting in the future.

When the United Nations gets involved in an intrastate conflict, they are by definition a third party intervening in the conflict. This process can be very complex for many reasons. Unlike other potential third parties, the United Nations must maintain a strict adherence to national sovereignty. This creates a delicate line that often results in the United Nations doing less, rather than more, to ameliorate a potential conflict. As demonstrated in case studies later in this guide, it is apparent that many of the traditional approaches to third party intervention and conflict resolution have failed.

In the article entitled "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict," which involves examining historical situations grounded in game theory, authors Carment and Rowlands examine these traditional theories and develop alternatives that would make third party intervention more effective. According to their examples, the first lesson that is derived is that "more intensive initial interventions are more likely to result in

²⁵¹ http://nobelprize.org/educational_games/peace/conflictmap/readmore.html

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Blum, Ruthie. "One on one: Ruling Out the Wrong Rhetoric." *The Jerusalem Post*. June 16, 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1212659747566&pagename=JPost_percent2FJPArticle_percent2FShowFull

cooperative outcomes.” While this is intuitively expected, imposing a higher cost on combatants to force conflict resolution could cause problems further in the future because the grievances of combatants have not actually been addressed. However, their model also developed interesting conclusions when examining situations in which low-intensity intervention is likely to cause successful conflict resolution. Carment and Rowlands assert that one situation in which low-intensity intervention can be successful is when a third party intervenes in a highly salient conflict with weak combatants.²⁵⁶ In this situation, a combatant’s credibility to threaten escalation remains high. Another situation in which low-intensity intervention is successful is in a “low-salient, weak combatant, high gains scenario where resistance by a combatant is likely due to the high gains, but the intervener’s threat to escalate is not credible due to low salience.”²⁵⁷ According to Carment and Rowlands, in this situation the best strategy is to lower costs, while keeping weaker opponents from being defeated by the other weak combatant.²⁵⁸ The degree of intervention by the third party can have significant impact upon the outcome of a conflict, manipulating the variables in such a way that it would be in the best interests of parties to stop fighting. The careful manipulation of these variables is exceptionally important in third party intervention.

Nations as Third Parties

Nations may sometimes take it upon themselves to function as a third-party mediator in an internal dispute. Generally, they have some interest in the conflict and would also benefit from peace between the countries.²⁵⁹ For example, Russia intervened in the civil war in Tajikistan in the mid 1990’s because it had economic interests in Tajikistan and its role as a third party allowed it to increase its military presence in Central Asia, a long-term goal of the early Russian Federation.²⁶⁰ Functioning as a third party intervener could potentially increase a country’s reputation throughout the world. For example, Qatar has often been involved as a third-party in negotiations in the Middle East since the current emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, carried out a bloodless coup against his father.²⁶¹ Most recently, Qatar was involved in negotiating a peaceful settlement in Lebanon in May 2008.²⁶² The effects of such negotiations have conferred privileges upon Qatar and its citizens. According to Abdel Aziz al-Mahmoud, the editor of Al Arab, a newspaper in Qatar, “in the old days, nobody had really heard of Qatar. Now, once you say ‘I’m from Qatar,’ it’s, ‘Step right this way.’”²⁶³ There is a clear advantage that states gain by acting as a third party.

Because nations have certain incentives to become involved in a conflict, the role of bias can be contentious. In studies of conflict resolution, there are two main theories regarding the idea of bias in a conflict. The first theory indicates that third parties should be unbiased in conflict resolution. Intuitively, one would believe that only an unbiased nation could manipulate the bargaining range in such a way that is fair to all combatants. A biased nation may favor one side over the other in negotiations, causing further hostilities and increased tension. However, others that study conflict resolution believe that biased nations are more likely to resolve a conflict effectively. Their reasoning is that a biased nation has a stronger vested interest in the conflict and even if it is biased towards one nation, will work to solve the issue because it would be in the third party’s best interest. A negotiated peace between the combatants could increase the third party’s good relations or ability to trade with its ally. According to this

Carment, David and Dane Rowlands. “Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Oct 1998), pp. 572-599.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Barseghyan, Kristine and Zainiddin Karaev. “Playing Cat and Mouse: Conflict and Third-Party Mediation in Post Soviet Space.” *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*. http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/6_1n-k.htm

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Worth, Robert F. “Qatar, Playing All Sides, Is a Nonstop Mediator.” *The New York Times*. July 9, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/middleeast/09qatar.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=Qatar&st=cse&scp=3

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Ibid.

theory, bias by a third party is acceptable as long as the third party is perceived to be even handed. Even handedness, the idea that regardless of a country's views, a country presents fair solutions, is very important when a nation acts as a third party in a dispute.

The United Nations as a Third Party

As an international organization devoted to peace and security, it makes sense that United Nations would be involved in conflict resolution. Chapter VI of the United Nations' Charter relates directly to the function of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization. According to Article 36, Chapter VI, the Security Council has the power to recommend appropriate measures or "methods of adjustment" when a conflict is brought to their attention.²⁶⁴ While this does not explicitly authorize peacekeeping troops, the United Nations has utilized this clause to include peacekeepers and mediators as a tool for conflict resolution.

Until the end of the Cold War, the United Nations only intervened in conflicts that contained two or more states, a principle known as non-interference.²⁶⁵ Increased knowledge about the internal politics of a country has occurred due to greater openness of information and the invention of the internet. Another reason is because many borders in the post-colonial world were arbitrarily drawn. The new borders, based upon colonial divisions included multiple ethnic groups with conflicting views.²⁶⁶ The arbitrary drawing of borders leads to internal conflicts and suppression of minorities. The developments of more information and post-colonial conflicts have encouraged the United Nations to play a greater role in negotiating and maintaining peace between combatants.

However, UN intervention has not seen the same success. Intervention in the early 1990's in Bosnia is generally regarded as a failure. The United Nations had declared a safety for the Muslims in the area, but were unable to secure it adequately, leading to a slaughter of thousands in Srebrenica.²⁶⁷ The problem was worsened by the fact that the Serbs used the blue-helmet troops of the United Nations as a form of military deterrent to prevent the West from responding to their actions.²⁶⁸ Similarly, United Nations intervention in Rwanda did nothing as the Hutu slaughtered approximately 800,000 Tutsis.²⁶⁹ While these failures indicate the limits of United Nations' action in the short-term, long-term action must also be considered.

Long-term action is an extremely important point to consider for several reasons. If long-term action is less effective, then the end result would be that it only temporarily preserves the status-quo in a conflict, rather than solve any issues. In 1996, Paul Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul Hensel published an article that detailed the results of a study on the long term effects of the United Nations in conflict resolution. According to Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel, the preservation of the status-quo in a conflict could make the Member State that is most vulnerable particularly hostile to United Nations intervention, as it could actually worsen their bargaining position over time.²⁷⁰ The lack of success could also lead to further escalation of war. Thus failure by the United Nations results in lost opportunities for peaceful solutions and increases the probability that combatants will fight again in the future.²⁷¹ Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel considered the long term effects of United Nations intervention and

²⁶⁴ "Charter of the United Nations." *The United Nations*. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

²⁶⁵ "Is Peace in the World a Utopian Dream? The Role of the United Nations." *The United Nations and the Culture of Peace*. <http://www.unac.org/peacecp/factsheet/role.html>

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Boot, Max. "Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of UN Peacekeeping." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2000. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000301fareviewessay34/max-boot/paving-the-road-to-hell-the-failure-of-u-n-peacekeeping.html>

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Diehl, Paul F., Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul Hensel. "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict." *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 683-700.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

came to the conclusion that intervention had no effect on the timing, occurrence, or severity of future conflict.²⁷² While Carment and Rowands found that more intense and intrusive interventions were beneficial in the beginning of third party interventions, Diehl, Reifshneider, and Hensel assert that the United Nations as a third party has no effect in this category. They believe there are four reasons for this lack of success. Firstly, the UN functions as a reactive organization because they consider disputes only after a conflict has passed the crisis level. The lack of early warning system or political will to rectify the situation sooner can make the success of long term solutions much more difficult. Secondly, the UN is often quick to leave disputes. The UN and international media turn away from a crisis as soon as it has settled. A third reason is that UN intervention may limit a crisis from having a decisive solution that would generally prevent future conflict. Freezing the status quo may merely delay future conflicts from occurring. A fourth reason is that factors beyond the UN's control can lead to recurring conflict, such as long-standing grievances, that will compel parties to fight no matter what.²⁷³ The conflicts examined in "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict" were only conflicts that had reached the full-blown crisis stage. The authors theorize that intervention before conflicts reach the crisis stage might be less inconclusive.²⁷⁴

Cyprus: A Failure in Ending Internal Dispute

On 16 August 1960, the Republic of Cyprus became an officially recognized state in the international community.²⁷⁵ The United States entered a treaty to guarantee the territorial rights of Cyprus and the Constitution, which was supposed to balance the interests of both Greeks and Turks in various Cypriot communities.²⁷⁶ After serious constitutional crises, violence broke out on the island on 21 December 1963.²⁷⁷ Cyprus asked the Security Council to intervene, charging that Turkey was intervening in their internal affairs and preparing to invade Cyprus. Turkey charged that Greek Cypriot leaders were trying to nullify the rights of Turkish Cypriots.²⁷⁸

In 1964, the Security Council approved a peacekeeping mission to the island of Cyprus. Peacekeeping troops were sent in to help the British soldiers patrol the "green line," which became the de facto dividing line between the Greek portion of Cyprus and the Turkish portion.²⁷⁹ While the peacekeepers were a short-term solution to the problem, long-term solutions met resistance from both Greeks and Turks. The situation deteriorated when a military junta seized control of Greece and seemed determined to resolve the Cyprus situation by force.²⁸⁰ Fighting broke out in 1974 when a coup occurred by the Cypriot military, supported by Greece, to unite the two countries. Five days later Turkey sent in troops to protect the Turkish Cypriots.²⁸¹ The Greek junta dissolved over the issue and a cease fire was reached on 23 July.²⁸² After attempting a peace settlement, fighting resumed causing 180,000 Greek Cypriots to flee from the northern part of Cyprus south of the "green line" and 50,000 Turks to flee north.²⁸³ UN peacekeepers and landmines enforced the border between the north and the south. In 1975, the Turkish Cypriots in

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ "Cyprus –UNFICYP - Background." *The United Nations*. 2007. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficypr/background.html>

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Housden, Tom. "Cyprus: How the Crisis Unfolded." *BBC News*. April 1, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1760565.stm>

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ "Cyprus: Divided Island." *BBC News*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/europe/04/cyprus/html/invasion.stm>

the northern portion of the country declared their independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which has only been recognized by Turkey.²⁸⁴

While the UN has sponsored peace negotiations between both sides since 1980, little progress has been made.²⁸⁵ With Cyprus' possible accession into the European Union, there were renewed hopes to find a solution to the crisis. Disagreements on the right of return of Greek Cypriots in the north and the presence of Turkish troops complicated the issue.²⁸⁶ Kofi Annan managed to get both leaders to agree to present his reunification plan to the public since both leaders could not agree.²⁸⁷ The referendum was especially important considering Cyprus' candidacy for European Union (EU) membership. If either side voted no on the reunification plan, southern Cyprus would accede to the EU without its northern counterpart.²⁸⁸ On 24 April 2004 the referendum was held.²⁸⁹ The plan called for a loose confederation of the two states, based on the Swiss model with a rotating symbolic presidency between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The plan also allowed some Turks to return to their homes in the south and authorized a small number of Turkish troops to maintain a presence on the island.²⁹⁰ The Turkish Cypriots supported the plan for reunification while the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelmingly against it. Several ministers of the Greek Cypriot government, including President Tassos Papadopoulos, urged Greek Cypriots to vote against the measure.²⁹¹ EU membership only applies to the southern part of the island.

Recently, there has been hope that some progress would be made. In April 2008, a major crossing in downtown Nicosia was opened, bridging the gap between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots for the first time in more than 30 years.²⁹² While many are hopeful that progress may occur, one must realize that the UN and the United Kingdom have failed to resolve the issues between the north and south as third parties. The road to a reunified Cyprus is a difficult one. Separated by a large brick wall resembling the Berlin Wall, Nicosia, Cyprus' capital, remains the last divided city in Europe.

Case Study: Sri Lanka

The bitter civil war that has raged through Sri Lanka since the 1980's is rooted in the complex colonial history of the island. Traditionally, the Tamil have been the minority in Sri Lanka. Starting in 1815 the British brought in more Tamil laborers for tea and coffee production on plantations.²⁹³ The preferential treatment given by the British to the Tamils caused tensions to mount between them and the majority Buddhist Sinhalese community.²⁹⁴ This resentment and tension increased following the rise of Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism after Sri Lanka declared independence in

²⁸⁴ Housden, Tom. "Cyprus: How the Crisis Unfolded." *BBC News*. April 1, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1760565.stm>

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ "Cyprus: Divided Island." *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/europe/04/cyprus/html/peace_process.stm

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ "Cyprus: Divided Island." *BBC News*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/europe/04/cyprus/html/referendum.stm>

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² "Symbolic Cyprus Crossing Reopens." *BBC News*. April 3, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7327866.stm>

²⁹³ "Country Profile: Sri Lanka." *BBC News*. June 4, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/country_profiles/1168427.stm

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

1948.²⁹⁵ This began almost immediately after independence when the Tamil plantation workers were disenfranchised in 1949.²⁹⁶

A significant conflict occurred in 1958 between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The Tamils protested the discriminatory Sinhalese Only Language Act that was passed in 1956, causing Tamil protestors to be “beaten-up and shipped to their home-land (which was considered to be the northeast part of Sri Lanka at the time).²⁹⁷ The Sinhalese Only Language Act made Sinhalese the official language on Sri Lanka. This law made it more difficult for Tamils to find jobs and work in the Sri Lankan economy. This especially harmed their employment prospects in state services, which have been steadily declining since the 1950’s. As of 2002, the number of Tamils in the state services has dropped below 10 percent.²⁹⁸ Because this law came during a time of extreme Sinhala nationalism, the discriminatory act exacerbated existing tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

The colonial tensions reached critical levels in 1983. On 23 July 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked the military, killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers and sparking riots by Sinhalese in Colombo.²⁹⁹ The army killed 41 in Jaffna the following day.³⁰⁰ Additionally, 53 Tamil detainees at Welikade prison were killed, attacked by fellow prisoners, with no impartial inquiry holding the Sinhalese prisoners responsible.³⁰¹ Evidence suggests that this attack would not have been possible without cooperation from the government and the National Security Council.³⁰²

After several years of violent warfare, progress seemed to be made with the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987. Under this agreement, which also became the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution, the Indian government provided peacekeeping troops in Sri Lanka.³⁰³ The provisions called for a temporary merger of the two provinces that make up the island of Sri Lanka, subject to a referendum within one year to assess whether the populace would want such a merger to become permanent.³⁰⁴ Additionally, the agreement also stipulated that the Tamils must disarm and relinquish their arms to the Indian peacekeeping forces.³⁰⁵ This peace process, which caused a brief pause in fighting between the Tamils and the Sinhalese was not successful. The Tamils were accused of surrendering only a fraction of their arms to the Indian peacekeeping forces, causing the Sinhalese to declare the union of the north and east Tamil provinces to be illegal.³⁰⁶ They believed that the union of the provinces should not be valid because the Tamils did not keep their end of the bargain. During the Indian peacekeeping operation approximately 60,000 troops were drawn from two main divisions, the Central Command and the Southern Command.³⁰⁷ Originally sent with the intention of being a neutral body, the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF)

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ “Looking back two decades in perspectives – Black July 1983.” *Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam*. July 25, 2004. <http://www.ltteps.org/?folder=22&view=234>

²⁹⁸ Thirumalai, M.S. “Language in India.” January 9, 2002. <http://www.languageinindia.com/jan2002/srilanka1.html>

²⁹⁹ “The July 1983 Violence Against Tamils.” *University Teachers for Human Rights*. 2001. <http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume1/Chapter4.htm>

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Manivannan, Thirumalai. “The Importance of Two Provinces.” *BBC News*. October 17, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6059992.stm

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ “India Peacekeeping Operations.” November 10, 2004. http://www.photius.com/countries/india/national_security/india_national_security_peacekeeping_operati~174.html

fought gradually more against the Tamils.³⁰⁸ The necessity of Indian troops to fight the Tamils, coupled with allegations of rape and murder of civilians, and limited cooperation from Sri Lankan forces, led to a loss of support of the IPKF by both combatants of the war.³⁰⁹ Following the Sri Lankan presidential election in 1988, newly elected President Ranasinghe Premadasa ended the five and a half year state of emergency and asked India to withdraw its peacekeeping forces. This was completed in March 1990.³¹⁰ During the Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict between 1987 and 1990, approximately 1,500 Indian troops were killed and over 4,500 were wounded.³¹¹ Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India who helped facilitate the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was assassinated by a Tamil extremist in 1991.³¹²

Talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE began as the Indian troops were withdrawn. However, the negotiations broke down as soon as their common agenda of removing Indian troops had been achieved. By June 1990, the collapse of the negotiations caused the start of the Second Eelam War in the north and east sections of Sri Lanka.³¹³ The Second (and successive) Eelam War is a continuation of the same conflict that sparked tensions in the 1950's and led to the First Eelam War. The LTTE captured territory in the northern and eastern sections of Sri Lanka. They also increased the intensity of their attacks through suicide bombings, which were used to kill Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and President Premadasa in May 1993.³¹⁴

Hostilities between the army and the LTTE exploded on 11 June 1990. A day prior, a Muslim man was found in a compromising position with a Sinhala woman and sent to prison. The Muslim happened to be a tailor who sews Tamil uniforms.³¹⁵ That evening armed forces of the LTTE arrived at the police station in Batticaloa where the Muslim tailor had been sent.³¹⁶ The LTTE were told that the man had been sent to the hospital. The following morning 250 armed LTTE cadres surrounded the police station and occupied it.³¹⁷ The LTTE forced Sinhalese police and citizens living in the north and east of Sri Lanka to leave the area or face consequences. The Sinhalese were accommodated at air force bases. When the LTTE overtook the police station, they removed 45 million rupees in cash, gold and jewelry as well as 109 T 56 rifles, 77 T 84 S rifles, 28 light machine guns, 29 self-loading rifles, 65 sub machine guns, 78 .303 rifles, and 78 SAR 80 guns.³¹⁸ A total of 899 police personnel were abducted by the LTTE with only 125 escaping.³¹⁹ The individuals that did not escape were murdered, indicating that the Sri Lankan's government decision for the police officers to surrender to the LTTE was a mistake. Through the Second Eelam War, little or no territorial gains were made by either side, constituting in a stalemate.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² "1991: Bomb Kills India's Former Leader Rajiv Gandhi." *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/21/newsid_2504000/2504739.stm

³¹³ Edrisinha, Rohan. "Trying Times: Constitutional Attempts to Resolve Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka." *Conciliation Resources*. August 1998. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sri-lanka/trying-times.php>

³¹⁴ "Conflict History: Sri Lanka." *International Crisis Group*. May 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=100

³¹⁵ Rajasingham, K. T. "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story." June 15, 2002. <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DF15Df01.html>

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

Peace efforts were again attempted after the parliamentary victory of the People's Alliance (led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party) and the SLFP's Chandrika Kumartunga's election as president in 1994.³²⁰ Both were elected specifically because they promised to bring a negotiated settlement to the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE rebels. Kumartunga's election was especially promising because it was the first time that a party other than the United National Party (UNP) won in the last 17 years.³²¹ Political change in Sri Lanka was especially promising for the prospects of concluding a peace agreement.

With a new mandate for peace, the government and the LTTE agreed to a cessation of hostilities on 8 January 1995. Talks resumed in Jaffna following the ceasefire. The hope that the ceasefire would lead to an early breakthrough was dashed early in the peace process. The LTTE insisted that the government make economic and military concessions, including the dismantling of a major army camp and other steps that would improve the Tigers' strategic position.³²² When Kumaratunga refused to acquiesce to the Tigers' demands, she was accused of becoming a captive of the military. Furthermore, the Tigers believed that a lower level delegation representing the government in the peace process indicated that they were less committed to the peace process.³²³ While it seems that the Tigers harbored misgivings about the arrangements of the cease fire and negotiations, this unease had some legitimacy. The government promised significantly more supplies than were actually delivered when they promised to lift the embargo on the north. Bureaucratic inefficiencies delayed shipments, leading to further suspicion by the LTTE.³²⁴ Both sides did not trust the other, making the cease fire extremely fragile and uncertain. The decision of the Tigers to resume hostilities was based on such negative perceptions. According to Schaffer, the Tigers used the cease fire to solidify their position in the east and procure supplies in the north. The LTTE also had the added bonus of appearing open-minded and flexible to Sri Lankans and the international community by accepting President Kumaratunga's offer for peace.³²⁵

When hostilities resumed, the government of Sri Lanka scrambled to restart their arms procurement and other military operations, as they had been suspended during the ceasefire.³²⁶ However, because the Sri Lankan government could not give the Tamils an independent nation in the north and east, one of the core reasons they have been fighting since the 1980's, it was inevitable that they would return to the battlefield at some point. By calling off the truce, the LTTE claimed that the government failed to meet its two primary demands: the dismantlement of the military base at Pooneryn and the free movement of armed rebels in the east.³²⁷

³²⁰ "Conflict History: Sri Lanka." *International Crisis Group*. May 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=100

³²¹ "History." *United National Party*. May 11, 2007. http://www.unp.lk/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=27

³²² Schaffer, Howard B. "Sri Lanka in 1995: A Difficult and Disappointing Year." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part II (Feb., 1996), pp. 216-223

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ "April 1995 – Collapse of Peace Process." *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 41, April 1995. [http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value\[m\]=1&kssp_time_start_value\[y\]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value\[m\]=12&kssp_time_stop_value\[y\]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=41](http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value[m]=1&kssp_time_start_value[y]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value[m]=12&kssp_time_stop_value[y]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=41)

³²⁵ Schaffer, Howard B. "Sri Lanka in 1995: A Difficult and Disappointing Year." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part II (Feb., 1996), pp. 216-223.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ "April 1995 – Collapse of Peace Process." *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 41, April 1995. [http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value\[m\]=1&kssp_time_start_value\[y\]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value\[m\]=12&kssp_time_stop_value\[y\]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=4](http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value[m]=1&kssp_time_start_value[y]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value[m]=12&kssp_time_stop_value[y]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=4)

After midnight on 19 April 1995, the Tigers sunk two gunboats at the Sri Lanka's navy's Trincomalee base without providing the required 72 hour notice that they were terminating the cease fire.³²⁸ This action began the Third Eelam War. In the prolonged fighting in the first few days of new hostilities, some of the most severe casualties were inflicted by the Tigers. By the end of April at least 160 government troops and 100 rebels had perished in recent clashes.³²⁹ This was followed by a string of successful operations by the LTTE against military, police, and civilian targets, putting the government on the defensive for the next two months.³³⁰ The momentum of the war shifted in favor of the government in November 1995. Armed with more than 21,000 troops, artillery, aircraft, and tanks, the government forces had entered Jaffna, the LTTE's largest city and stronghold on November 20th. By November 24 had sealed off the city completely, trapping 2,000 LTTE rebels.³³¹ United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed "deep concern" over the displacement of civilians as a result of the siege on Jaffna.³³² The Sri Lankan government refused to allow any outside agencies to assist in refugee relief efforts because of fears that such international organizations may be partial to the Tigers.³³³ On 31 January 1996, the LTTE retaliated with a major suicide bombing in the main commercial district in downtown Colombo. Over 1,400 were injured and at least 80 individuals died.³³⁴ This was one of many suicide bombing incidents that the LTTE used to attack the Sri Lankan government and caused the fighting between the two sides to increase in intensity. Several major attacks occur during this phase of the war including the bombing of Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site, President Kumaratunga being wounded in a bombing, and a suicide bomb on the international airport destroying half the Sri Lankan fleet.³³⁵ Heavy fighting continued into 2001.

Renewed hopes for a peace process occurred in late 2001. Following the December elections of the new UNP government, the LTTE and the government declared unilateral cease fires.³³⁶ A formal ceasefire was brokered by Norway between Sri Lanka and the Tigers in February 2002, and was monitored by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.³³⁷ Peace talks began in Norway in 2002, but the Tigers withdrew in 2003, claiming that they were being marginalized.³³⁸ The disaster of the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka was enough to bring the LTTE and the government

³²⁸ Schaffer, Howard B. "Sri Lanka in 1995: A Difficult and Disappointing Year." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part II (Feb., 1996), pp. 216-223.

³²⁹ "April 1995 – Collapse of Peace Process." *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 41, April 1995. [http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value\[m\]=1&kssp_time_start_value\[y\]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value\[m\]=12&kssp_time_stop_value\[y\]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=41](http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value[m]=1&kssp_time_start_value[y]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value[m]=12&kssp_time_stop_value[y]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40507n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=41)

³³⁰ Schaffer, Howard B. "Sri Lanka in 1995: A Difficult and Disappointing Year." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part II (Feb., 1996), pp. 216-223.

³³¹ "November 1995 – Seige of Jaffna – Suicide Attacks in Colombo." *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 41, November 1995. [http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value\[m\]=1&kssp_time_start_value\[y\]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value\[m\]=12&kssp_time_stop_value\[y\]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40823n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_v_id=41&_apn=0](http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=2&kssp_sortby=Relevance&kssp_time_start_value[m]=1&kssp_time_start_value[y]=1994&kssp_time_stop_value[m]=12&kssp_time_stop_value[y]=1996&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40823n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_v_id=41&_apn=0)

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ "January 1996 – Colombo Bombing – Renewed fighting between government troops and LTTE rebels." *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 42, January 1996. [http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=10&kssp_sortby=Oldest_First&kssp_time_start_value\[m\]=1&kssp_time_start_value\[y\]=1996&kssp_time_stop_value\[m\]=12&kssp_time_stop_value\[y\]=2001&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40906n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=42](http://www.keesings.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/search?kssp_search_phrase=sri+lanka&x=19&y=10&kssp_sortby=Oldest_First&kssp_time_start_value[m]=1&kssp_time_start_value[y]=1996&kssp_time_stop_value[m]=12&kssp_time_stop_value[y]=2001&kssp_date_range_type=publication&kssp_a_id=40906n01lka&kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_rspn=1&kssp_v_id=42)

³³⁵ "Timeline: Sri Lanka." BBC News. June 18, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1166237.stm

³³⁶ "Background Note: Sri Lanka." *U.S. Department of State*. May 2008. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>

³³⁷ Dugger, Celia W. "Truce Accord in Sri Lanka Could Herald Peace Talks." *The New York Times*. February 23, 2002. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9800E6D7103EF930A15751C0A9649C8B63>

³³⁸ "Background Note: Sri Lanka." *U.S. Department of State*. May 2008. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>

back to the negotiating table. With over 30,000 Sri Lankans killed it was important that some sort of coordination occur for the relief of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils on the island.³³⁹ In 2005, the government and the LTTE reached an agreement that would allow them to share \$3 billion in tsunami international aid; but the agreement never came into force because it was challenged in court.³⁴⁰ Unfortunately, tensions grew following the 2005 Presidential election. Because the LTTE enforced an election boycott in the areas under its control, perceived hard-liner Mahinda Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) won election.³⁴¹ Although low level hostilities occurred, the cease fire continued to hold. In February 2006, exactly four years after the 2002 cease fire agreement, both the LTTE and the government renewed their commitment to talks in Geneva.³⁴² In April, amidst more violence, the LTTE said that they were pulling out of peace talks indefinitely with the Sri Lankan government, “until a stable and conducive environment is created.”³⁴³ Further violence erupted, including an explosion in a Sinhalese market in Trincomlee, an attack of the main army compound in Colombo, and retaliations by the government through airstrikes.³⁴⁴ Fighting continued into August, in which hundreds were killed and tens of thousands were forced to flee their homes when Tiger forces clashed with government forces in the north and east.³⁴⁵ The government seized the Trincomlee harbor in September 2006, the first major seizure of territory by either party since 2002.³⁴⁶ The Tamils launched their first air attack in March 2007, targeting Katunayake Air Force Base.³⁴⁷ Tensions further escalated in November 2007 when a Sri Lankan air force bomb LTTE political chief and number two S.P. Tamilchelvan. During that same month, the LTTE detonated a bomb in a busy shopping center in Colombo killing 17 and wounding many more.³⁴⁸

On 3 January 2008, the Sri Lankan government announced that it was annulling the six year cease fire. Since 2006, more than 5,000 people had been killed.³⁴⁹ The annulment of the cease fire marked the beginning of the Fourth Eelam War. Since the beginning of 2008, violence between the government and the Tigers has continued to increase. Most recently, on 7 June a bomb ripped through two passenger busses killing 23 civilians.³⁵⁰ The Tigers claimed that the attack was in response to the government killing ethnic Tamil minorities with mines and air raids. The recent resumption of hostilities in Sri Lanka constitutes a significant blow to the peace process. While peace is certainly possible, based upon the fact that cease fires have occurred in three different instances, the path to peace is complex and difficult. Several issues must be addressed before peace can be achieved in Sri Lanka. The government must improve its ability to follow through on agreements, such as the promise to completely lift the blockade in 1994 or the lack of delivery of tsunami aid money to the LTTE in 2005. The Tamils must demonstrate a strong commitment to cease fires and hold to them. The issue of ethnic minorities must also be confronted. Currently, Tamil minorities under the Sri Lankan government are required to carry multiple identification papers and are permitted to be interrogated and searched for no reason. Serious consideration should be given to the

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Senanayake, Shimale. “World Briefing – Asia: Sri Lanka: Tamil Rebels Pull Out of Peace Talks.” *The New York Times*. April 21, 2006. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEFEDE153FF932A15757C0A9609C8B63&scp=3&sq=Sri+Lanka&st=ny>

³⁴⁴ “Background Note: Sri Lanka.” *U.S. Department of State*. May 2008. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ “Sri Lanka: Cease-fire is Annulled.” *The New York Times*. January 3, 2008. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E02E1DE1131F930A35752C0A96E9C8B63&scp=9&sq=Sri+Lanka&st=nyt>

³⁵⁰ “Bus Bombings Kill 23 in Sri Lanka.” *The New York Times*. June 7, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/world/asia/07lanka.html?scp=4&sq=Sri+Lanka&st=nyt>

devolution package that was not technically proposed, which would make regional bodies more responsible for government. This could give the LTTE autonomous control over the north and east without forming a separate nation. With the resumption of hostilities, peace is still a long way off.

Conclusion

The UN was founded to be an organization that, amongst other things, maintained peace and security throughout the world. While it has certainly attempted that role as a third party in internal disputes, much is left to be desired of the outcome. The UN continues to be a reactive organization, making it difficult to solve internal disputes. The difficulties of ending disputes illustrated in both the Cypriot and Sri Lankan cases depict the complexities that are involved in ending an internal dispute. The UN's role has been very limited in the Sri Lankan case. If the UN hopes to be successful in both the Sri Lankan case and the Cypriot case, it must reform its current practices of ending internal disputes.

Committee Directive

It is clear based on the lack of success in conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, Cyprus and more generally with the United Nations that some sort of reform is necessary to make third party intervention a viable option. What can be learned about the Cypriot and Sri Lankan cases? How should the points that were brought up in "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict" be addressed? What were the causes of the ceasefires in Sri Lanka and how can those causes be adopted into a more successful strategy for UN conflict resolution? What caused the cease fires in Sri Lanka to dissolve and how can those situations be avoided in future conflict resolution missions of the United Nations? Delegates should focus on writing a resolution that addresses past actions and proposes new, innovative ideas that could make conflict resolution more successful. Delegates should use case studies like the Sri Lanka case to understand what has been done and what can be done to facilitate such actions. As illustrated in the first portion of this background guide, delegates should consider the implications of short-term and long-term effectiveness and consider strategies that deal with both aspects of a conflict.

Technical Appendix Guide

Topic I: Maintaining Peace and Security Through Reforms to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

"Arms Control Association." <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

The Arms Control Association is a think tank that deals with international security and disarmament issues. This site has articles that might be useful in research. It has especially good resources regarding understanding the NPT, its current status, and implementation.

Bragin, Victor, John Carlson, and Russell Leslie. "Integrated Safeguards: Status and Trends." *The Nonproliferation Review*. Summer 2001. <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/82/82bragin.pdf>

Integrated safeguards are a new type of safeguard created by the IAEA that go above and beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol. This article explains the history of safeguards and discusses the importance for more flexible safeguards. Safeguards are important when discussing the NPT because they are the only means of verifying whether a state is cheating or not. Delegates should know which types of safeguards are implemented in their country.

"De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons: Stepping Back from the Brink." *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*. October 2004. <http://www.ippnw.org/ResourceLibrary/DeAlerting.pdf>

This page contains a two page summary on de-alerting, discussing what it is and the various reasons it is important. While de-alerting is not specifically discussed in the background guide, it is a very important concept in understanding ways to make progress on Article VI of the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states should understand de-alerting and utilize its importance in the discussion. Nuclear weapon states should understand what their nation's position on de-alerting is and why they can or cannot de-alert their nuclear weapons.

Du Preez, Jean. "The Role of Security Assurances: Is Any Progress Possible?" *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. April 2004. http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_45a.html.

This article explains the history and current implications of security assurances (both positive and negative). Security assurances are another form of security that the NPT could provide to ensure compliance and discourage cheating. Non-nuclear weapon states should especially pay close attention to

negative security assurances and why it would or would not be important to their country. Nuclear weapon states should carefully review this document and determine their position regarding security assurances. Some nuclear weapon states are very likely to give them, while others are not so forthcoming.

“James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.” <http://www.cns.miis.edu/>

This is the site of the largest think tank devoted solely to the issue of nuclear weapons disarmament. Delegates can search this website and find information about their countries, disarmament treaties, and other information pertaining to nuclear weapons and disarmament.

“Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security.” *International Atomic Energy Agency*. May 2005. <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/nuke.pdf>

This article explains what safeguards are, why they are important, and how the IAEA functions with safeguards. It should give delegates a good overview of the whole safeguard system. Do not use the information at the end of this report to determine safeguard status as it is out of date. Please see the other source I provide in this document for that information.

“Nuclear Threat Initiative.” <http://www.nti.org/>

This site has a plethora of information about countries, their nuclear policies, and just about any sort of information about nuclear weapons disarmament. On the left portion of the page, the site maintains country profiles of states that have or had a significant history with weapons of mass destruction. If there is a particular topic in the guide or in the TAG that needs further research, the search engine on this site is very helpful.

“Safeguards Current Status.” *International Atomic Energy Agency*. May 30, 2008. http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sir_table.pdf

This page is a list of the safeguard agreements between the IAEA and its member states. Please note that all safeguards with the exception of INFCIRC 66 (Israel, India, and Pakistan) are comprehensive safeguard agreements. States are only implementing safeguards that are labeled “in force.” If it is not in force, then that safeguard agreement is not in place. This list does not include states that are implementing the integrated safeguards, which can be found on the IAEA website. Delegates should take note of what their country’s safeguard status is to understand their position regarding safeguards in the debate of the NPT.

“The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.” *Reaching Critical Will*. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nptindex1.html>

This page contains links to the documents from various NPT prep conferences and review conferences. Specifically pay close attention to the 13 point action plan that was released in the 2000 review conference and the events that occurred at the 2005 review conference. The review conferences are held every 5 years to determine the effectiveness and implementation of the NPT. The 13 point action plan as well as the 2005 conference make a great starting point for dealing with some of the major questions presented in the committee directive (especially with how non-nuclear weapon states should deal with the nuclear weapon states).

Topic II: Reforming Peacekeeping Forces: Combating Cultural and Regional Barriers

De Brito, Miguel. (1997). “The Relationship Between Peacekeepers, Host Governments and the Local Population.” <http://www.iss.co.za/Monographs/No10/DeBrito.html>.

The rights of peacekeepers is an important element to peacekeeping reform. Understanding their role and the guidelines that they must follow during peacekeeping operations is essential to the topic of peacekeeping reform. This article outlines the various circumstances related to peacekeepers on a case to case basis. It analyzes the relationship that peacekeepers have with civilians, military, police and the local government while also focusing on the legal and political aspects of such missions. The author concludes that there are no pre-set rules governing the relationship between peacekeepers and the parties involved in conflict, but that there is an overriding need for good will to ensure the success of peacekeeping missions.

Lyman, Princeton N. (2005). “MONUC: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform.” Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7881/monuc.html>.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) is an excellent case study that can be used to highlight the need for peacekeeping reform. This particular article regarding

MONUC discusses the various scandals surrounding this peacekeeping mission including charges of sexual abuse. The MONUC case study is an excellent example of a failed United Nations peacekeeping mission and can be used to illustrate what peacekeepers should and should not be allowed to do during missions. The author outlines the role of the United Nations and emphasizes that peacekeeping reform is essential for peace and stability in the world.

“Peacekeeping Reform.” Global Policy Reform.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/index.htm>

This document provides an excellent place to find work that the United Nations has already accomplished on peacekeeping reform. It includes information regarding the Brahimi Report, NGO recommendations, and various articles and United Nations Documents related to peacekeeping reform. Additionally this document offers information pertaining to troop training and the use of military and civilian police that will be very beneficial to debate on this topic.

Rubin, Michael. “Sending in the Peacekeepers is a Fool’s Game.” *New York Daily News*. 2006. <http://www.meforum.org/article/979>.

This somewhat controversial article highlights the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. The Middle East can be used as a case study for the length of peacekeeping operations and this article illustrates that despite many unsuccessful attempts at peace, the United Nations continues to deploy valuable resources to that region. This source is valuable because it offers a dissenting opinion of peacekeeping operations.

Stimson. “Regional Actors in Peace Operations.” <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP20050614847>.

Stimson offers several articles related to the incorporation of regional actors in peacekeeping operations. In particular this resource spotlights Africa and how regional bodies could offer a better solution to their ongoing peace struggles. By discussing current African peace operations, this source looks to regional alternatives and outlines their possible effectiveness.

“Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships.”

http://www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/Veroeffentlichungen/CIC_ZIF_Conference_Report_06_08.pdf.

This article focuses on the African continent and the successes and failures of peace missions since the 1990’s. More importantly, it encompasses many ideas related to regional actors and how their partnerships can better peacekeeping operations. The document outlines the important issue that while peacekeeping operations have been widely used, they can not continue to be the international community’s sole response to conflict situations. This document is an excellent source of current information as it often refers to the 2008 annual review distributed by the United Nations Peacekeeping Department.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.” http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf.

This document, known as the Capstone Doctrine, is one of the most recent resources developed on this topic. Various parts of information from this document were referenced in the background guide however the complexity and comprehensiveness of this document highlights many key issues of peacekeeping reform. The Capstone Doctrine was designed to create a framework for peacekeeping operations that would include the planning and implementing these missions along with human resources management and a timeline for exiting. This document can be very useful in understanding work that the United Nations Peacekeeping Department has already accomplished on peacekeeping reform and offer ideas for further reform debate.

“United Nations Peacekeeping.” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>.

While this source was referenced several times throughout the background guide, it is vital to the success of your research. This website outlines past and current peacekeeping missions and their mandates. It further details the strengths and weaknesses of peacekeeping operations and gives the reader a comprehensive overview of peacekeeping operations. This website should be referenced in an attempt to know what work has already been accomplished on this topic and to generate ideas for new debate. It is an extremely important source of information.

Topic III: Ending Internal Disputes for a Peaceful Future

“Cyprus.” *International Crisis Group*. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3996&l=1>

The International Crisis Group provides an excellent account of the Cyprus conflict if delegates need more information. Each article includes an executive summary (which is recommended if one is short on time) and includes recommendations as to how certain aspects of the conflict can be solved. Delegates can use this as a starting point for answering questions posed in the committee directive.

Baharvar, David. “Beyond Mediation: The Integral Role of Non-Governmental Approaches to Resolving Protracted Ethnic Conflicts in Lesser-Developed Countries.” *The Online Journal for Peace and Conflict Resolution*. Summer 2001.

This article begins by describing the limitations of states in conflict resolution. It then shifts the discussion to ways in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can fill in that gap to make conflict resolution more likely and effective. The article concludes with a discussion of the potential problems that NGO participation in conflict resolution may have. Delegates should consider the role of NGOs when thinking of creative and different solutions to the issues in the background guide.

“General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.” *Reaching Critical Will*. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html>

This page contains links to information regarding past events in previous General Assembly First Committee Sessions. Delegates should consult this to understand what actions have been taken in the past and what options are available to deal with these issues. Generally, the First Committee has many resolutions that recur every year, making past action in this committee potentially more valuable than in others.

Lobel, Jules and Michael Ratner. "Humanitarian Military Intervention." *Foreign Policy in Focus*. January 2000. Volume 5, Issue 1. <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n01hmi.html>

This article specifically discusses humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is often the justification third-party actors use to intervene in a conflict. This article discusses those issues in relation to Clinton's military intervention in Yugoslavia. Delegates should carefully consider the role of humanitarian intervention and determine whether it should be treated in the same manner as other types of intervention.

Rioux, Jean-Sebastien. "Third Party Intervention as Conflict Intervention: The Case of Africa." September 2003. http://www.institutidrp.org/contributionsidrp/Rioux_7octobre2003.pdf

This article goes far beyond what the background guide does in describing third-party intervention. Using examples of conflicts in Africa, it gives the reader a better understanding of why third-parties intervene and what the effects of such intervention could be. It also discusses the different types of third party intervention. Delegates should understand these types to evaluate whether different standards should be used for different types of intervention. This article would be very helpful in that purpose.

"Sri Lanka." *International Crisis Group*. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4459&l=1>

The International Crisis Group provides an excellent account of the Sri Lanka conflict if delegates need more information. Each article includes an executive summary (which is recommended if one is short on time) and includes recommendations as to how certain aspects of the conflict can be solved. Delegates can use this as a starting point for answering questions posed in the committee directive.

Tanner, Fred. "Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution: Limits of Multilateralism." *International Review of the Red Cross*. March 9, 2000. <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQ2>

This article begins by evaluating current United Nations efforts in conflict prevention. It then discusses the potential roles of various actors including the United Nations, regional organizations, states, and non-governmental organizations in conflict prevention. This article is very pertinent to the issue raised in the guide about the effectiveness of United Nations intervention.

Vayrynen, Raimo. "Is There a Role for the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 189-196.

This article is a discussion about the United Nations' role in conflict resolution. This article is a great resource to understand the UN's role in ending internal disputes and get an idea of what actions can and should be taken regarding the issue.